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Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to understand the Neutrality Debate, 
in the light of two basic distinctions: a distinction between 
political philosophy and politics, and a distinction between 
three different views of political philosophizing, which I 
call foundationalism, explanationism and interpretivism.
According to foundationalism, the political philosopher 
starts with an account of what is essentially human and 
deduces from it moral/political principles, which should 
govern every human society. According to explanationism, the 
political philosopher seeks to understand a particular society 
(e.g. the Western state) sub specie aeternitatis. i.e. as an 
immutable, autonomous, self-sufficient world of ideas. 
Similarly, interpretivism focuses on a particular society 
(e.g. the Western state) , but understands it as an ever- 
changing world of shared conceptions, understandings and self­
perceptions, which are unearthed by the political philosopher. 
Of the three meta-theories only foundationalism and 
interpretivism are normative (regulative), whereas 
explanationism is an intellectual exercise.
What is commonly known as "state neutrality" is actually 
three different philosophical positions each corresponding to 
a different one of the three meta-theories. Given that each 
one of these three state neutralities makes different 
epistemological assumptions, their combination into a single 
(meta-theoretically mixed) argument with the intention of 
making state neutrality more attractive to a wider audience is 
flawed from a philosophical point of view. Such an argument is 
"political" in that it seeks to persuade rather than to 
demonstrate philosophical truth.
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Preface
The idea of state neutrality is an answer to the question of 
what should be the moral authority and responsibility of the 
state. State neutrality holds that the state should be 
"neutral" towards the different conceptions of the good that 
its citizens hold. According to many of its advocates, state 
neutrality is a philosophical position, an implication of 
philosophical truth.
There are two problems with this view. First, as I argue 
in Chapter 1, "neutrality" is a semantically overloaded term, 
a term that is better suited to politics than to philosophy. 
I, therefore, propose to replace it with "state constraint". 
Second, there is no single view of philosophical engagement 
and of the nature of philosophical truth. In Part I, I present 
three different views of political philosophizing. One which 
is universalist, essentialist and normative in character 
(foundationalism), one which is particularist, non- 
essentialist and normative (interpretivism) and one which is 
particularist, essentialist, but non-normative 
(explanationism). Given that each one of these views makes 
different epistemological assumptions, the philosopher cannot 
combine them together without becoming a politician, i.e. 
someone who speaks the language of persuasion rather than that 
of demonstration. It is quite clear that, despite their 
claims, neutralists (like their critics) have, indeed, put 
forward meta-theoretically mixed arguments. In Part II, I 
present state constraint as two distinct, meta-theoretically
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undiluted positions: foundationalist state constraint and
interpetivist state constraint. Being non-normative, 
explanationist state constraint is left out of Part II, as 
well as of Part III, where I focus on the much politicized 
neutrality debate, which is, of course, a normative debate. I 
leave for Part IV the explanationist neutrality of Michael 
Oakeshott, which, I argue, cannot and should not be implicated 
in the neutrality debate.
Throughout Parts II and III, I refrain from using the 
term "liberalism" or "liberal state", so as to avoid 
unnecessary confusion. The term is introduced only in Part 
III, where it is identified with a particular institutional 
arrangement, one which both interpretivist and foundationalist 
neutralists endorse.
A final point concerning the notes made on the text. 
Footnotes are reserved for explanatory comments and endnotes 
for bibliographical references.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: 
The Contextuality of "Neutrality"
The terms "neutrality" and "neutral" appear in a number of 
different contexts and have acquired many different meanings. 
Hence, before one enters a discussion on the issue of "state 
neutrality", one is tempted to embark on a semantic 
exploration. And yet most of those authors who are involved in 
such a discussion usually assume either that there is a single 
context-independent sense of "neutrality", which we all share 
and understand, or that such a sense can be determined through 
a method of induction.®
The main point I want to make in this introductory 
chapter is that although there are two broad, independent 
meanings of "neutrality" in the English language, they are not 
specific enough to be independent of all particular contexts 
within which "neutrality" appears. In fact both of these 
meanings are so broad as to require further, context-
“Only Alan Montefiore, in Neutrality and Impartiality 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980), pp. 8-22, and 
Jeremy Waldron, in "Legislation and Moral Neutrality", in R. 
Goodin (ed.), Liberal Neutrality (Routledge: London, 1989), 
pp. 63-69, offer semantic investigations of "neutrality" 
independent of the question of "state neutrality". Authors 
like Joseph Raz, John Rawls, William Galston and Richard 
Arneson examine only the semantic ramifications of "state 
neutrality", although the first two are clearly influenced by 
Montefiore's account on "neutrality".
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dependent, specification. According to the first meaning, 
neutrality involves "taking neither side in a dispute, 
disagreement or difference of opinion"1 and according to the 
second one, it means lacking those characteristics which are 
used to place something or someone in one or more (implied or 
explicitly specified) classes or varieties. Neutrality in the 
former sense is intentional and causal whereas in the latter 
sense it is not.
Both of these broad meanings raise questions which are to 
be answered within the particular context in which the term is 
applied. With regard to the first meaning, what has to be 
specified is, first, the identity and nature of the neutral 
party (i.e. whether it is a person, a state, a group, an 
institution, an official etc.), second, the identity and 
nature of the conflicting parties, third, the nature of the 
conflict (i.e. whether it is a game, a debate, an armed 
conflict), fourth, the way the conflicting parties are treated 
by the neutral party and, fifth, the reason why the neutral 
party is neutral. The last two parameters are clearly 
dependent on the other three. In other words, they are to be 
determined within the particular context. As Alan Montefiore 
notes in his introduction to Neutrality and Impartiality, the 
neutrality of a referee in a game of football is different 
from the neutrality of the judge as it is different from the 
neutrality of a nation not participating in a war between 
other nations.2
The second meaning of "neutrality" raises a rather 
different question, namely, "What are the characteristics used
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to classify non-neutral things (that is, characteristics which 
the neuter— that which is neutral— lacks)?" or, to put it 
differently, "In what sense is the neuter incommensurate?". In 
one particular context, namely in science, "neutrality" is the 
absence of certain specified characteristics (e.g. having the 
properties neither of an acid nor of a base) or being at an
equilibrium (e.g. lying at the point where the forces of
extension and compression meet and offset each other). In 
biology "neutrality" is the condition of belonging to neither 
sex. In literature and in everyday language it features as a 
descriptive term; the neutral object is thought to be lacking 
any distinctive characteristics, to be colourless or 
expressionless.
In his discussion of "neutrality" Alan Montefiore
overlooks this second meaning and concentrates on "neutrality 
as taking neither side in a dispute". Although he acknowledges 
the fact that there are different, context-specific meanings 
of neutrality, his main objective is to find a definite,
context-independent answer to the question of how the neutral 
party treats the conflicting sides. In his view there are two 
possible answers: it either assists them (or hinders them) to 
an equal degree, or it refrains from giving any help (or 
hinderance) to either of them. Montefiore rejects the latter 
answer because, as he puts it, "... it is a necessary condition 
for the concept of neutrality to have any genuine application 
that it should be open to the potential neutral to choose 
whether or not to exercise an influence on the situation of 
conflict."3
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This point deserves some clarification. Montefiore does 
not distinguish between two further, secondary meanings of 
"neutrality". After all, refraining from giving any help (or 
hindrance) to either side is helping (or hindering) both of 
them to the same degree. Rather, Montefiore's point is that if 
one's position makes one's involvement in the conflict 
impossible, "neutrality" is not the proper word to 
characterise one's position in relation to the conflict.b But 
surely, this point is conveyed by the term "refraining from 
giving help or assistance". Refraining from doing something 
means having the ability to do it, but choosing not to. This 
notion of self-restraint is, I believe, implicit in the 
intentional/causal meaning of "neutrality".
Although flawed and inconclusive, Montefiore's argument 
is rather .illuminating. Having defined neutral conduct as 
"assisting or hindering to an equal degree", he avers that 
there is a serious problem with this definition: Equal
assistance or hindrance may lead to "...strange, counter­
intuitive situations in which 'neutrality' is not the word 
that springs to mind."4 As an example Montefiore uses the case 
of two children, each appealing to their father to intervene 
with his support in a dispute between them. If their father 
gives equal support to both of them, the older, stronger and 
more resourceful one is bound to come out on top. For 
Montefiore this is hardly in accordance with our "intuitive"
bFor example, the fact that Ireland is very far from both 
Peru and Ecuador and maintains very few or no links with them, 
does not make it neutral in the recent conflict between them. 
"Indifference" and "detachment" would be better 
characterizations of its position.
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understanding of "neutrality". But, in truth, it is not in 
accordance with our understanding of "parenthood". 
"Neutrality" is not a term which we normally use in connection 
with family relations and, hence if it is to be brought into 
this context it has to be given a special meaning; it has to 
be redefined. In international relations one would hardly ever 
claim that the neutral should assist the weaker side so as to 
even up the odds of its being victorious.0 This clearly means 
that the meaning of "neutral treatment" is context-specific.
Montefiore overlooks this point and suggests that the 
problem can be bypassed if we regard neutrality as an option 
only when there is no clear basis for distinguishing between 
the initial balances of strength and weaknesses of the 
parties. He, however, quickly acknowledges that the whole 
thing would then become "dependent on a...complicated 
subjective order."5 He then briefly considers the claim that 
"there is no coherent application of neutrality at all" only 
to reject it on the grounds that "there are various forms of 
legal and 'technical neutrality' and certain available 
conditions of neutrality" which are apparently used all around 
the world.6 But instead of drawing from this very fact the
cIt could be argued that this is no longer the case. In 
the on-going Yugoslav wars it has been argued that the UN 
should intervene militarily to even up the odds between the 
stronger side and the weaker side. This means that even within 
particular contexts one cannot talk of a single meaning of 
"neutral course of action". As I will claim later on, this is 
enough reason for us to avoid the use of "neutrality" in the 
debate about the moral authority and responsibility of the 
state. If, however, for some reason, "neutrality" cannot be 
abandoned (which is actually the case since the term features 
in most of the recent literature) , then its contextuality 
should be emphasized.
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conclusion that "neutrality" is context-specific, he takes it 
as an indication that he should continue his search for a 
single, independent meaning.
One of the most crucial points made by Montefiore is that 
". . .the adoption of neutrality may very well work in favour of 
one party to the conflict or to the detriment of another...so 
long as the neutral does not choose to be neutral in order to 
favour one side."7 This point contradicts his view on parental 
neutrality, i.e. neutrality as evening up the odds of each 
side's winning the contest, but he brushes this difficulty 
aside. What he now means to say, is that if the neutral knows 
that action A will have as a consequence (and not as the 
intended outcome) action B which will favour one side to the 
conflict over another, and if he still chooses to follow 
action A for reasons other than favouring any one side, then 
he does not lose his neutral status.
As it is usually the case, the basis on which such 
choices are made is self-interest. Can the neutral party 
unintentionally (but knowingly) favour one side to the 
conflict in pursuit of its own interests? Can a particular 
state, for instance, maintain its trade links with another 
state involved in a war without losing its neutral status? No 
straightforward answer is possible. In the second World War 
Germany tolerated American assistance to Britain and the USSR 
(before December 1941) so as to avoid drawing the US into the 
war. Germany recognised the US as neutral because it could not 
afford to do otherwise. This suggests that neutral, at least 
in international relations, is the side which is accepted as
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such, the side which one or more of the adversaries is not 
prepared to draw, or not interested in drawing, into the 
conflict.d
A different position is put forward by Joseph Raz who 
distinguishes between narrow neutrality, according to which 
the neutral nation is neutral only in those activities and 
regarding those resources which the adversaries would wish 
neither to engage in nor to acquire but for the conflict, and 
comprehensive neutrality, according to which the neutral 
nation is neutral in all matters including those which are 
unrelated to the conflict.8 Implicit here are, first, the view 
that neutrality does not depend on acceptability and, second, 
the view that the potential neutral side cannot use its self- 
interest as an excuse for unintentionally favouring one side 
over the others.
Now, even if we accept that the neutral party's self- 
interest does not warrant actions whose (unintended) 
consequences favour one side to the conflict over another, 
there may be other grounds on which such actions are 
warranted. There may be a set of rules or principles which the 
neutral party subscribes to or abides by and which regulate 
either the activities of the neutral party alone, or the
dEven the concept of neutrality found in Public 
International Law is determined by the interests of the 
different parties and can, therefore, be understood as 
"accepted neutrality". In the Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (North-Holland Publishing Company: 
Amsterdam, 1982), s.v. "neutrality, concept and general 
rules", it is stated that "the laws of neutrality constitute 
a compromise between the conflicting interests of the 
belligerents and the neutral State. Their content thus depends 
on the power relationship between the two."
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conflict as a whole. If the latter is the case, then those 
consequences of the neutral party's actions that have an 
unequal effect on the adversaries are not in conflict with 
that party's neutral status or in breach of its neutrality. To 
use an example, if by penalising one team a football referee 
brings about its defeat (an unintended consequence since the 
referee's job is to apply the rules of the game and make sure 
the opponents subscribe to them) , he does not cease to be 
neutral. Similarly the judge who rules for one litigant does 
not contradict his neutral position although, unlike the 
referee, he is not only abiding by rules but making rules. In 
this case the dispute is concerned with the administration of
something much more abstract than a set of game rules.
However, both cases have a common, very important feature: the 
neuter is not merely restrained (i.e. choosing not to enter 
the fray or to act in ways that would draw him into the 
conflict) , but "constrained" by a set of rules or a moral 
order whose authority is acknowledged.
It is important to note that in both examples (and in
most, if not all, examples that could be mustered) the neutral 
party can never take part in the conflict in the same way or 
on the same terms as the adversaries. Unlike the nation which 
chooses to remain neutral in a conflict between other nations, 
the judge or the referee can fail to perform adequately, but 
can never enter the conflict. This means that their neutrality 
(and the neutrality of the rules or principles they help to 
administer) is also descriptive (what I have called the second 
broad meaning of neutrality) in that it connotes the lack of
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those characteristics which would make them potential sides to 
the conflict (e.g. football teams or litigants).
Now, what happens if instead of regulating the conflict 
(and dictating the role of the neutral) , the rules or 
principles govern only the actions of the neutral party. What 
if the latter although committed to neutrality, has to abide 
by principles dictating actions whose (unintended)
consequences favour a particular side to the conflict? Does 
its conduct qualify as "neutral"?
In such a situation the neutral party would not play a
specified role within the conflict and would not be considered
as internal to it. Consider the following example: Britain 
declares its neutrality in the Yugoslav wars but adheres to 
pacifism and regards the maltreatment of civilians and PoWs as 
an evil. It, therefore, dispatches a peace-keeping force to 
the area seeking to minimize the conflict and to protect, to 
the extent that this is possible, the lives of non-combatants. 
In doing so it occasionally has to obstruct the military
operations of one side and castigate its methods. This, 
however, does not mean that it sides with the opposing sides 
or that it wishes a particular outcome to the conflict. The 
question that arises here is whether this kind of limited 
intervention is justifiable to the warring sides and, if not, 
whether it contradicts Britain's declared neutrality.6
60ne could argue that since the intervention is authorized 
by the UN, this is a case similar to that of the referee. 
Nevertheless, the "game" of war is notoriously difficult to 
regulate and the authority and reputation of the UN as a 
referee are questionable. For this reason one might argue that 
Britain's role is dictated by its strategic and economic 
interests rather than by any principles or rules. The use of
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A possible answer is that the reason why Britain or the 
UN have the right to limited intervention is that the sides to 
the conflict do themselves appreciate (sometimes openly as 
their leaders are quoted saying that they deplore the evils of 
war) of the values of peace and immunity for non-combatants 
and by acting against them they implicitly acknowledge that 
they are in the wrong. An alternative answer is that by 
committing atrocities and expanding the war, the warring 
factions violate what is essentially human and, therefore, any 
intervention intended to control such activities is warranted. 
What is implicit in both answers is the view that neutrality 
is compatible with limited intervention whose purpose (and 
result) is not the defeat of a particular side to the 
conflict.
These or similar arguments are often made in connection 
with Britain's role in the Yugoslav wars, but are always 
combined with arguments about Britain's national interests 
(about the cost of intervention, its relation to economic and 
strategic interests etc.), about efficiency (whether 
intervention has actually achieved better conditions for non- 
combatants and prevented the war from spreading elsewhere), 
and about national prestige. It, therefore, seems that those 
values which warrant neutral intervention are hardly the only 
ones that are taken into consideration and this undoubtedly 
makes the case for neutrality rather weak. If there are values 
or principles which are neutral in the "second broad sense" of
"neutrality" in this case is, therefore, quite problematic.
17
the word (i.e. if they lack those characteristics which would 
make them particularly Muslim, Serb, Croat or British— and 
certainly a, however qualified, pacifism and the principle of 
non-combatant immunity are such values), it seems that they 
should not be combined with the vested interests of any one 
side. In the actual world of politics and international 
relations this is virtually impossible. Values and principles 
are always attached to particular vested interests and are 
used in order to persuade and justify rather than because they 
are the only true bases for action. It follows that even 
within this particular context, it is very difficult to put 
forward a clear definition of neutrality. The tendency will be 
to regard as neutral the side which is accepted as such by all 
the sides to the conflict.
"Neutrality11 has recently been introduced into moral/political 
philosophy and is used in connection with the issue of the 
moral authority and responsibility of the state. The latter is 
considered to be "neutral" because it is governed by a 
"neutral" morality (in the second broad sense of "neutral") 
and because it is not supposed to take action so as to 
intentionally promote particular "conceptions of the good"f or 
moral outlooks over others (i.e. because it is neutral in the 
second broad sense of the word).
One might think that since philosophy, unlike politics
fThe term "conception of the good" will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. For the purposes of this preliminary discussion, it 
suffices to say that particular values (moral as well as 
aesthetic) and any considerations which may be thought to have 
moral implications are included.
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and international relations, is not about mustering as many 
disparate arguments as possible in order to persuade people of 
the wisdom and desirability of various policies and actions, 
but seeks to discover the truth and prove what its 
implications are,g it is more likely to have a coherent notion 
of neutrality. However, the case is that "neutrality" has 
brought into political philosophy the extra luggage it 
acquired in various other contexts and especially in politics 
and international affairs. Since in these contexts neutrality 
is usually regarded as a means to achieving a desired end, 
many commentators started to evaluate the "state neutrality" 
on the basis of what they regard as desired ends. In 
international relations there are those who think of 
neutrality as profitable or convenient, those who think of it 
as a contribution to world peace (which is itself regarded as 
a good) , those who take it to be the opposite of "justice" or 
of "fighting for what one believes is right" (and, therefore, 
a bad) and those who regard it as a synonym for 
"isolationism", as the lack of the power and/or willingness to 
influence others. Similar weaknesses and advantages were, 
therefore, attributed to "state neutrality".
Others are not very clear about what exactly 
distinguishes the "neutral morality" governing the 
institutional structure of the state from all other moral 
outlooks and makes it incommensurate with them. They are not, 
in other words, sure in what sense the state is neutral in the
8These implications, as we shall see, can be both 
normative (prescriptive) in character and non-normative.
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second broad sense of "neutrality". Some of the advocates of 
neutrality do themselves add to this confusion by claiming 
that the neutral state is not governed by a "neutral morality" 
but by what is not a moral conception at all.9 In other words, 
"state neutrality" is equated to "moral neutrality", an idea 
which was always bound to draw many critics.
To dispel misconceptions of the latter kind one should 
emphasize that the neutral institutional structure is indeed 
governed by a conception of the good, although by one which is 
incommensurate with other conceptions since it is a higher- 
orderh moral outlook. After all, as many authors have pointed 
out, it would be impossible for it to be an a-moral (or 
morally irrelevant) conception of the good since the very idea 
of having such a conception is absurd.
Another way of dissipating this kind of misunderstanding 
is by discarding the term "neutrality". This is an option 
which should be given serious consideration especially since 
it would be the only way of dealing with the other problem 
mentioned above, namely the projection of meanings and 
connotations of "neutrality" acquired in politics and 
international affairs on to political philosophy. The 
"neutrality" which the political philosopher has in mind is 
not a policy or a course of action whose effectiveness in 
achieving particular ends can be argued about. It is an 
implication of philosophical truth. There may be various,
hOne could just as well use the term "lower order 
morality" to make the same point, namely that the neutral 
morality is a morality of a different order and that it is 
incommensurate with the various conflicting conceptions of the 
good.
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disparate bases of evaluation of neutrality qua policy, but 
the philosopher's notion of neutrality is defined by the 
theory itself and is not open to the scrutiny of the non­
philosopher. If this point is too hard for some to accept, and 
I believe that this is the case, then "neutrality" should be 
replaced with a less problematic term.
In Part II of this thesis I will replace "state 
neutrality" with "state constraint" ("constraint" being, as I 
have explained, an implication of the first broad sense of 
"neutrality") in order to avoid any misinterpretations of the 
neutralist position. In Chapter 6, I re-introduce "neutrality" 
for the simple reason that it features in virtually all of the 
arguments that appear in the literature which I examine there. 
"Neutrality" is then used as a stage-piece without affecting 
the content of the neutralist position.
I have mentioned that state neutrality is an implication of 
philosophical truth. The problem, however, is that there is no 
single view of the nature of philosophical truth. In the next 
chapter I distinguish between three such meta-theoretical 
views and go on to say that what is widely referred to as 
"state neutrality" are actually three different, 
incommensurate positions, each corresponding to a different 
view of philosophical truth. This means that the contextuality 
of neutrality has to be accounted for even within the context 
of political philosophy.
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Part I: A Meta-Theoretical Distinction
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CHAPTER 2
Three Views of Political Philosophizing
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the main difference 
between a political and a philosophical argument is that the 
former seeks to persuade (i.e. to make others accept something 
as true or false, good or bad, advantageous or harmful, 
feasible or impossible etc. and perhaps even to cause them to 
follow particular courses of action) whereas the latter seeks 
to prove. It follows that a successful political argument is 
one that is received well by the audience (the particular 
audience to which it is addressed) whereas the good 
philosophical argument is that which arrives at the moral and 
the political truth and/or its implications and is independent 
of any notion of acceptability. The nature of the truth is 
defined by what one might call "a meta-theory11, "a philosophy 
of political philosophy" or "a view of political 
philosophizing".
My aim in the present chapter is to distinguish between 
three different views of political philosophizing: 
foundationalism, explanationism and interpretivism. My 
starting-point is Plato's illustration of the philosopher's 
engagement in what is known as the Story of the Cave.1 The 
imagery of the story alludes to the main issues that underlie 
all three views of philosophizing and helps to elucidate the
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epistemological differences between them.
2.1 Foundationalism
In Plato's Story of the Cave, a number of men are chained 
inside a cave, facing a blank wall, with a fire burning behind 
them, obstructing the entrance to the cave. These people do 
not see the light of day and know the world only by the moving 
shadows it casts on the wall before them. Being in this 
condition all their lives, they are bound to believe that the 
shadows are real objects and that they are the whole truth of 
the world. When one of them is released from his bonds, he 
goes beyond the burning fire, leaves the cave and discovers 
the real world illuminated by the sunlight. He later returns 
and attempts to convince his former companions that what they 
see on the wall of their cave are but vague reflections of 
reality.
Without following very closely Plato's explanation of the 
symbolism in the story, I would say that the cave, with its 
chained residents and simulacra of the "real world" is a 
community, a particular socio-political entity with its own 
practices, institutions, moral and aesthetic values, while the 
escapee is the philosopher who by leaving the cave abandons 
the conventional (common) ways of thinking about and doing 
things. It is this distancing, or withdrawal from "practice" 
(meaning "convention") that is associated with philosophizing, 
that is, with the discovery of Ideas (or Forms) of which 
social meanings, common values and beliefs are incomplete 
understandings. An Idea, therefore, in this view, is complete
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and autonomous, it has an "independent existence".” This does 
not hold for its simulacra in the world of practice and 
convention. Human nature can have its particular social 
meanings and can be embedded in custom and convention, but the 
Idea of human nature is independent of such things and the 
Platonic philosopher who "sees"b the Idea is able to define 
justice as an independent, universal concept.
The Idea of human nature comprises a number of essential 
characteristics which can be known philosophically or, to use 
the imagery of the Story of the Cave, can be discovered 
outside the cave. Human nature should not be identified with 
the condition of the members of any particular community, but, 
as Raymond Plant puts it, should be considered "...against a 
general metaphysical background which relates to the place of 
human life and agency in the natural order and to an account 
of the fundamental purposes and drives of human beings."2 The 
Platonic account of human nature comprises three different 
faculties, namely appetite, spirit and reason.
Returning to the explanation of the symbolism in the 
Story of the Cave, what has not yet been made clear is the 
role of the freed, disillusioned prisoner after his return to 
the cave. Is his acquired knowledge of any use to his former 
companions? Can it be used in tackling their practical
“For Plato only the Ideas are without qualification. The 
objects of our sensory experience are described as just, 
moral, beautiful, large etc. in comparison with something 
else.
b"Idea" stems from the Greek verb idein which refers to 
the act of "seeing", but here it means mental rather than 
physical perception.
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problems or is it knowledge of a world that very little 
resembles their own and can, therefore, have no effect on 
their lives?
According to one meta-theoretical view, philosophical 
knowledge, knowledge of human nature or of the essences, 
enables us to formulate normative (regulative) principles, 
i.e. evaluative prescriptive rules, which could govern the 
institutional structure of society or even provide its members 
with moral guidance in their private lives and/or dictate to 
them a particular lifestyle. Such principles are founded on 
knowledge of the essences and are, therefore, derived from, or 
rather dictated by, them. This point is made by Christopher 
Berry who states that
[t]he concept of human nature provides a criterion 
for acting or not acting in the world. This means 
that the conceptual context within which the facts 
of human nature are identified is oriented towards 
practice. Such facts establish a context within 
which it is possible to identify what is appropriate 
for humans to do...this factual establishment of 
what is appropriate is thus also the establishment 
of a context of normative significance. However, 
there is here just one context. It is not a question 
of having the facts of human nature on one side and 
the values or norms on the other, but rather that 
the facts and values are best understood as dual 
elements, like the warp and weft of fabric, that 
constitute a conceptual whole.3
This view is explicitly stated in Platonic philosophy. Unlike 
Aristotle, Plato contrasts the principles0 that derive from
cFor Plato the principles that derive from his account of 
human nature govern both the institutional structure of 
society and the life of the individual. Given that in 
different individuals different essentially human faculties 
predominate, Plato asserts that different individuals are to
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the essences with endoxa, i.e. with the principles implicit in 
the Ancient Greek political culture.41 The fact that endoxa 
consists of the imperfect copies of these principles or, to 
put it differently, the fact that the moral/political 
principles of any given society are not based on knowledge of 
the Ideas, means that its members do not know the principles 
which sustain human nature and are, therefore, in an awkward 
predicament, the predicament of the chained cave-dwellers. A 
number of actual problems (perceived as such by the members of 
the society themselves) may be associated with, or rather 
caused by this: moral crises, political instability, deep, 
divisive inequalities, coercion and maltreatment of 
individuals or groups etc.. Nevertheless, it should be said 
that the denizens of the cave may not perceive of their 
situation as a predicament. It is only the philosopher who, 
having acquired an independent notion of perfection, perceives 
their situation in this way.
occupy different social positions: those whose appetite is 
dominant should produce, those whose spirit is dominant should 
defend and those who are predominately rational should rule 
[Plato, Republic (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1987), p. 183].
Plato's prescribed arrangements constitute the single, 
immutable notion of justice, and societies are just only to 
the extent that they approximate these arrangements.
dAccording to Aristotle endoxa means "communal beliefs", 
the beliefs that the citizens of the Greek polis actually held 
on moral/political matters; see Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 
(Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1983), p. 40. However, it should be 
emphasized that the term also refers to principles which are 
implicit in practice and are thus only tacitly acknowledged. 
As I will argue later on (see below 5.2) the philosopher 
should not identify endoxa with expressed opinion (which is 
often guided by self-interest). It should also be noted that, 
for Aristotle, endoxa is a particularist, historical 
specification of foundationalist morality (i.e. of the 
universally true good). This is not how I use the term here.
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It is this normative essentialism that I call 
foundationalism. In the history of political thought there are 
quite a few examples of philosophers who found their 
moral/political prescriptions on what they regard as 
essentially human. The Stoics, for example, claim that the 
active material that comprises the whole cosmos. what they 
called "intelligent pneuma". permeates the whole world and in 
human adults achieves its purest and fieriest temper as 
reason. The latter is the crux of the Stoics' account of human 
nature on the basis of which they prescribe the life of 
imperturbability.4 Hobbes and Locke also found their 
prescriptions on what they saw as human nature. The convention 
of a "State of Nature" is meant to show that failure to 
establish a particular social arrangement would compromise 
what is essentially human. Hume, who challenges ethical 
rationalism and avers that communal life and, therefore, 
morality is prescribed by sentiments and more specifically the 
"sentiment of humanity", is actually putting forward his own 
account of human nature on the basis of which he justifies a 
particular institutional arrangement. J.S. Mill proffers an 
account of human nature which comprises "the diversity of 
inward forces" and the capacity to be autonomous. In his view, 
which I will discuss in the next chapter, human nature needs 
to be protected and this is exactly what the main prescriptive 
principle of On Liberty purports to do.
What is implicit in all these differing positions is the 
view that the philosopher withdraws from convention and 
abandons his parochial interests, his loyalties and sympathies
29
in order to capture what is essentially and universally human 
and distinguish it from what is contingent and particular. He 
then deduces principles of conduct which he presents as 
dictates of the essences.
For the person who seeks to persuade a wide, diverse 
audience, a foundationalist argument by itself is not the 
perfect tool. In Berry's words, its "weakeners seems to be its 
definitionism", the fact that, in truth, its starting-point is 
an account of human nature which may not be acceptable to 
all.5 In other words, the politician must anticipate and/or 
accommodate the critics in his audience and this may require 
combining his foundationalist argument with non- 
foundationalist ones, or abandoning his foundationalist 
argument altogether.®
Now, foundationalism is not the only essentialist view of 
political philosophizing. In the next section I will turn to 
a different essentialist meta-theoretical position, which I 
will call explanationism.
eAs Berry puts it in Human Nature (Macmillan: London,
1986), p. 93, "it is because any substantive reading of human 
nature can be challenged that theorists opt for the supposed 
safer ground offered by formalism... The acceptance of this 
formalism means regarding 'human nature' as too flimsy a 
foundation upon which to erect any persuasive or authoritative 
political programme." It is not quite clear what Berry means 
by "formalism". The fact that he attributes it to John Rawls 
(Ibid., p. 90) is not a very strong clue. In my view, it could 
either mean what I will call "an interpretivist position", or 
it could mean a mixed foundationalist/interpretivist position, 
or, again, it could mean some sort of compromise between the 
differing foundationalist positions (a kind of overlapping 
area which is acceptable to all).
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2.2 Explanationism
Unlike foundationalism, which puts forward some account of 
what is essentially human and deduces from it principles that 
should govern every human society, the view of political 
philosophizing I will now examine focuses on a particular 
society with a particular moral/political culture and seeks to 
understand it sub specie aeternitatis. that is, to understand 
it as an autonomous, self-sufficient, immutable world of 
ideas. The chief exponent of this view is Michael Oakeshott.
In his meta-theory Michael Oakeshott takes the view that 
philosophical knowledge does not apply to practice and that it 
cannot be used to regulate or in any way alter the lives of 
the non-philosopher s.f In terms of the imagery of the Story of 
the Cave this means that knowledge acquired outside the cave 
can neither be used to disillusion the chained cave-dwellers 
nor to help them get out of any predicament. This is the first 
fundamental difference between foundationalism and 
explanationism.
In Oakeshott's view, normativism (which includes what I 
have called foundationalism) belongs to the world of practice 
in the sense that it is concerned with the alteration of "what 
is" into an unrealized idea, a "to be".6 What is presupposed 
in this process of purposeful change is, first, that "what is" 
is a transient, mutable fact and, second, that its outcome is
fAlthough Oakeshott is the only self-proclaimed
explanationist, he offers a list of thinkers whom he regards
as fellow explanationists. The list includes Bodin, Hobbes,
Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Hegel; see On Human Conduct
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 243-252.
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subject to "valuation", or, in other words, that it belongs to 
the "world of value".7 The latter is a coherent world of 
thought which has a certain built-in "objectivity". It is this 
objectivity that gives practice a normative element by turning 
"what is to be" into "what ought to be". Philosophical 
knowledge is not, therefore, contrasted with endoxa or with 
practice as convention, as in foundationalism,8 but with 
practice as action, as purposeful change.
Of course, Oakeshott's moral/political philosophy is more 
than a negation of normativism. Like the Platonic view, it is 
explicitly essentialist, but it rejects the universalist 
character of foundationalism. For Oakeshott, the philosopher's 
engagement is the pursuit of what is satisfactory (complete) 
in experience. It stems from a commitment (or propensity) to 
achieve an absolute coherence, to achieve the concrete whole 
that is implied in all experiences. In Oakeshott's own words,
philosophical thought [is] the pursuit, for its own 
sake, of an unlimited unmodified experience, and at 
the same time [it is] a mood, a turn in mind... 
[This is] so difficult and dubious an undertaking, 
leading us so far aside from the ways of ordinary 
thought, that those may be pardoned who prefer the 
embraces of abstraction.8
This view of philosophy as an unconventional way of thinking
gThis point needs some clarification. Foundationalists do 
not hold that foundationalist principles are necessarily 
opposed to the moral/political practices of all societies. 
They claim that in certain cases there are discrepancies 
between the two, but in others there are not. When the latter 
is the case, it is important for the members of society to 
understand that their practices are in accordance with the 
dictates of the universal morality that stems from what is 
essentially human (this, I take it, is Plato's view).
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is quite close to the foundationalist view of philosophy as 
the understanding of something that is already understood in 
practical terms. The subject of philosophical and conventional 
understanding is necessarily the same (e.g. justice, the 
State, the citizen) , but the terms of each "mode of 
understanding" are fundamentally different.
In order to understand Oakeshott's essentialism it is 
important to examine his theory of understanding. According to 
Oakeshottian meta-theory, understanding comes about in stages. 
The first stage, that of "recognition", involves noticing, 
comparing and distinguishing characteristics. The second 
stage, that of "identification", involves grouping together 
characteristics so as to formulate identities. In the third 
stage, such identities are compared with one another in 
accordance with fixed, unquestionable criteria which Oakeshott 
calls "ideal characters".9 Ideal characters facilitate our 
lives by providing fixed points of reference, the "embraces of 
abstraction" mentioned above. The three stages of conditional 
understanding are, therefore, stages of practical thought. 
They are part of action or purposeful change.
To use the imagery of the cave, Oakeshott's ideal 
characters are the moving shadows reflected on the cave's 
walls and the only common points of reference for its 
residents. The cave itself is not a prison, a symbol of the 
human predicament, but a shelter that provides protection from 
the winds of uncertainty.
Of course, the process of understanding does not stop 
with the formulation of the ideal characters. Philosophy is
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the exploration of their conditionality. In other words, 
philosophy starts where practice ends and this means that it 
is both limitless and of no practical use. First, it is 
limitless because it questions the conditionality of the 
unquestioning criteria of practice and can go on questioning 
the new bases of understanding that it establishes. Second, it 
is non-practical because it is of no use to anyone who wants 
to achieve an imagined "to be". Philosophy, in this view, can 
only inspire or provoke new philosophical explorations; it 
cannot provide the basis for action. This differentiation from 
the foundationalist view is the crux of Oakeshottian meta­
theory .
Of course, Oakeshott does not only explain his view of 
the philosopher's engagement, of the philosopher's trade, but 
actually produces philosophical work that is in accordance 
with that view. To use the non-political idiom, he puts his 
theory of theory to work. The man of action can therefore 
deduce a certain methodology leading to Oakeshottian 
philosophizing. But does not this mean that Oakeshott's view, 
which is based on the separation of the practical from the 
philosophical, is flawed? Is Oakeshott refuting his own meta­
theory by consciously trying to produce a non-normative form 
of philosophizing? Is not the production of such a philosophy 
a purposeful task rather than the result of an inclination, a 
propensity to philosophize? The answer is No. Oakeshott's 
meta-theory is not a guide to "how to become a philosopher", 
but a work of philosophy in itself. Oakeshott does not talk 
about what he intends to do or what should be done; he does
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it. He explores the conditionality of "philosophy". The latter 
is taken as an ideal character, but its is an idea that non­
philosophers can only understand conditionally. "Questioning 
the conditionality" of such an idea means finding what is 
essential to it, finding those secondary ideas, its 
postulates, which are exclusively its own and understanding it 
in terms of these. The object of the search and study of 
postulates is to understand the central idea, the ideal 
character, as a coherent, self-sufficient whole, as a world of 
ideas.h
The same is done in On Human Conduct where the position 
of the ideal character to be contemplated is the idea of the 
Western state or "Civitas". Civitas is understood in terms of 
its own postulates, its essential characteristics, so that all 
of them together form an autonomous, self-sufficient whole. 
Oakeshott makes it clear from the start that Civitas is to be 
understood as an autonomous, self-sufficient entity, as an end 
in itself.10 To understand the Western state in this way is to 
move away from practice, to grasp it as an unadulterated idea 
which does not correspond to any historical institutional 
arrangement and can never be realized in the actual world.
The selection of postulates is, of course, one of the 
philosopher's main concerns. Since the postulates are those 
features without which the ideal character would not be a 
world in itself, they should not be in breach of its self-
h0f course, it should be noted that although this does not 
involve an idea of human nature, it certainly involves a 
theory of cognition which is universal. It is this theory that 
provides Oakeshott with the criterion for the selection of 
postulates.
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completeness. In order to make sure that his postulates meet 
this condition, Oakeshott contrasts the ideal character in 
question with other ideal characters. In Experience and Its 
Modes he contrasts Philosophy with History, Science and 
Practice, whereas in On Human Conduct he contrasts Civitas (or 
the Civil Association) with Enterprise Association (or 
"purposeful association") and with Hegel's Burgerliche 
Gesellschaft (or "the economy"). This enables him to 
circumscribe the area under exploration, avoid the overlapping 
of ideal characters and select the proper postulates.
What becomes clear in this discussion is that in 
Oakeshott, as in Plato, the philosopher looks for what is 
essential or necessary to certain distinct, self-sufficient 
ideas. But unlike Plato, who attributes these ideas to a 
different, superior world of formal reason, Oakeshott draws 
from communal life in Western democratic societies. Concepts 
like "philosophy" or "the state" are expressed in words we 
commonly use in our everyday lives. Oakeshott's is, therefore, 
a different kind of essentialism, one that is based on the 
assumption that we can know the essences of the abstractions 
we invent through conventional languages to facilitate our 
lives, that is, the essences of the conceptual tools we use in 
practice.1 And this, of course, makes philosophizing a non-
*It could credibly be argued that Plato himself engages 
in explanationist philosophizing, or rather that there is a 
strong explanationist element in his work. This, however is 
not the point. After all, as I will argue in Chapter 6, 
Oakeshott himself has produced foundationalist and 
interpretivist writings. Rather, the point is that the 
normative, universalist essentialism which is often regarded 
as most characteristic of Plato is distinct from the non- 
normative, particularist essentialism of Oakeshott.
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practical, albeit satisfying, enterprise. To use once again 
the imagery of the Story of the Cave, the philosopher leaves 
the cave not to discover a different world, but to contemplate 
the realities of the cave away from it, to the think of the 
cave as a complete, self-sufficient, immutable world.j
2.3 Interpretivism
So far I have presented two essentialist views of political 
philosophizing: one which is universalist and normative in
character and one which is particularist and non-normative. I 
will now focus on a third view which combines two of the 
characteristics of the other two. Like the first one it is 
normative and like the second one it is particularist. It is 
the particularist element of this third view that will be the 
starting-point of the present discussion. The main idea here 
is that we cannot and, perhaps, should not philosophize about 
the moral and the political without adhering to the values, 
aspirations and ethos of our own particular community. This 
idea may take the form of either of two arguments. First, 
foundationalism, the search for human nature and the immutable 
truths that give it meaning cannot deliver a moral outlook of 
the richness and density that an actual lived-in morality 
exhibits and which is necessary for it to function.
jThis is ultimately the reason why Oakeshott's political 
philosophy is non-normative. Although one could argue that he 
fails to adequately explain why the philosophical mode of 
thinking has no influence on lived life, one cannot claim that 
the explanationist view of the Western state qua immutable, 
autonomous world (i.e. Oakeshott's specifically political 
philosophy) can be achieved or can be a realistic objective. 
(See below 8.1).
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Second, foundationalism fails to grasp the moral and the 
political for these can only be found within a particular 
community, or to use the Platonic fable, inside the home of 
the chained cave-dwellers. This means that their cave is not 
a reflection of the real, inaccessible, immutable world, but 
is itself the only world there is, a world which is under 
constant change as are the shapes of the shadows on its 
walls.k The first point is made by Michael Walzer who avers 
that
We do not have to discover the moral world because 
we have always lived there... No design procedure 
has governed its design, and the result no doubt is 
disorganized and uncertain. It is also very dense: 
the moral world has a lived-in quality, like a home 
occupied by a single family over many generations, 
with unplanned additions here and there, and all the 
available space filled with memory-laden objects and 
artifacts. The whole thing, taken as a whole, lends 
itself less to abstract modelling than to thick 
description. Moral argument in such a setting is 
interpretive in character, closely resembling the 
work of a lawyer or judge who struggles to find 
meaning in a morass of conflicting laws and 
precedents.11
This point against foundationalism gives us a first view of 
this, quite distinct meta-theoretical position: the
philosopher focuses on moral language and practice seeking 
"social meanings", that is, principles, self-perceptions and 
general expectations that are latent in them. He, in other 
words, tries to make sense of the many, sometimes conflicting, 
elements in a living morality, to find the predominant
kThis means that for the interpretivist the shadows in the 
Platonic cave must be those of its denizens and not of the 
pragmata of the outside world.
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meanings. His is, therefore, an interpretive task and this 
view of moral/political philosophy is, quite suitably, called 
11 interpretivism".
The second point against foundationalism is made by 
Benjamin Barber who states that
While a...[foundationalist] question may take the 
form: "what are the true necessities [essences] of 
the world and how do we know them to be so?"...a 
political question takes the form: "what shall we do 
when something has to be done that will affect us 
all and we wish to be reasonable, yet we disagree on 
means and ends and are without independent grounds 
by which we might arbitrate our differences?". This 
formulation makes clear that the real political 
problem is one of action under conditions of 
uncertainty, not of truth or justice in the 
abstract... [T]his viewpoint... eschews metaphysics 
and circumvents issues of final truth or absolute 
morals.12
In this view foundationalism is a "vicious abstractionism" 
that threatens to abolish politics, to do away with the moral 
and political practices through which we understand morally 
relevant conflict in our society and it, therefore, obscures 
the truth.1 The foundationalist offers to solve the problems 
of uncertainty about the requirements of the shared, lived-in 
morality in particular cases by abolishing this morality 
entirely and replacing it with one based on some "absolute 
truth". Walzer makes this same point alluding to the Platonic 
Story of the Cave. As he puts it
‘it should be noted that although Barber attacks 
foundationalism as a meta-theoretical position, he really 
objects to a particular kind of foundationalism (i.e. neo- 
Kantianism) which will be the main focus of the next two 
chapters.
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[the foundationalist] must deny the assurances of 
the commonplace... To what sort of place, then, does 
he withdraw? He constructs for himself...an ideal 
commonwealth, inhabited by beings who have none of
the characteristics and none of the opinions and the
commitments of his former fellow citizens.13
According to this argument, leaving the cave is an attempt to 
abandon the role of the citizen and to view the political 
through the eyes of an a-political being. Once this view has 
been achieved, the return to the cave, or rather, the
application of the acquired knowledge to life in the cave
becomes very problematic. The returning escapee can neither 
see nor understand politics because political life is life 
within a particular social practice which cannot be understood 
in terms other than its own. Foundationalist political 
philosophy is, therefore, flawed in the sense that it fails to 
grasp its own subject.
This meta-theoretical argument in favour of normative 
particularism can also take the form of a political argument 
addressed to the members of Western democratic societies. 
According to this argument, foundationalist philosophizing is 
not only based on false assumptions or leading to erroneous 
conclusions, but is "dangerous" for the Western political 
tradition, for our shared way of life. Barber claims that the 
"assimilation of political judgement to cognition instead of 
action", is thoroughly undemocratic (i.e. contrary to the 
Western, Anglo-American political tradition). In truth Barber 
seeks to discredit foundationalism to his audience by claiming 
that foundationalist philosophizing is foreign to their 
tradition and that it can change their preferred way of life.
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Walzer directs this same argument against the doctrine of 
judicial review followed in the United States. He fears that 
foundationalists may influence Supreme Court judges in their 
interpretation of the Constitution and claims that when the 
latter is interpreted in the light of 
essentialist/foundationalist principles, democracy is 
undermined.14
This critique of foundationalism brings to mind the 
reaction of the chained inmates in the Platonic Story of the 
Cave: They take offence at the escapee's rejection of their 
opinions and criticism of their way of life. What is implicit 
in their reaction is the meta-theoretical view that the 
philosopher should not leave the cave but should remain to 
philosophize about its particulars, to use, so to speak, the 
already available material.
Having concluded the discussion of the first 
characteristic of interpretivism, namely its particularism, I 
will now turn to the second one, namely its non-essentialist 
character. Interpretivist political philosophy does not seek 
to discover or determine the essences (seen either as society- 
independent, external ideas or as the postulates of a 
particular culture understood as an autonomous, immutable 
world) since it denies there are any. The question that 
therefore arises is this: Given that the philosopher does not 
leave the cave either to find the ideas or to contemplate the 
conditionality of the particulars of the cave, in what sense 
is his outlook distinguishable from that of the other cave- 
dwellers'? In what sense is his engagement philosophical?
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Now, it is not my intention to give an independent 
definition of political philosophizing or to endorse any one 
of the meta-theoretical positions discussed in this chapter. 
I more or less regard as political philosophy whatever 
features in the syllabus of a university course in political 
philosophy. (And that includes works by exponents of all three 
positions discussed here.) I assume, however, that 
philosophical engagement involves some kind of reflective 
detachment from practice, the examination or formulation of 
what Walzer calls "general concepts" (like liberty, equality, 
justice, power or of principles like, say, the Rawlsian 
difference principle) and that unlike political argument it 
seeks to prove what is true (either for a specific culture or 
universally). Does interpretivism, with its particularist non- 
essentialism, fulfil this minimum requirement?
According to Walzer the interpretivist is concerned with 
"social meanings" or "shared understandings", that is, with 
deeply rooted, widely shared moral positions and self­
perceptions. These "...are frequently expressed in general 
concepts— in [society's] historical ideals, its public 
rhetoric, its foundational texts, its ceremonies and 
rituals."15 The interpretivist studies carefully these 
outstanding features of public life and institutional 
development in order to identify the general concepts. This, 
as in foundationalism and explanationism involves examining 
sets of interrelated ideas which, however, are regarded as 
social meanings, implicitly or explicitly prescriptive 
positions dependent on practice, rather than as independent,
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transcendental ideas (as in Plato) or as ideas essential to 
the particular moral/political tradition understood as an 
autonomous, self-sufficient sphere of ideas (as in Oakeshott). 
Of course these meanings undergo frequent, sometimes very 
subtle, changes over time and the interpretivist has to keep 
track of them and reveal both their content and their 
normative implications. This involves distancing himself from 
any loyalties, interests and attachments that he may feel or 
have and proving that his revelations are the truth about the 
community's moral and political life. It is, therefore, 
obvious that interpretivism like the other two views of 
political philosophizing does fulfil the minimum requirement 
mentioned above.
Some philosophers have emphasized the dialectical (or 
dialogical) aspect of the engagement of the interpretivist. 
Barber claims that in interpretivist philosophy 11. . .theory and 
practice are reconciled... The criteria yielded by common 
action are permitted to inform and circumscribe philosophy no 
less than philosophical criteria are permitted to constrain 
the understanding of politics and inform political action."16 
If this is simply another way of saying that interpretivism 
does not look for independent, immutable facts about human 
nature in the form of general concepts but is concerned with 
the general concepts implicit in the living practices of an 
actual society, then it is fully compatible with my taxonomy. 
However, I believe, that the dialogical aspect of 
interpretivism is often taken to mean something quite 
different. For instance, Stanley Kleinberg claims that
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political philosophy (meaning what I call interpretivism)
refers to two related engagements: First, "...the use of
philosophical reflection with the aim of advancing more cogent 
arguments," and, second, the study of political debate itself 
in order to learn something about the nature of philosophical 
argument.17 What is suggested here is that philosophy and
politics merge into a forceful, persuasive kind of 
argumentation. Through the "study of political debate" the 
philosopher learns about the interests, attachments and 
opinions of his audience. He then uses this knowledge to 
formulate general concepts and applies the principles of 
deductive reasoning in order to put forward more persuasive 
arguments. His role, in other words, is to tidy up political 
arguments and make them more effective. Although this is one 
way of looking at the political role that political 
philosophers often assume, it is not related to
interpretivism. To reiterate the point, political philosophy 
does not seek to persuade but to demonstrate, to prove. And 
this is certainly true of interpretivist philosophy."1
This, however, is not the only misconception of
interpretivism that is endemic in contemporary political 
philosophy. Interpretivist philosophy is also confused with 
communitarianism and traditionalism. Assuming that 
communitarianism prescribes principles conducive to a closely
“The case of Oakeshott deserves a mention at this point. 
In Rationalism in Politics and On Human Conduct he implies 
that politics and interpretivism (what he calls "the pursuit 
of intimations") is one and the same thing. As I will argue 
below, in 8.4, this is not the case. Oakeshott simply confuses 
interpretivism with a postulate of civitas.
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knit community, there is no reason why it cannot take the form 
of a foundationalist position. Furthermore, there is no reason 
why an interpretivist should not prescribe non-communitarian 
principles." As Walzer avers in "The Communitarian Critique of 
Liberalism", the interpretivist can prescribe individualist 
principles without contradicting his view of philosophical 
engagement. In fact he argues that such principles can be 
shown to be implicit in Western moral tradition, a tradition 
which, in his view, is at least as individualist as it is 
communitarian.18
Now, the confusion of interpretivism with traditionalism 
(or conservatism) has more to do with its 
particularist/relativist character. The interpretivist 
philosopher prescribes different moral principles to societies 
with different social meanings. For example, in a society 
"whose social meanings are intergraded and hierarchical, 
justice will come to the aid of inequality."19 Seen in this 
way, the interpretivist's position appears to be nothing more 
than a justification of the status quo, an endorsement of the 
existing distributive arrangement. But of course this is a 
misreading of interpretivist meta-theory. Existing 
distributive schemes and institutional arrangements are not 
necessarily consonant with social meanings. The latter are 
independent of personal or group interests, claims and 
expressed opinions and prescribe distributive principles of 
their own. To illustrate the point I will now turn to the
“These are often lumped under the labels of 
"individualism" and "atomism" which sound too extremist, as 
indeed does "communitarianism".
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often cited Walzerian argument for universal health service 
coverage.
According to Walzer, health care in Western societies is 
a social good with a particular social meaning. In order to 
determine the latter and understand what it dictates the 
interpretivist must examine the language, customs and social 
history of Western societies. First of all "health care" means 
the restoration of physical health. It follows that, as a 
social good, it should be distributed by the state to all 
those members of society who are unhealthy. Some of the 
institutional arrangements in the U.S. reflect this very 
point. There are general vaccination programmes, there are 
programmes that provide some care to the poor and the elderly 
and there is public funding of medical research. And yet 
members of the more affluent social groups have better access 
to costly, extensive, high-quality medical services while some 
of the poor are deprived of every form of medical attention. 
Walzer reads this as a discrepancy between the public 
conception of medical care and the existing scheme of 
distribution. In his view the medical profession has always 
had a "bad conscience" about the link between health care and 
the market and this is proven by the fact that there have 
always been doctors who offered their services to those who 
could not afford them. Even the call "Is there a doctor in the 
house?" reflects a moral expectation that doctors will hasten 
to meet emergencies whenever they occur. To consolidate his 
position Walzer turns to the European history of institutional 
development and finds that health care was from the very early
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years regarded as a need rather than as a luxury to be bought 
at a price. In his view, until confidence in the possibility 
of curing disease strengthened, Medieval Christians 
concentrated in the cure of the soul in which they had more 
faith. For that purpose there was easy access to churches, the 
teaching of catechism, confession etc.. When the curing of 
disease became possible and physical health began to be taken 
seriously, the licensing of physicians, the establishment of 
publicly funded medical schools and other such measures 
succeeded the earlier forms of a publicly provided health 
care.20
So to summarize Walzer's argument, language, custom, 
history and some aspects of the institutional arrangement give 
evidence in support of the view that, in the particular 
societies he investigates, the social meaning of health 
service requires free, universal coverage. The application of 
this position in the U.S. would involve broad, expensive 
reforms which the medical establishment would fiercely oppose. 
Walzer's interpretation is, therefore, a critique of the 
present arrangement, of the status quo: not an endorsement of 
it.
It is quite obvious that Walzer's interpretation ignores 
all evidence in support of the view that health care in 
Western societies is assumed to be a marketable good. People 
in Britain, for instance, buy expensive medical treatment in 
private clinics although they are entitled to free treatment 
in public hospitals under the National Health Service. Money 
buys them fast and effective treatment while publicly provided
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health service is slow and inefficient mainly due to lack of 
state motivation and sufficient state funds. Even if we accept 
the connection between medical treatment in modern times and 
absolution in Medieval Europe, it is difficult to ignore the 
fact that the practice of simony in the Middle Ages ensured 
the distribution of the medieval equivalent of health care in 
accordance with wealth.0
So it could be said that there are at least two possible 
interpretations of the social meaning of health service in 
Western societies. Waltzer uses no external criteria or method 
showing that one of them is more accurate than the other. In 
fact he himself avers that no understanding of meaning can be 
final and definitive and this means that all interpretations 
are educated guesses of people who cannot know how things will 
turn out or whether the tendencies they have identified will 
persist.21 This clearly is a sceptical position. For the 
sceptic who subscribes to interpretivist meta-theory, but does 
not think it is possible to pick a single, correct 
interpretation on the basis of presented evidence, the 
relevant question is whether there is some other way to 
determine the most accurate interpretation. Walzer answers the 
question by likening social interpretation with literary 
interpretation. As he puts it
°The idea of drawing evidence from the past poses a 
certain problem for the interpretivist. He has to avoid making 
any suggestion that there are principles which are essential 
to the moral tradition he investigates or principles derived 
from universal essences. But how can he look for evidence in 
the distant past without implying the existence of (either 
kind of) essences?
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[t]he best reading [of a poem] is not different in 
kind, but in quality, from the other readings: it
illuminates the poem in a more powerful and 
persuasive way. Perhaps the best reading is a new 
reading, seizing upon some previously misunderstood 
symbol or trope and re-explaining the entire poem.
The case is the same with moral interpretation. . ,22
The best interpretation, in this view, must be original, 
powerful and persuasive or, in one word, impressive. Most 
importantly, however, it must be a "re-explanation of the 
entire poem" to a particular audience. As Georgia Warnke 
avers, the latter point has been the main thesis of literary 
hermeneutics at least since the time of Schleiermacher: the 
literary critic must reconcile all the different parts of a 
text and show how these work together to compose a well- 
intergraded meaning.23 It is the idea of a comprehensive unity 
of meaning that guides the critical understanding and 
separates the better interpretations from the worse. It is not 
very clear how Walzer uses this principle in connection with 
social interpretation. What exactly is the equivalent of the 
"entire poem" when it comes to social interpretation? Walzer's 
answer seems to be that it is taking into consideration all 
information related to the development of the social meaning 
of a particular good, like health care. This, however, leads 
us nowhere because the selection of relevant information is 
the interpretation itself. For instance Walzer does not 
consider the existence and successful operation of private 
clinics relevant to the development of the meaning of health 
service and this is why he reaches the conclusion he does.
A more plausible answer is that the "text" here is simply
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the denotation of, say, "health care" and that a successful 
interpretation consists in exploring its connotation and 
arriving at a single prescriptive, distributive principle like 
"publicly provided equal distribution" with respect to health 
service. It follows that an interpretation that arrives at a 
mixed principle (for example a principle allowing of two 
parallel schemes of distribution of health care, one public 
and one private) is suspect. According to Walzer, the view 
that "...the best interpretation is the sum of all the others, 
the product of a complicated piece of survey research [is no 
more credible than the view] . . .that the best reading of a poem 
is a meta-reading, summing up the responses of all the actual 
readers.1,24
This view is not, however, without its problems. If 
indeed health care has been perceived throughout the centuries 
both as the satisfaction of a need and as a response to the 
demand for a luxury, why should we not prescribe a mixed 
scheme of distribution— pretty much like the one presently in 
place in Britain, France and a number of other Western 
European countries? Why would the inclusion of both 
conflicting perceptions of health care be discreditable? 
Walzer's answer seems to be that a more inclusive 
interpretation loses its critical force. It is a fatuous 
statement rather than an attempt at resolving the conflict 
between those latent perceptions and expectations which 
comprise social meanings. In my view this is not the case. 
Walzer, like virtually all political philosophers, can hardly 
resist the temptation to exert influence on his audience. As
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he unwittingly confesses, he wants his interpretations to be 
persuasive, captivating. His ambition is not to reveal the 
truth, but to be influential. And perhaps this is a good 
enough reason in itself for not accepting his interpretative 
criteria. His scepticism, or rather, his willingness to appeal 
to the sceptics in his audience steers him away from 
interpretivist philosophy towards politics.1*
2.4 Conflicting Meta-Theories or Different Concerns?
Implicit in my presentation of the three different positions 
on political philosophizing is the view that they are 
competing meta-theories or philosophies of philosophy. It 
could be suggested, however, that they are just different 
concerns, different projects to be undertaken by the political 
thinker on different occasions. The latter seems to be the 
view that Michael Oakeshott would endorse in the light of his 
purist view of the philosophical engagement: philosophy is the 
exploration of the conditionality of ideas which we commonly 
formulate and use in order to facilitate our life. 
Foundationalism and interpretivism either formulate such 
practical ideas or disclose the hidden meaning of those 
already in use. But they do not question their conditionality, 
they do not, in other words, try to understand the particular
pIt should be emphasized that scepticism (the view that 
we cannot know which interpretation is correct) is not an 
integral part of interpretivist meta-theory. It should also be 
noted that there is a great difference between this kind of 
scepticism (which could be called "interpretivist scepticism") 
and that of someone who accepts that there are universal 
essences, but doubts that we can acquire knowledge of them. 
The latter is discussed in 6.3.
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sub specie aeternitatis. Instead, both foundationalism and 
interpretivism assume that implicit in these ideas is a "to 
be" which will be achieved only if certain arrangements are in 
place. This does not mean that foundationalism and 
interpretivism are somehow flawed, incoherent, undesirable or 
for some other reason objectionable. It simply means that they 
belong to the world of practice rather than to that of 
philosophy. The political philosopher may engage in social 
interpretation or in the quest for the essences that comprise 
human nature (as Oakeshott himself does in many of his 
writings) but not as part of his philosophical engagement.
I have already explained in what sense foundationalism 
and interpretivism are philosophical, non-practical, 
engagements: Like explanationism they aspire to prove rather 
than to persuade. But there is yet another sense in which they 
are non-practical. Although they both prescribe a particular 
"to be", they are not interested in how the transition from 
the present state of affairs, from the particular "what is",
to the prescribed objective will be achieved. This is a
political, non-philosophical issue that is treated, if at all, 
separately. Of course there is no denying the fact that
Oakeshott's conception of the philosophical (or of the non-
practical) is different and more exclusive. My point, however, 
is that there are two senses in which foundationalism and 
interpretivism, like explanationism, are non-practical. But 
this does not answer the question of whether the three views 
are competing meta-theories of different projects for even if 
they all are philosophical engagements they do not have to be
52
incompatible with one another.
In Interpretation and Social Criticism Walzer expresses 
his own view on this issue. He suggests that his 
interpretivism and what he calls the "path of discovery" (a 
view of political philosophizing which roughly corresponds to 
foundationalism) could both yield significant, philosophical 
findings.25 Perhaps, he asserts, the principle of utility or 
the rights of man can be regarded as discoveries, as general 
concepts discovered outside the Platonic cave. He nevertheless 
doubts that any moral/political change is due to new morally 
significant discoveries, to fresh foundationalist positions. 
In his words, change "has less to do with the discovery... of 
new principles than with the inclusion under the old 
principles of previously excluded men and women."26 This means 
that foundationalism, unlike interpretivism, can have little 
effect on our moral life because it ignores the lived-in 
morality, the thick moral/political language and practices of 
the particular society. Obviously this is a less severe 
criticism of foundationalism than the one examined earlier; it 
is now presented as an approach with slim chances of success 
rather than as a flawed meta-theoretical position. But, as I 
have explained, the feasibility or realizability of a 
philosopher's prescriptions is a political, rather than 
philosophical, concern. Walzer's statement amounts to saying 
that a politician can exert more influence by using 
interpretivist arguments rather than foundationalist ones. But 
this does not mean that the politician cannot use both kinds 
of arguments in his attempt to persuade his audience. In fact
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he can juggle all kinds of arguments in his effort to be 
persuasive. But can the philosopher also perform the juggling 
act without contradicting himself? Walzer fails to answer the 
question.
In my view there is an important reason why 
foundationalism, explanationism and interpretivism should be 
seen as rival meta-theories: All of them answer the same three 
ontological/epistemological questions in ways that make them 
mutually exclusive. Only two of the three meta-theories answer 
any one question in the same way (either in the negative or in 
the affirmative) and each one of them shares with each of the 
other two only one answer. The first question is "Are there 
essences which can be known to us?". Foundationalism and 
explanationism answer in the affirmative. Interpretivism 
denies that there are universals that can be known to us and 
holds that social transition makes the existence of 
particularist essences (i.e. features which are essential to 
a moral/political tradition) impossible. It follows that the 
philosopher can only follow the course or development of the 
meanings implicit in moral and political practice.
The second question concerns the existence of universals, 
that is, of morally relevant properties that can be predicated 
of all the individuals of the class of human beings. According 
to foundationalism we can acquire knowledge of essences which 
are also universals. This view is rejected by both the other 
two views of political philosophizing. For explanationism the 
essences (human nature included) are ontologically determined 
by the particular society in which we exist, whereas for
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interpretivism no morally relevant essences can be known. 
Morally relevant can only be a particular society's variable 
moral meanings.
Finally, the third question is this: Does knowledge of 
the philosophical findings (whether these are universal 
essences, postulates of ideal characters or social meanings) 
prescribe courses of moral and political action? Is, in other 
words, political philosophy normative? Both foundationalism 
and interpretivism answer this question in the affirmative. It 
is relatively easy to see why this is so according to 
interpretivism: Social meanings cannot but have built-in moral 
and political principles. For foundationalism, however, the 
prescription of such principles involves a remarkable 
conversion of our knowledge of universal essences into 
principles that could govern the institutional structure of 
(any) society. To put it differently, for a foundationalist 
argument to be valid on its own terms, it has to establish a 
particular relation between its prescriptions (principles and 
policies) and its essentialist/universalist foundations: It 
must demonstrate that the former is derived from the latter.
Explanationism's answer to the third question has already 
been mentioned: by examining the conditionality of the Western 
state the philosopher creates an autonomous world of ideas 
(the postulates) which cannot be regarded as a "to be", as a 
world of experience to be achieved in the future. By setting 
out a "to be" one initiates a process of purposeful change 
which presupposes, first, that "what is" is a transient, 
mutable fact and, second, that its outcome is subject to
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"valuation", that it belongs to the world of value. The latter 
is a coherent world of thought which has a certain built-in 
objectivity giving practice a normative element by turning 
"what is to be" into "what ought to be". The philosopher's 
search for the postulates of ideal characters and the ensuing 
creation of self-sufficient worlds of ideas are very far 
removed from this world of purposeful change, from what 
Oakeshott calls "the ways of ordinary thought".
The three views of political philosophizing are, 
therefore, mutually exclusive in the sense that each one of 
them starts with different epistemological assumptions. And 
yet one can hardly help noticing that virtually all political 
philosophers (even those, like Walzer and Oakeshott, who are 
very conscious of meta-theoretical differences) combine all 
three meta-theories in their work. It, therefore, appears that 
one must either reject this implication of my taxonomy or 
assert that most, if not all, philosophical positions ever put 
forward are inherently flawed. Fortunately this is not a 
genuine dilemma. As has been mentioned, the combination of 
disparate meta-theoretical positions is a characteristic of 
political argument. The fact that political philosophers often 
juggle arguments of different meta-theoretical backgrounds 
confirms that they can hardly resist the temptation to assume 
the mantle of the politician, to use all available arguments 
in order to persuade their audiences. One must, therefore look 
for the philosophical in their work and distinguish it from 
the political.
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2.5 Walzer’s "Three Paths in Moral Philosophy"
To conclude the present chapter I will compare the tripartite 
distinction made above with one made by Walzer in 
Interpretation and Social Criticism.27 Walzer refers to "three 
distinct paths in moral philosophy": the path of discovery, 
the path of invention and the path of interpretation. As I 
have already mentioned, the first one of these roughly 
corresponds to what I have called foundationalism. In Walzer's 
words, "...what is involved in [philosophical] 
discoveries...is something like a dis-incorporation of moral 
principles, so that we can see them, not for the first time 
but freshly, stripped of encrusted interests and prejudices. 
Seen in this way, the principles may well look objective. . . 
They exist at some distance from our parochial practices and 
opinions."28 Discovery here is equivalent to the exit from the 
Platonic Cave. What is seen and learned away from it, away 
from practice, is converted into moral principles which can 
then substitute or complement the old ones.
Walzer's "path of invention" does not correspond to any 
one of the three views of political philosophizing presented 
above. For Walzer moral invention is "the construction of an 
entirely new moral world..." whose principles and laws "all 
tend towards the same end."29 Walzer suggests that there is a 
strong similarity between this undertaking and Descartes' 
intellectual project described by its author as an attempt "to 
reform my own thoughts and to build on a foundation wholly my 
own."30 In this view the philosopher strives to invent a 
"universally inhabitable world, a world for all persons." His
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creation derives its force and authority either from the 
reputation of its creator (an example offered by Descartes 
himself is that of Lycurgus, the sage who became the lawmaker 
of ancient Sparta) or from a proper method, a process which 
yields the right results. In either case, "the point of an 
invented morality is to provide what God and nature do not 
provide, a universal corrective for all the different social 
moralities.1,31
Now if philosophy as invention is universalist in 
character, as Walzer seems to be suggesting, it must be 
similar to foundationalism. It is the foundationalist who puts 
forward a "universal corrective" for all living moralities. It 
is he who leaves the cave and comes back having acquired a 
new, different moral outlook. The philosopher-inventor can be 
thought of as a foundationalist whose "correct method" is a 
way of distinguishing the essential from the contingent, the 
universal from the particular.
The problem here is that along with this universalist 
picture of moral invention Walzer offers a second, 
particularist one. As he puts it, "Descartes' Spartan analogy 
suggests a different view, which I think is also Rawls' view, 
a minimalist version of inventiveness. What Lycurgus creates 
is not the best city, the city that God would have created, 
but only the best city for the Spartans, the work, as it were, 
of a Spartan god."32 This view of philosophical invention is, 
as I will argue in Chapter 5, interpretivist. The philosopher 
interprets the social meanings of a particular society and has 
them interact with one another in accordance with a process
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which bears the characteristics of one of society's major 
institutions (for example by constructing a hypothetical 
situation, like the Original Position, which resembles the 
legislative assembly of a western, democratic society). Walzer 
does not include this kind of interpretivist invention into 
his interpretivism (his third path of moral philosophy and the 
one he endorses) . This is the reason why his idea of 
interpretivist philosophy does not coincide with the third 
view of political philosophizing presented in this chapter.
Before I close this chapter I should note that I have not 
addressed the question of whether my list of different views 
of political philosophizing is exhaustive because it seems to 
me that within this particular meta-theoretical scheme (the 
particular set of epistemological questions discussed above) 
there can be no further alternatives.
I will now go on to argue that there actually are three 
different positions of state neutrality each corresponding to 
a different one of the three meta-theoretical views.
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Part II: The Normative Positions
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CHAPTER 3
Foundationalist State Constraint (1):
The Millian and Rawlsian Arguments
The recent introduction of the notion of neutrality into 
political philosophy in connection with the issue of the 
state's moral authority and responsibility has caused great 
excitement and has divided contemporary political thinkers 
into neutralists, who share the view that the state should be 
"neutral" between "conceptions of the good", and anti­
neutralists, who reject the notion of state neutrality as 
flawed, inconceivable or impracticable. The two sides are 
presently engaged in a fervent debate whose outcome is not as 
yet decided.
The debate itself is political in the sense that each 
side musters as many disparate arguments as possible in order 
to persuade its audience to accept or reject its position on 
state neutrality. Neutralists, like their critics, combine 
philosophical arguments of different meta-theoretical 
backgrounds and often relate them to practical considerations 
in order to make their position more popular.8 However, from
aBy "practical considerations" I mean considerations 
concerning the means of transforming "what is" into a 
prescribed or desired "to be". These could also be referred to 
as "political considerations".
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a philosophical point of view, foundationalist, interpretivist 
and explanationist arguments cannot be combined together into 
a single, compelling case (in favour of or against state 
neutrality) since each one of the three meta-theories has a 
different view on the nature of philosophical truth. The 
philosopher must, therefore, distinguish between three 
different state neutralities, each corresponding to one of the 
three views of political philosophizing. This involves 
extricating the foundationalist, interpretivist and 
explanationist elements from the mixed arguments offered by 
the participants in the neutrality debate and turning them 
into coherent philosophical positions. Of course, the 
significance of this project should not be overstated: one 
cannot hope to impose meta-theoretical limitations on a 
political debate. However, it is important to expose the 
debate for what it really is, especially because many of those 
who take part in it profess that their sole concern is to 
explore the implications of philosophical truth.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the political and military 
analogues of the notion of neutrality are by far the most 
prominent ones. The introduction of "neutrality" into 
political philosophy is, therefore, bound to be conducive to 
the subordination of philosophy to politics. "Neutrality" 
obscures the meta-theoretical distinction of Chapter 2 by 
bringing its excess semantic luggage into the issue of the 
moral authority of the state. It could be said that 
"neutrality" symbolizes the preoccupation with being 
persuasive rather than with demonstrating what is true. It is,
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therefore, a good idea to replace it before examining the 
truly philosophical, neutralist arguments.
This move does not involve making any changes to the 
principles prescribed by neutralist philosophers or to any 
other feature of their philosophical arguments. The very fact 
that neutralists can drop the notion of neutrality and still 
maintain their philosophical positions, strongly suggests that 
they initially adopted it only in the belief that it would 
make these positions more attractive to their audience.
The term I propose to use instead of "neutrality" is 
"state constraint". The reason why "constraint" is better 
suited to philosophy is that unlike "neutrality" (or at least 
the most common sense of "neutrality") it does not hinge on 
the self-interest of the prospective neutral or the interests 
of the conflicting sides and their willingness to keep him out 
of the conflict. It is independent of any notion of 
acceptability or intent. Given that the philosopher prescribes 
principles which he regards as the dictates of philosophical 
truth and that he, therefore, is not concerned with their 
acceptability, he has reason to avoid using a term that brings 
this parameter into play in connection with one of the 
prescribed principles.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, constraint is implicit in 
a particular sense of neutrality. This is why the term often 
appears in the literature in connection with state 
neutrality.15 Its adoption is not, therefore, likely to
bFor instance Bruce Ackerman uses "neutrality" and 
"constrained dialogue" interchangeably in his Social Justice 
in the Liberal State (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1980),
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confound all of those who have taken part in the neutrality 
debate.
My objective in the present chapter is to single out the 
two most coherent foundationalist state constraint arguments 
drawing mainly from the work of John Rawls (see 3.3-3.7). My 
starting-point (see 3.1-3.2) will be the Millian argument of 
On Liberty which, as I will argue, is the precursor of 
contemporary foundationalist constraint arguments.
3.1 Mill’s Constraint Principle
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is a puzzling and controversial 
work which purports to defend "one very simple principle". 
This principle is one of the first— if not the first—  
explicitly made constraint statements. In Mill's own words, On 
Liberty is a "philosophic text book [that argues for]...the 
importance to man and society of a large variety in types of 
character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to 
expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions."1 
This essay makes Mill the forerunner of modern state 
constraint theories and raises issues that help us distinguish 
between foundationalist and interpretivist state constraint 
arguments.
The main question addressed in On Liberty is "What is the
pp. 8-12; Andrew Mason regards "neutrality" as an "absolute 
(or near absolute) constraint" in his "Autonomy Liberalism and 
State neutrality", The Philosophical Quarterly. 40 (1990), p. 
444; Robert Nozick, whose foundationalist position is often 
regarded as neutralist, talks of "moral constraints on the 
state" in his Anarchy. State and Utopia (Blackwell: Oxford, 
1990), pp. 48-51.
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nature and extent of the power which society ought to exercise 
over the individual?" Mill answers this question with his 
"simple principle", a principle which "is entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society in the way of compulsion 
and control, whether in the form of legal penalties or the 
moral coercion of public opinion."2 The content of the 
principle is given in the following passage:
...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number is 
self-protection. . . [It follows] that the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with 
him, or reasoning with him, or entreating him, but 
not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil 
in case he do otherwise.
To justify that, the conduct from which it is 
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce 
evil to someone else. . . In the part which merely 
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own mind and body, 
the individual is sovereign.3
Mill's principle of constraint is obviously dependent on a 
"harm principle". It forbids the use of state, social 
(collective) or individual action for the suppression of an 
individual's conception of the good, "physical or moral", when 
adherence to or pursuit of that conception is not harmful to 
others.
Mill's principle is, therefore, based on some definition 
of "harm". In the quoted passage "harm" means "interference
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with the others' liberty of action". This interference may not 
only take the form of physical violence or obstruction but may 
also become interference with the others' ability to 
deliberate, to form beliefs, to hold conceptions of the good 
and to act upon them. This means that Mill's constraint 
principle is characterized by a certain reciprocity: no one 
should be persecuted for holding and acting in accordance with 
a particular conception of the good unless, in so doing, he 
prevents others from holding and pursuing their own 
conceptions.
Mill also gives an idea of what harm is not. In his view, 
doing harm (or "evil") does not consist in disregarding 
etiquette, considerations of propriety, principles of self- 
preservation or some conception of prudence. Disregard for 
such considerations does not warrant any form of coercive 
action—  undertaken either by individuals or by the state. In 
Mill's words, the individual is "sovereign over his mind and 
body".
Nevertheless, there may be reasons to persuade, entreat 
or remonstrate with someone whose conception of the good is 
allegedly mistaken, improper, self-destructive or foolish. 
Mill does not become very specific about the forms that 
persuasion or entreaty may take. For example, can taxation or 
subsidization on the basis of held conceptions of the good be 
part of a process of persuasion? Is state propaganda precluded 
by the constraint principle? These questions are far more 
relevant today than they were in Victorian Britain.
To understand the scope and implications of Mill's
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principle, it is essential to focus on his justification for 
its adoption and distinguish the philosophical argument from 
the political. In my view, the philosophical part of the 
argument is basically foundationalist and raises all the 
issues discussed by modern exponents of constraint theories.
In the opening chapter of On Liberty Mill talks about 
what he perceives as an intolerant society, namely nineteenth- 
century Britain. His claim is that people show a tendency to 
impose their own opinions, lifestyles and inclinations on 
others. He talks of the "despotism of custom" which prescribes 
singularity and thwarts individuality. As he puts it, 
"everyone must still dress like other people, but the fashion 
may change once or twice a year." Change is allowed only on 
condition that all change together. This imposition of 
uniformity brings about a world without "...any marked 
character...[it] maims by compression, like a Chinese lady's 
foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently 
and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar..."4
Mill's argument seems to have been sparked off by an 
enthusiasm for eccentricity. At times it appears that his real 
concern is the "tyranny" of custom and clothes fashion and 
this makes his position appear trivial. But it is not so much 
his motive for writing On Liberty as it is the foundationalist 
argument itself that gives weight to his position.
Mill's first step is an account of human nature. As he 
puts it, "[H]uman nature is not a machine to be built after a 
model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but 
a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all
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sides, according to the tendency of...inward forces which make 
it a living thing."5 This diversity of "inward forces" is an 
essential part of being human. It is this diversity that 
explains the adoption of different conceptions of the good. It 
is only natural for people to choose different conceptions of 
the good for they are different. Diversity has, therefore, 
moral value exactly because it is an aspect of human nature.0
In On Liberty, diversity is combined with a certain 
Kantian element: the individual has the capacity to be
autonomous, to be independent of the others' will. This 
capacity is the second aspect of human nature and, according 
to Mill, it may never be realized in a dogmatic, intolerant 
environment where "...human capacities are withered and 
starved, [where people] become incapable of any strong wishes 
or native pleasures and are generally without either opinions 
or feelings of home growth or properly their own."6 Mill's 
notion of autonomy is really the capacity to bring out the 
distinct character of the individual, to release the 
individual's "inward force", and to acquire preferences, 
develop conceptions of the good and form original opinions.
The upshot of Mill's argument is that the constraint 
principle is dictated by morality since it aims at the 
protection of what is essentially human: diversity and the 
capacity to act autonomously. This is a higher-order 
conception of the good in a sense that it is not a detailed
cIt is important to distinguish Mill's "diversity as human 
nature" from diversity as a social fact. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, constraint principles can be developed from 
an interpretation of the political and moral values that are 
implicit in a diverse society.
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picture of an ideal lifestyle, a psychological profile or a 
list of natural inclinations which precludes particular ideals 
of the good, but a capacity to seek and fulfil any such ideal. 
This is why the principle of constraint aims at the 
establishment of conditions under which constant change and 
revision of accepted ideals is possible, that is, conditions 
that guarantee the availability of many, differing ideals, 
lifestyles, and forms of expression that can be revised and 
modified to accommodate the diverse nature of human beings.
Thus stated, Mill's argument is quintessentially 
foundationalist. It is both essentialist/universalist, in that 
it singles out those characteristics which are essentially 
human, and normative in that it puts forward a normative 
principle which draws its moral significance from the 
essences.
3.2 Mill’s Progressivism and the Constraint Argument
The problem, however, with Mill's constraint argument is that 
it is not as consistent as it is described above. Mill 
incorporates into the argument two interrelated views which 
seem to contradict the foundationalist, constraint principle. 
These two views I shall call "progressivism1 and 
"perfectionism" and I shall claim in this section that 
although they are more in agreement with Mill's position than 
it is claimed by the critics, they considerably weaken his 
foundationalism.
On Liberty is replete with references to "human 
advancement", "progress", and "the growth of civilization",
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ideas which Mill tries to link with the constraint principle. 
On one occasion he states that "...where not the person's own 
character but the traditions or customs of other people are 
the rule of conduct, there is wanting. . .quite the chief 
ingredient of individual and social progress."7 What Mill says 
here is that when individuals are free to choose, develop and 
fulfil their ideals of the good, they improve themselves, both 
individually and collectively. "Progress" here does not only 
refer to the transition from oppressive uniformity to a 
situation of state (or social) constraint, where the 
autonomous choice and pursuit of ideals is possible, but to 
every single autonomous choice. For Mill every expression of 
the free will is seen as an improvement, as a choice for the 
morally better.
According to Mill there are two reasons why autonomous 
choice is seen as an improvement. First, because it further 
increases the number of conceptions of the good (given that 
each individual chooses in accordance with his unique "inward 
force") and, therefore, brings us closer to the most extensive 
pluralism possible, and, second, because all the autonomously 
chosen and developed conceptions of the good are morally 
superior ones. In Mill's own words, "the only unfailing and 
permanent source of improvement is liberty... since by it there 
are as many possible independent centres of improvement as 
there are individuals."8
The former notion of progressivism is in agreement with 
Mill's foundationalism. Progress as continuously expanding 
pluralism is in fact required by Mill's account of human
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nature. The ideal, according to that account, is for each 
individual to have his own conception of the good. The 
problem, however, with Mill's position is that the second 
notion of progressivism alludes to the existence of non- 
foundationalist criteria by which to evaluate, or at least 
characterize, conceptions of the good. Such criteria 
constitute a higher, nobler, more refined conception of the 
good. It is this conception that the autonomous individual 
eventually fulfils in Mill's view through the fulfilment of 
the ideal of autonomous choice.
But if this conception is not derived from the Millian 
foundations (and this certainly seems to be the implication of 
Mill's assertion) how can it be incorporated into the 
foundationalist argument? There is little doubt that the 
exalted conception to which autonomous choice eventually leads 
is (some interpretation of) the endoxa of Victorian Britain 
which is a contingent moral outlook rather than a system of 
principles derived from universal essences. The combination of 
the two distinct notions of progressivism is, therefore, a 
calculated move on Mill's part, an attempt to make the 
constraint principle more palatable to his Victorian audience 
by assuring them that it is fully congruous with the values 
and principles implicit in their moral practices.
The question that arises at this point is whether Mill's 
commitment to a contingent, lower-order conception of the good 
is stronger than his commitment to autonomy and diversity. If 
this is so, then he should give a different, perhaps more 
elaborate, account of human nature, abandon the constraint
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principle and prescribe a different one, or put forward an 
interpretivist argument instead.
The incompatibility of the constraint principle with 
Mill's perfectionist views is the main theme in Susan Mendus's 
critique of On Liberty. Mendus focuses on what she regards as 
one particular aspect of Mill's substantive, elaborate 
conception of the good: his view on marriage expressed in "The 
Subjection of Women". According to Mendus, "if there is a 
correct ideal of marriage (as he clearly thinks there is), and 
if failure to embrace that ideal constitutes a prevailing evil 
(as he clearly thinks it does), then why freedom?"9
Strangely enough Mendus picks the wrong example to expose 
the inconsistency of the constraint position. Mill's view on 
marriage is autonomy-based and, therefore, in full agreement 
with the foundationalist, constraint position. He declares 
that
[w]hat marriage may be in the case of two persons 
...between whom there exists that best equality, 
similarity of powers and capacities with reciprocal 
superiority in them...is the ideal of marriage; all 
opinions, customs, and institutions which favour any 
other notion of it...are relics of primitive 
barbarism.10
The "best equality" that Mill refers to here is equal liberty 
to act autonomously. This point is made more explicitly in the 
introduction, where Mill states that "[a]11 women are brought 
up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal 
of character is the opposite to that of men; not self-will and 
government, but submission and yielding to the control of
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others.1111
The argument, therefore, is directed against the idea of 
marriage as an institution based on the subordination of one 
of the two parties involved; an institution that involves the 
treatment of women as less than autonomous, independent 
beings. This, therefore, is not an argument in favour of 
married life or of the single, "proper" form of marriage, but 
a corollary of Mill's minimalist foundationalism.
Of course, the progressivist/perfectionist aspect of 
Mill's argument constitutes its main weakness. If Mill had 
incorporated it into the essentialist part of the argument, 
his foundationalism would have been coherent, but he would 
have to abandon the constraint principle altogether. If, on 
the other hand, he had omitted any reference to progress and 
to certain widely shared moral priorities of his time, his 
argument in favour of state constraint would have been even 
more fiercely criticised than it actually was.
Mill is not the only philosopher to dilute his 
foundationalist position with interpretivist elements in order 
to exert more influence on his contemporaries, but his 
argument is the precursor of neo-Kantian foundationalist state 
constraint. His essentialist account, the view that human 
nature can be compromised if public life is not governed by a 
higher-order morality derived from the essences, and the 
constraint principle itself are the main aspects of his 
position that have been adopted and further elaborated by the 
neo-Kantians. It is to their foundationalist arguments that I 
will now turn starting from those of their principal
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representative, John Rawls.
3.3 Foundationalism and Rawlsian State Constraint
Rawls has not only combined arguments of different meta- 
theoretical background in order to put together a more 
persuasive argument, but has claimed that his process of 
deriving principles governing state action is not based on 
"any metaphysical doctrine or theory of knowledge" and that it 
"simply appeals to what anyone can accept."12 Implicit in this 
claim is the view that the particular audience he addresses 
would never find persuasive a foundationalist argument or an 
argument which (like the argument of On Liberty) incorporates 
strong foundationalist elements. And yet the argument of his 
A Theory of Justice has a strong foundationalist component. 
The constraint principle of A Theory of Justice is actually 
derived from an account of what is essentially human. This is 
hardly a new interpretation of Rawls' book. Many critics of 
Rawls' position, and more notably Michael Sandel, criticize 
what they have dubbed "the Rawlsian theory of the person" 
implying that Rawls' prescriptions are founded on an account 
of what is essentially human. My intention, however, is not to 
criticize Rawls for contradicting himself or for putting 
forward a dubious theory of human nature, but to isolate the 
foundationalist constraint position from the rest of his 
political argument.
Like Mill, the foundationalist Rawls asserts that there 
are two different moralities: The one flows from what is
essential to being a person while the other is contingent and
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may vary in accordance with personal choices, local cultures 
or fashions. For a foundationalist it is the former that 
should regulate public life since it is the only one that 
respects our essentially human characteristics.
Unlike Mill, Rawls takes a very specific view of public 
life (and the kind of collective action that is predicated by 
it) ; he thinks of it as a structure of institutions which are 
supposed to have the ability to create and convey advantages 
and disadvantages leading to economic and social success or 
failure. This "basic structure", as he calls it, is the 
state.d It is, therefore, the state— its structure and 
function— that ought to be governed by the morality that flows 
from what is essentially human or from what Rawls calls 
"justice" or the "right". There is, however, something special 
about the relation between this morality and the contingent 
morality (or moralities) that does not stem from the essences: 
they are, in some sense, compatible. The following general 
formulation of the Rawlsian constraint principle makes this 
very point:
The State...does not concern itself with 
philosophical and religious doctrine [i.e. the 
contingent morality] but regulates individuals' 
pursuit of their moral and spiritual interests in 
accordance with principles. .. [of justice].13
dIt could be argued that Rawls applies a notion of the 
state that is characteristic of Western, democratic societies 
and that he, therefore, contradicts his foundationalism. In 
truth, however, the foundationalist Rawls does not "apply" any 
already established notion of the state. Rather, he, like 
Robert Nozick in Anarchy. State and Utopia (Blackwell: Oxford, 
1990) , derives his particular view of the state from his 
foundations.
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It could be argued that the use of the term "philosophical" in 
this passage is an indication that Rawls does not understand 
his argument as a foundationalist project (assuming, of 
course, that he takes "philosophy" to mean the derivation of 
normative principles from an account of what is essential to 
being human). However, "philosophical doctrine" can be taken 
to mean either the normative principles latent in moral and 
political practice, or those foundationalist views which are 
not meant to govern the basic structure and, perhaps, do not 
have (or were not meant to have) any political implications 
(say, the philosophy of Schopenhauer and its emphasis on the 
significance of artistic expression). It follows that 
"philosophical doctrine" is not on a par with and does not 
rival the foundationalist, higher-order morality. The 
application of the latter's principles entails the regulation 
of the people's pursuit of their conceptions of the good and 
not the evaluation, promotion or rejection of any such 
conception. In other words, the principles of justice do not 
rival the various conceptions of the good. For the 
foundationalist Rawls the endorsement and application of the 
morality which derives from the essences does not disprove or 
threaten the differing, contingent moralities; foundationalist 
morality refers to the means rather than the ends of 
individuals' lives. It is this interpretation of the passage 
quoted above that allows us further to pursue the 
foundationalist component in Rawls' mixed argument.6
Alternatively, it could be argued that Rawls does not 
really mean the distinction between philosophy and his 
principles of justice and that he makes it only in
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Now, the Rawlsian principle of constraint can be stated 
as a series of premises three of which have a strong meta- 
theoretical flavour. The series runs as follows: (i) there are 
moral principles that stem from our knowledge of human nature; 
(ii) there are moral ideals that are conventional or 
contingent; (iii) the former are suitable for the regulation 
of public life (axiomatic); (iv) the latter are compatible 
with the former and their pursuit can be regulated by them. 
The last statement is true only because Rawls' account of 
human nature is such as it is. A different account of human 
nature (say, that offered by Hegel) would make the essences- 
derived morality an alternative to many contingent moral 
outlooks.
Nevertheless, the claim that Rawls' foundationalist 
morality does not encroach on contingent morality needs to be 
qualified. Contingent morality is thought to include a wide 
variety of differing conceptions of the good. The very notion 
of a conception of the good is, as I will explain later on, 
defined by the Rawlsian essentialist account. Compatibility is 
not, therefore, something that we can confirm in terms 
independent of those specified by the essentialist account 
itself. The foundationalist morality is a system of higher- 
order moral values which defines the pursuit of lower-order 
moral outlooks, or conceptions of the good.
anticipation to the critics' reaction.
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3.4 The Neo-Kantian Essentialist Account
In order to piece together a Rawlsian account of what is 
essentially human, one needs to focus on the Rawlsian 
conception of autonomy and more particularly on what Rawls 
calls the "full" and the "thin" theories of the good. The 
former refers to the individuals' relation to their ends 
whereas the latter focuses on certain general wants held by 
all people and is often regarded as a general theory of 
motivation.
Unlike the Mill of On liberty, the Rawls of A Theory of 
Justice is aware of the Kantian element in his work and makes 
it clear that the Original Position is meant to be an 
illustration of the Kantian conception of autonomy.14 
According to Kant, autonomy is a property of the will. 
Autonomous is the will that is not motivated by anything 
outside itself and which, at the same time, is not abandoned 
to the lawlessness and disorder of internal impulses and 
desires. Autonomy is, in this sense, a matter of staying free 
from external influences and conquering internal disorder by 
being obedient to a self-made rule. Both the formulation of 
this rule and its application are identified with the concept 
of rationality. According to Kant, however, the will cannot be 
autonomous in the actual, causally determined world. It can 
only exist timelessly in the noumenal realm. What the 
foundationalist Rawls attempts to do is take the Kantian 
conception of autonomy out of the two-world context or, more 
accurately, to extend it to the actual world and use it to 
derive a morality (namely, justice) that applies to the basic
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structure of society.
For Rawls, the only possible manifestation of autonomous 
will is rational choice-making and it is the capacity for this 
that we must take to be the essence of personhood. This point 
is combined with the view that no particular object of 
rational choice is essential to being human. In his own words, 
"...the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; 
even a dominant end must be chosen among numerous [i.e. 
contingent] possibilities."15 A person's ends are, therefore, 
his solely because he chooses them and not because they are 
constitutive of him. To put it differently, the self is 
distinct from and antecedent to any aims, or as Rawls himself 
puts it, "[t]he essential unity of the self is prior to the 
choice. . . "16
Rawls explains in great detail the process of choosing 
aims and formulating rational plans for their pursuit. In his 
view, a rational plan is "one that would be chosen with 
deliberative rationality from among the class of plans all of 
which satisfy the principles of rational choice... We 
eventually reach a point though where we must decide which 
plan we most prefer without further guidance from 
principle.1117 Upon reaching this point, says Rawls, we can try 
to "...find a more detailed or illuminating description of the 
object of our desires," hoping that we can then re-apply the 
principles and reach a final decision.18
It is fairly obvious that considerations of "deliberative 
rationality", "principles of rational choice", "forms of 
critical reflection" etc. are introduced in order to explain
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choice as a process and emphasize the universalist character 
of choice-making. Although these inventions "do not replace 
the concept of rationality,"19 they describe the relation 
between the essential, individuated self and the various, 
contingent, available plans.
For Rawls the capacity to choose is a capacity to process 
information concerning our aims. This processing of 
information is patterned and the patterns are dictated by 
"laws of human psychology".20 Consider, for example, Rawls' 
so-called Aristotelian principle. According to this, "a 
person...prefers the [activity] that calls upon the greater 
number of more subtle and intricate discriminations."21 
According to another principle, that of "inclusiveness", "a 
plan is preferred to another if its execution would achieve 
all the desired aims of the other plan and one or more aims in 
addition."22 Implicit in these principles is the view that 
human nature, or even Nature itself, comprises a number of 
natural tendencies: a natural inclination to master more
complex than simpler activities (perhaps as an urge to adapt 
to one's environment), an inclination to achieve a given end 
by exercising less than more effort and so forth. It seems, 
therefore, that convenience, adaptability, economy, 
effectiveness, continuity and coherence are the objective 
criteria for critically reflecting on available information 
and reaching a decision.
Although this process is essentially human, the things 
chosen, i.e. the specific plans, just like the available 
information, are not. But how about the aims? What exactly is
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their relation to the rational plans and to the self? 
According to a passage quoted above, the aims are "the objects 
of our desire". Rawls avers that by "[u]sing the principles of 
rational choice as guidelines, and formulating our desires in 
the most lucid form we can, we narrow the scope of purely 
preferential choice, but we cannot eliminate it altogether."23 
This means that aims are ultimately arbitrary expressions of 
preference and that choices are made on the basis of sub- 
rational desires which cannot be evaluated or identified in 
accordance with objective (rational) criteria. It is hardly 
surprising that Rawls should make this point. If he were to 
claim that rational choice is a complete break from the 
subjectivity and arbitrariness of desires, he would not be 
able to bridge the gap between the phenomenal and the noumenal 
worlds of Kantian theory.
It seems, nevertheless, that a person's aims— no matter 
how arbitrary they may be— are not entirely separate from the 
plans through which they are pursued. In fact, it would make 
sense to say that the adoption of a plan is an expression 
(perhaps the only expression) of our having a desire, a 
manifestation of our having a set goal. As I have already 
mentioned, Rawls seems to be aware of this point and at times 
considers aims and plans to be constitutive of what he calls 
conceptions of the good.
The Rawlsian emphasis on autonomous (rational) choice 
means that "personhood" (or the "separateness of being") is an 
essential feature of human nature. It is this separateness, 
this moderate solipsism, that leads to the notion of diversity
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or "plurality". As Rawls himself puts it "the plurality of 
distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential 
feature of human societies."24 In actual societies, autonomous 
individuals are bound to choose differently, first, because 
the options and information available to them as well as their 
physical and mental capabilities vary and, second, because 
there can be no one "correct" process of rational choice.
Now, we have seen that foundationalist philosophy derives 
normative moral/political principles from an account of what 
is essentially human. These principles are meant to regulate 
the interaction between individuals qua essential characters 
(i.e. bearers only of the essential characteristics). Given 
that for Rawls the objects of our rational choices are not 
essential but contingent or, to put it differently, given that 
no single adopted lifestyle, moral tradition, ideology or 
religious doctrine is essential to one's being a person, it 
follows that foundationalist morality is not derived from any 
such conception of the good.f It also follows that all those 
features that distinguish one individual from another are of 
no concern to the foundationalist morality. Social status, 
natural assets and abilities, intelligence, strength, gender 
as well as "special features of personal psychology"25 are not 
essential to personhood and are, therefore, irrelevant where 
justice is concerned. This means that justice does not include 
principles that value specific social or physical 
characteristics or intellectual abilities.
fIn the Rawlsian view, it is essential that a person holds 
some conception of the good. This is not saying that a 
particular such conception is essential to being a person.
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One very important aspect of the neo-Kantian essentialist 
account is the view that all individuals have an equal 
capacity to be autonomous/rational choice-makers. This 
egalitarian element is not present in all foundationalist 
positions.8 It seems, however, that Rawls thinks of it as 
inherent in his conception of autonomy (along with the notions 
of personhood, or "the separateness of being", and diversity). 
Whether this is the case is an issue that need not be 
discussed here.h
Since, the crux of foundationalist meta-theory is the 
view that the basic structure of society must be governed by 
principles which protect, comply with or are conducive to the 
essentially human character, foundationalist neo-Kantianism 
prescribes principles which are conducive to and respect 
rational choice-making. As has been mentioned, in the actual
8For instance, Plato holds that all individuals possess 
three faculties (appetite, spirit and reason), but that as a 
fact of nature in different individuals different faculties 
are dominant. This leads to the division of citizens into 
three social classes each having different duties and 
responsibilities. Aquinas holds that all men are equal in 
being rational, although they have not all actualised their 
reason to the same extent. This means that some notion of 
equality is inherent in foundationalist positions. So, 
perhaps, it is more accurate to say that, although some notion 
of equality is implicit in all foundationalist positions, not 
all of them share the same notion of equality.
hRobert Nozick, whose foundationalist state constraint 
position is similar to what I will call "Rawls' first 
foundationalist constraint argument", does not hesitate to 
present his essentialist account as an array of largely 
unrelated characteristics. As he puts it in Anarchy. State and 
Utopia. p. 48, "[t]he...proposals for the important
individuating characteristics connected with moral constraints 
are the following: sentient and self-conscious; rational...; 
possessing free will; being a moral agent capable of guiding 
his behaviour by moral principles and capable of engaging in 
mutual limitation of conduct..."
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world of causal relations rationality can be compromised by 
means of external interference. The constraint principle is, 
therefore, a principle that protects the individual from 
coercion and thus realises his essential capacity to be 
autonomous. Whether such a principle can be deduced from the 
neo-Kantian essentialist account without the introduction, 
somewhere along the way, of elements which cannot be traced 
back to the essences, is an important issue which will be 
addressed in Chapter 5.
3.5 The First Foundationalist Constraint Argument
Although autonomous choice, individual distinctness and 
metaphysical equality are not the only aspects of Rawls' 
essentialist account, they are sufficient for a first 
constraint argument. I shall start with Rawls' formulation of 
the constraint principle and then connect it with the 
essentialist account presented above. As J.M. Finnis avers, 
Rawls' constraint argument consists of two complementary 
principles.26 The first is the liberty principle (or first 
principle of justice) and the second is a harm principle very 
much like the one put forward by Mill. According to the 
former,
[e]veryone should have the greatest equal liberty 
consistent with a similar liberty for others.27
And according to the latter,
... justice. . .requires us to show that modes of 
conduct interfere with the basic liberties of others 
or else violate some obligation or natural duty
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before they can be restricted.28
Starting with the liberty principle, it is the notion of 
"greatest, equal liberty" that we must try to derive from the 
Rawlsian essentialist account. The first question that arises 
is "Why liberty?" The answer to this is rather 
straightforward. As has been mentioned, autonomy, the most 
important of human attributes, means the creation of self-made 
rules and the ability to abide by them without external 
interference. In the causal world autonomy/rationality 
requires liberty, i.e. a right to carry out chosen plans and 
achieve chosen ends without interference from others or from 
the state. Without liberty the capacity to choose one's ends 
is compromised and may even be lost. Since foundationalism 
requires, ex hvpothesi. respect for and the protection of the 
essential character of each person, it must require liberty as 
a right to choose ends and to act upon them.
It is important to note at this point that Rawls 
distinguishes between liberty as non-interference, or, to use 
the Berlinian term, as "negative freedom", and liberty as the 
ability to achieve, or the chances of achieving, one's ends. 
In the second sense, the better one's chances, the fewer the 
obstacles on one's way, the freer one feels. Rawls makes it 
clear that he does not accept this second sense of liberty. As 
he put it,
[t]he ability to take advantage of one's rights and 
opportunities as a result of poverty or ignorance, 
and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted 
among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall 
not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of
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these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the 
value to individuals of the rights that the first 
principle [i.e. the liberty principle] defines.29
But, what is the relation between this distinction and Rawls' 
essentialist account? Is the former congruent with the latter? 
In answering these questions I should restate three main 
points in Rawls' essentialist account. First, autonomy 
involves rational choice-making, that is, the processing of 
available information and the conception of plans for the 
achievement of personal goals.
Second, although there are certain general, objective 
criteria which a rational choice-maker may apply, his aims 
stem from sub-rational desires. In relation to this point I 
have claimed that Rawls is inclined to treat the aim and the 
plan for its achievement as a whole. This means that if actual 
impediments (like poverty, ignorance and lack of means) do not 
allow the achievement of a goal (even if this is but a sub- 
rational desire) then it is dropped in the sense that the 
agent chooses autonomously— rationally— to abandon it since no 
rational plan can lead to its achievement. Sub-rational 
desires are, in this sense, tested before they can be 
considered as personal goals.* Rawls would have us believe 
that unrealistic goals (desires or even preferences and tastes 
that are developed over long periods of time) can easily be 
replaced by more realistic ones. This is noted by Brian Barry 
who states that for Rawls "people's tastes, aspirations and
‘This point is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter.
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beliefs are always open to modification.1130
Third, Rawls states that no particular object of choice 
is essential to the self and, since justice requires the 
protection of the essential aspects of personhood (this being 
an axiom of foundationalist philosophy), there is no reason to 
compensate for the "inability to take advantage of one's 
right" to achieve a chosen goal. Only when the inability to 
pursue the particular goal is due to others' coercive action 
or to prohibitions and measures dictated by a state-enforced, 
contingent morality is one's autonomous nature violated and 
even compromised. It appears, therefore, that the distinction 
between liberty and the worth of liberty is an implication of 
Rawls' essentialist account as it has been presented in this 
section.J
Having explained how liberty becomes a requirement of 
justice, it remains to explain why justice requires the 
"greatest equal" liberty. We have already seen in what sense 
individuals are, at the metaphysical level, equal: all
distinguishing characteristics which can be used in real life 
to categorize individuals are contingent. What is essential is 
their separateness and their capacity to choose autonomously. 
It follows that if this notion of equality is to be turned 
into a principle pertaining to real life, it must become 
"equality of liberty". Given that liberty is essential to the
jHowever, Brian Barry suggests that Rawls adopts the 
replaceability of aims and the "unequal worth of liberty 
principle" simply because if he did not, the second principle 
of justice justifying the unequal distribution of wealth, 
income and power would contradict the liberty principle. 
("Chance, Choice and Justice", expanded text of a public 
lecture given at the LSE on 25 April, 1990, p. 2 3.)
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autonomous, rational individual and that all individuals are 
essentially equal qua rational choice-makers, "equality of 
liberty" is the only form of equality required by this kind of 
foundationalist morality. Had Rawls claimed that individuals 
do not have the same propensity to choose rationally, that is, 
that essential characters are classifiable in this way, then 
justice would require liberty rights, but not "equal" liberty 
rights.
The equality of liberty prescribed by the liberty 
principle implies a certain notion of compatibility of all 
individuals' liberty rights. One cannot exercise one's liberty 
to the extent that it thwarts the liberty of another. So the 
extent of personal liberty is determined by this consideration 
and the foundationalist must, therefore, prescribe the 
"greatest possible" equal liberty.31
Turning now to the harm principle, it should be noticed 
that it states explicitly what is implied in the liberty 
principle: modes of conduct which violate others' liberty
(their equal rights) ought to be restricted or prohibited. 
Oddly enough, this principle is in stark contrast with Rawls' 
official view on the issue of the bigots' status in a just 
society. The fact that it is not any chosen ends whose choice 
is prohibited but "modes of conduct" which presumably lead to 
the achievement of these ends, means that even bigoted 
conceptions of the good (e.g. racism or chauvinism) are valid 
objects of autonomous choice. Their pursuit, however, must not 
violate the liberty principle or endanger the existence of the 
institutions governed by the foundationalist morality.
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Ultimately individuals who choose intolerance find themselves 
in the situation of those whose liberty is of low value 
because of a lack of means to achieve their ends. A fascist 
is, in this sense, somebody with an extremely expensive 
conception of the good. To achieve his end (e.g. a racially 
pure society) he may choose to adopt modes of conduct that are 
likely to be expensive— in terms of money (fines) and time 
(spent in confinement) . On the other hand, he may choose to 
hold his conception of the good as a belief, a fantasy or a 
vision.
In a critique of the neo-Kantian position, Brian Barry 
claims that the reason why neo-Kantians prescribe the state 
constraint principle is because they include in their 
essentialist account the view that individuals hold their 
conceptions of the good in a specific manner, i.e. as beliefs 
or "personal preferences" .k He then goes on to criticise this 
view as flawed, claiming that people do not normally hold 
their ideals in a detached way but strive to establish them as 
the overriding morality that governs the basic institutional 
structure.32 In one of his earlier essays Barry quotes the 
following passage in order to illustrate this point:
However bigoted the announcement may sound, the 
Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a 
Christian organization of society— which is not the 
same thing as a society consisting exclusively of 
devout Christians.33
kThe notion of a "personal preference" is introduced by 
Ronald Dworkin and is contrasted with the notion of an 
"external preference", i.e. a preference whose satisfaction 
involves the limitation of other peoples' liberty.
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It is certainly true that certain conceptions of the good are 
often held as "external preferences" (although I am not sure 
that this can be said of Christianity as a whole) . However, 
the point is not quite relevant to the issue at hand.1 Neo- 
Kantian foundationalism does not assume that any one way of 
holding conceptions of the good is essential to being human. 
It prescribes principles which prohibit the treatment of 
individuals as anything other than equal, autonomous, rational 
beings but its notion of rationality does not presuppose that 
individuals hold their conceptions of the good as personal 
preferences. Rather, the treatment of all conceptions of the 
good as personal preferences is a dictate of the neo-Kantian 
notion of equality. Conceptions (like nationalism or religious 
fundamentalism) whose fulfilment involves the suppression of 
the autonomous choices of others are regarded as personal 
preferences and are not suppressed unless their adherents 
violate (the foundationally derived) criminal law.
But is this interpretation in accordance with what Rawls 
actually says in A Theory of Justice? Looking at the harm 
principle, we see that state interference is required not only 
when modes of conduct violate the liberty of others, but also 
when they are in violation of "some obligation or natural 
duty". According to Rawls, obligations and natural duties are 
"principles for individuals". As he puts it, "[a] complete 
theory of right [i.e. of foundationalist morality] includes a 
number of moral principles as well [as principles for the
*In section 3.7 below, I will explain why certain critics 
have reached this particular interpretation of the neo-Kantian 
position.
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basic institutional structure]."34
Apparently this alters everything said so far about 
Rawls' position. If foundationalist morality includes a number 
of moral principles by which one ought to live one's life, 
then justice becomes a rival morality that conflicts with 
conceptions of the good, traditional moral principles, 
religious ideals etc.. The bigot is no longer free to hold 
ideals on condition that he does not harm others, but has to 
give priority to justice in his own private life and refrain 
from choosing certain aims. Justice, to put it differently, 
becomes an aim to be pursued personally as well as 
collectively; it becomes a constant preoccupation. The notion 
of liberty that is consonant with such a view, is no longer 
liberty as non-interference, but Berlinian "positive freedom".
This, however, is not what Rawls has in mind when he 
talks about principles for individuals. He states that 
"...obligations presuppose principles for social forms. And 
some natural duties also presuppose such principles."35 They 
are in a sense corollaries of the principles of justice. One 
has an obligation to support a just institutional arrangement 
when "...one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of this 
arrangement."36 This notion of responsibility seems to be 
consonant with Rawls' view of rationality and, therefore, it 
finds a place in Rawls' moral prescriptions.
But how about those rational duties which do not 
presuppose principles for social forms? Rawls makes clear that 
most natural duties apply to us "without regard to our 
voluntary acts." Thus "we have a natural duty not to be cruel,
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and a duty to help another, whether or not we have committed 
ourselves to these actions."37 This view is problematic in 
that it assumes benevolence and altruism to be elements of the 
essentialist account. If this assumption is adopted then there 
simply is no need to have a harm principle as such because 
there is no middle ground left between doing harm and not 
doing good. This means that the foundationalist morality 
becomes a rival of many moral outlooks and loses its status as 
a higher-order morality to be predicated of the basic social 
structure.
This, however, is not the only problem with Rawls' 
position. If talk of natural duties seem to be incongruous 
with the state constraint principle, Rawls' remarks on the 
agent's psychological motivation totally contradicts it. As he 
puts it in the closing chapter of A Theory of Justice.
...[w]e cannot express our nature by following a 
plan that views the sense of justice as but one 
desire to be weighted against others. For this 
sentiment reveals what the person is, and to 
compensate it is not to achieve for the self free 
reign but to give way to the contingencies and 
accidents of the world.38
What Rawls appears to be establishing here is the priority of 
the foundationalist morality over the various contingent 
moralities. But he does so in a self-contradictory way. What 
he now avers is not only that the foundationalist morality is 
predicated of the basic structure of society, but that the 
desire to affirm and act in accordance with this morality is 
essential to being human. Implicit in this point is that
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individuals express their essential human character by not 
adopting conceptions of the good (say, neo-Nazism or 
Stalinism) which reject the principles of justice. It follows 
that those who do affirm such conceptions are but lesser human 
beings, perhaps equivalent to the Aristotelian "natural 
slaves". This, I believe, is an implication of the application 
by Rawls of the Kantian categorical imperative. The autonomous 
individual chooses his conception of the good under the 
conviction that the process of rational choice-making (and not 
the chosen conception) sets rules (i.e. the principles of 
justice) for others to follow. This conviction becomes an 
essential characteristic of being human. The problem with this 
move, however, is that it is incompatible both with the 
already presented version of the harm principle and with a 
second version also featuring in A Theory of Justice according 
to which,
...[w]hile an intolerant sect does not itself have 
title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should 
be restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and 
with reason believe that their own security and that 
of the institution of liberty are in danger.39
Rawls does not explain (at least not in strictly 
foundationalist terms) why the bigots, who are presumably non- 
autonomous inferiors, should hold the same liberties the rest 
of the members of society hold. If the simple fact that they 
hold intolerant conceptions of the good makes them lesser 
beings, why should they not be repressed and reformed even 
when they refrain from acting harmfully or when their
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collective power is not enough to endanger the existence of 
just institutions? Rawls can hold on to his harm principles 
only if he abandons the particular application of the 
categorical imperative which divides people into humans and 
less than humans. What warrants the restriction of the bigots' 
liberty is, first, the violation on their part of the harm 
principle and, second, the meta-theoretical axiom that the 
state must be governed by the foundationalist morality. This 
means that Rawls needs to adopt a wider conception of 
autonomy, one that allows for autonomous individuals to adopt 
subversive conceptions of the good.
The point just made does not, of course, disguise the 
second main weakness of foundationalist political philosophy 
(the first being the problem of specification of principles 
without the introduction of interpretivist elements), namely 
the fact that there will always be cases of individuals whose 
bearing of the essential characteristics is doubtful. Bigots, 
drug addicts, foetuses and those with mental illnesses are 
among the group of individuals whose status, i.e. their 
essential humanness, is open to question in many modern 
societies. Ultimately, the foundationalist can be thought of 
as someone who determines who will be counted in and who will 
be left out of the institutional structure governed by the 
principles of foundationalist morality. I suspect that this is 
a role which the neo-Kantian foundationalist does not feel 
very comfortable playing. The least he can, therefore, do is 
abandon the particular application of the Kantian categorical 
imperative and accept a more inclusive conception of autonomy.
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3.6 The Second Foundationalist Constraint Argument
As I have already mentioned, Rawls further elaborates his 
conception of rationality claiming that it involves an 
essential concern for certain general desires or "desires for 
primary goods."40 These goods are actually conditions required 
for the pursuit of any particular goal. Rawls maintains that 
primary goods are certain rights and liberties, opportunities 
and powers, income and wealth and— something assumed to be 
made possible in the realization of the other— self-respect.
This elaboration of Rawls' essentialist account provides 
the basis for a second constraint argument* In the argument 
presented earlier, liberty is seen as a requirement of 
autonomy, a condition necessary for autonomous choice-making, 
itself an essential aspect of personhood. The second argument 
is based on the assumption that liberty, along with power, 
wealth and self-respect is an object of our essential wants. 
This further assumption yields both the constraint principle 
and the difference principle (which refers to the distribution 
of opportunities and resources) and broadens the range of the 
state's authority. Since state constraint is now linked to the 
distribution of certain goods and assumes a different, more 
elaborate meaning. Ultimately, the difference between the two 
arguments translates into the difference between a minimalist- 
state, right-wing political agenda (pretty much like the one 
defended by the foundationalist Nozick in Anarchy. State and 
Utopia) and the left of centre politics that is usually
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attributed to Rawls.
As we have seen, Rawls maintains that the initial 
distribution of all physical and social characteristics is 
arbitrary since no-one chooses or has any control over who his 
biological parents are going to be or which social environment 
he will brought up in. This means that social position, 
physical attributes and intellectual capacities are 
'undeserved' and should not determine the level of wealth, 
income, power and self-respect that individuals attain. 
Justice, therefore, requires that corrections are made to 
offset inequalities which cannot be traced to individuals' 
autonomous choices. Given that justice treats all individuals 
as essential characters, in the sense that it seeks to protect 
their essential characteristics, and that all individuals have 
the same essential want for primary goods (implicit in their 
essential capacity to choose rational plans of life), justice 
must counteract actual, undeserved inequalities. Whereas in 
the first constraint argument equality means equal liberty 
rights for all individuals, in this argument equality is taken 
to mean that all individuals should enjoy the same level of 
primary goods unless their autonomous choices— made after 
undeserved inequalities are corrected— lead to an unequal 
distribution. This surely is a radical interpretation of 
metaphysical equality and one that is impossible to implement. 
Rawls, therefore, settles for a principle which accepts 
undeserved inequalities but requires that "social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged..." individuals.41
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This is Rawls' second principle of justice.
How Rawls gets from equality of primary goods to the 
second principle of justice, is outside the scope of this 
paper.™ What is of interest here is that this same argument 
also yields the constraint principle (i.e. the equal liberty 
and harm principles).
For Rawls it is only income and power that cannot be re­
distributed equally by the institutional structure of society. 
Liberty can indeed be allotted equally since it is 
distinguishable from the "worth of liberty", that is, from the 
possession of the means and knowledge needed to achieve an 
autonomously chosen end or carry out a plan. It is implied 
here that although the satisfaction of our desire for wealth 
and power depends on our non-essential attributes (like 
physical strength, appearance and social position) and, 
therefore, requires corrective or compensatory, action by the 
state, the satisfaction of liberty does not. This is why this 
line of argument yields both principles of Rawlsian justice.
This argument also proffers a more complete explanation 
of the harm principle. It is not only the violation of others' 
rights and of the rules, laws and regulations of the basic 
institutional structure of society that constitutes harm, but 
the breach of obligations one undertakes by being a recipient 
of the State's compensatory policies. The added emphasis on
“To reach the particular form of inequality prescribed by 
his second principle Rawls makes further essentialist 
assumptions. These are: risk aversion, preference for more 
cooperative product (i.e. preference for larger unequal shares 
rather than smaller equal ones), motivation (leading to higher 
levels of cooperative output) through knowledge that unequal 
distribution of primary goods is in accordance with justice.
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obligations may warrant more state interference in matters of 
morality. Holding an ideal of the good that exhorts the 
substitution of the present institutional arrangement with 
another while at the same time being the recipient of some 
form of compensation for 'undeserved' inequalities, may be 
regarded as a breach of a tacitly undertaken obligation even 
if there is no actual legal violation.
It is important to bear in mind that the distinction 
between the two arguments is not made by Rawls himself. 
However, since both arguments are implicit in his philosophy 
and lead to recognizably different social agendas, they 
deserve to be distinguished from each other. In the first 
argument liberty is the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for rational choice-making, whereas in the second it 
is one of a number of goods satisfying certain essential wants 
implicit in the capacity to form rational plans of life.
3.7 The Three Arguments in A Theory of Justice
In the preceding sections I have attempted a foundationalist 
reading of Rawls's constraint position. The result has been 
the identification of two parallel arguments in favour of a 
principle of state constraint. As I explained in Chapter 1 and 
in the introduction of the present chapter, a state constraint 
principle imposes an absolute constraint on the moral 
authority and responsibility of the state. In this section I 
turn to three arguments which are not derived from an account 
of Rawlsian essentialism, but are offered by Rawls himself as 
the actual arguments in defence of his principle. The first
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two are connected with the arguments presented above, whereas 
the third, unlike the other two, is interpretivist in that it 
draws from our beliefs and experiences as members of 
democratic, pluralist societies.
Before I present these constraint arguments I should make 
two important points. First, Rawls presents his essentialist 
view in the form of a hypothetical situation, the Original 
Position, in which essential characters (bearing what appear 
to be the essential characteristics) assemble in order to 
decide on what the principles of justice are. The underlying 
idea presumably is that since autonomous, rational choice is 
the primary essential feature of personhood, justice must be 
regarded as the object of autonomous, rational choice; not of 
the choice of 'real' people— with given social positions, 
physical attributes, intellectual abilities etc.—  but the 
choice of essential characters. The result is an apparatus 
that yields principles of justice, an invention that is both 
impressive and convenient. Rawls manages to enliven his 
argument and make it more persuasive to his Western audiences 
by bringing in certain conceptions which are widely shared in 
Western, democratic societies without dropping his 
foundationalist outlook.
Second, Rawls, unlike Mill, understands his state 
constraint position to be the exact opposite of perfectionism. 
According to him, perfectionism is the view that the state has 
the moral responsibility to foster the good, the well-being, 
the flourishing and excellence of all its citizens and to 
discourage them from actions and dispositions which are not
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consonant with its ideals of excellence and well-being. To 
reiterate the central point of this foundationalist constraint 
position, perfectionist ideals are contingent and are, 
therefore, unsuitable for the regulation of the basic 
institutional structure. On the other hand, justice is a 
higher-order moral outlook that does not rival the contingent 
perfectionist ideals adopted by autonomous choice-makers, but 
proscribes the treatment of individuals as less than 
autonomous, rational choosers of conceptions of the good.
Let us now turn to Rawls' official constraint arguments 
formulated in terms of the Original Position. According to the 
first, the essential characters cannot choose perfectionist 
standards as a "workable basis" for shifting principles 
governing state action, because
[to] acknowledge any such standard would be, in 
effect, to accept the principle that might lead to 
a lesser religious or other liberty... They [persons 
in the Original Position] cannot risk their freedom 
by authorizing a standard of value to define what is 
to be maximized by a teleological principle of 
justice.42
This means that the acceptance of non-foundationalist, 
contingent principles limits liberty and since liberty is 
essential to autonomous rational choice (first argument) or 
the object of an essential want common to all (second 
argument), non-foundationalist principles are not consonant 
with human nature and are, therefore, rejected. To put it 
briefly, perfectionist ideals cannot be predicated of the 
basic structure of society because they restrict liberty.
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The second of Rawls' actual state constraint arguments 
goes as follows: the people in the Original Position cannot 
accept non-foundationalist principles as principles of justice 
because
[t]hey cannot take chances with their liberty by 
permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine 
to persecute or to suppress others if it 
wishes. . . [T]o gamble in this way would show that one 
did not take one's religious or moral convictions 
seriously.43
Rawls seems to be making a further essentialist assumption 
here. He seems to be saying that essential characters (the 
characters in the Original Position) exhibit an intractable 
individualism in that they choose on the conviction that the 
conceptions of the good they will adopt in the actual world 
will be valuable simply because they will be their own. An 
implication of this assumption is that essential characters 
hold their conceptions of the good as personal preferences and 
do not care to convey them to others. This is exactly the 
point made by Brian Barry (see 3.5): For Rawls an essential 
aspect of being human is holding one's conception of the good 
as an opinion or preference without transmitting it to others 
or putting it forth as true or good or valid and, therefore, 
as suitable for governing state action.
Like Barry, Finnis, claims that "when certain religious 
and moral convictions precisely were taken with great 
seriousness, rational people were indeed willing to admit the 
perfectionist principles and thereby 'gamble' that the right 
(from their own point of view) religious and moral beliefs
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would be enforced."44 Moral convictions, in Finnis' view, are 
not held in the way Rawlsian essential characters hold them 
and, therefore, Rawls' essentialist account, the foundation of 
the Rawlsian position, is seriously flawed.
This is a misinterpretation of the Rawlsian argument, but 
is, in some sense, justifiable because although the Original 
Position is supposed simply to be a colourful way of 
presenting the foundationalist position, the second official 
constraint argument indicates that it is not without serious 
problems. The participants in the Original Position know 
neither their identity nor any conceptions of the good which 
they could choose from. In this sense, their autonomy is 
different from the autonomy Rawls regards as an essentially 
human attribute (see 3.4) and which his essential characters 
assume upon their arrival in the real world. In other words, 
the essentialist account does not coincide with the set of 
characteristics of the participants of the Original Position. 
Those who overlook this point, are bound to find that Rawls 
incorporates atomism (or mutual disinterestedness) into his 
foundationalist argument.
The third and last of Rawls' actual arguments is not 
foundationalist in nature. It is based on a view which is 
widely shared in Western democracies and asserts that 
"criteria of excellence are imprecise as political principles 
and [that] their application to public questions is bound to 
be unsettled and idiosyncratic.1,45 Criteria of excellence are, 
therefore, regarded as conceptions of the good which have not 
been tested as political principles and are contrasted with
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the western, liberal, political tradition which, however, must 
be but another contingent, perfectionist ideal to the 
foundationalist philosopher.
Throughout this section I have referred to "conceptions 
of the good" as the objects of individuals' choices. In order 
to examine certain implications of the two foundationalist 
constraint arguments, namely the choice of self-destructive 
lifestyles and the significance of cultural membership to the 
individuals' autonomous lives, it is important that I examine 
more closely the notion of a conception of the good.
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CHAPTER 4
Foundationalist State Constraint (2): 
Conceptions of the Good
Conceptions of the good are the objects of individuals' 
choices. A conception of the good is a specific activity or 
sum of activities that conforms to a certain plan and is 
derived from a set of priorities, or, to use a more commonly 
used term, a system of values. A lifestyle, a general outlook, 
an occupation, a favourite pastime are all regarded by the 
neo-Kantian foundationalist as conceptions of the good. 
Straightforward though it may sound, this definition raises a 
number of questions which the exponent of foundationalist 
state constraint has to address.
As it has already been mentioned, Rawls regards the 
choice of conceptions of the good as a process. It is this 
process that shows what a conception of the good is: First, 
the individual describes "the object of [his] desires"1 by 
applying certain "forms of critical reflection"2 and, then, 
processes the information available to him in order to devise 
a plan that will help him attain the object of his desires. In 
the latter stage, he follows certain "principles of rational 
choice",3 which simply means that he (as a rational choice- 
maker) is disposed to take the most effective, economical and
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convenient way possible under any given circumstances. But, 
although there may be certain publicly agreed on criteria for 
the evaluation of the actual execution of the plan, there is 
no one correct or definitive process of choice-making. By 
adopting or devising a rational plan, one sets a self-made 
rule, a pattern of purposeful action which although it may be 
identifiable, it need not always be fully accessible or 
intelligible to others.
So choosing a conception of the good involves adopting or 
devising and following a rational plan of action. But what 
about the earlier phase that starts off the process? What 
exactly initiates the process of choice-making? As has been 
mentioned, for Rawls the starting-point is a sub-rational 
desire, a want or preference. Having desires, however, is not 
enough for choosing rationally. One has to articulate them, to 
formulate one's desires "in the most lucid way [one] can."4 
This involves making comparisons, establishing sets of 
priorities, and making coherent what may be intermittent, 
impulsive or whimsical. It is in this lucid way that we can 
understand and communicate our desires and seek their 
satisfaction.
Two crucial questions arise at this point: First, how can 
one be regarded as an autonomous agent when one's choice of 
plan is, to a large extent, determined by one's sub-rational 
desires? If being autonomous is overcoming internal disorder, 
how can we deem autonomous the person who simply responds to 
his desires? So far I have claimed that it is through 
articulation-planning-execution that one exhibits one's
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autonomous-rational nature.® In the present section I will 
attempt to further clarify this point.
The second question points to a certain ambiguity in the 
desire-based view of rational choice-making: In everyday life 
people make choices in accordance with principles or ideals 
which are independent of their personal desires and 
preferences. Such ideals "...discriminate among want- 
satisfactions, assigning a greater value to some than to 
others and perhaps assigning to some a zero or perhaps a 
negative value."5 Are we to conclude that ideals are not 
adopted in order to satisfy particular preferences and that, 
therefore, actions performed in accordance with them are non- 
autonomous?
4.1 The Notion of a Second-Order Volition
To illustrate the answer to both these questions, I shall make 
use of a much quoted passage by Ronald Dworkin where he states 
that
...the scholar who values a life of contemplation 
has a conception of the good, but so does the 
television-watching, beer-drinking citizen who is 
fond of saying "That's life", though of course he 
has thought less about the issue and is less able to 
describe or defend his conception.6
In this example the bibulous TV-viewer has chosen a conception
“This is the view that Robert Nozick takes in his 
rendering of the first foundationalist state constraint 
argument. He avers that we are rational in that we are 
"capable of using abstract concepts, not tied to responses to 
immediate stimuli"(Anarchy State and Utopia, p. 48).
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of the good that satisfies particular wants or desires, 
whereas the scholar is said to "value" the life of 
contemplation, i.e. to have adopted it because it is valuable 
in itself. The scholar is, in other words, thought to have 
access to certain evaluative criteria which are independent of 
any wants or desires he may have. Dworkin avers that both 
individuals have a conception of the good which, according to 
the definition of a conception of the good given above, means 
that they have both chosen autonomously (rationally). He then 
goes on to say that the beer-drinking TV-viewer is "less able 
to describe" his conception but this, evidently, does not mean 
that he has not articulated his preference or that he has not 
established some set of priorities. What Dworkin means is that 
his preferences and the lifestyle that satisfies them are 
rather uncomplicated. In fact Dworkin, like Rawls, claims that 
where justice (or foundationalist morality) is concerned, the 
two conceptions are on a par. They are both regarded as 
preference-satisfying lifestyles.
To explain how this position can be maintained, that is, 
how conceptions of the good embedded in ideals can be regarded 
as preference-satisfying conceptions, it is important to 
incorporate into the neo-Kantian picture of autonomous choice- 
making the concept of a "second-order volition", a concept 
which is introduced by Harry G. Frankfurt in "Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of the Person".7 According to Frankfurt, 
every individual has a will, that is, he can form desires that 
move him effectively to action. He can also form "second-order 
desires", i.e. he can want to have certain desires. The
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autonomous individual, however, can also want to have second- 
order desires that will move him effectively to action. These 
desires Frankfurt calls "second-order volitions" and considers 
the ability to form them essential to being a person. Clearly, 
the capacity to form rational plans of life presupposes this 
particular ability.
To illustrate this point, Frankfurt contrasts the 
autonomous drug addict with the non-autonomous one. The latter 
has two conflicting desires: to take the drug and to refrain 
from taking it (which is a second-order desire). He, however, 
simply weighs the two desires. He has "no stake in the 
conflict and can, therefore, neither lose nor win the 
struggle."8 The autonomous addict, by contrast, "makes one of 
the conflicting desires his own and in so doing he withdraws 
himself from the other."9 It is this identification with the 
second-order desire that turns it into a second-order 
volition.b
The point to be made here is that individuals can form 
the desire to appreciate or internalise systems of values that 
discriminate among preference-satisfactions. This, of course, 
involves suppressing rival desires or preferences. The scholar 
in Dworkin's example may have striven against his desire for 
beer-drinking cum TV-watching before he was able to enjoy the 
life of contemplation. But, even when one is moved by an 
ideal, one can form the second-order volition to stop being
bIt does in no way follow from all this that the 
autonomous addict will actually be successful in sloughing off 
his addiction or that he will not need help from others to 
achieve this end.
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affected by it. As I mentioned in the previous section, Rawls 
himself makes a similar point. He believes that one can easily 
change one's preferences and that, therefore, the adoption of 
a conception of the good is not necessarily dictated by them. 
This indicates that Frankfurt's view is not only consonant 
with this aspect of Rawlsian essentialism, but that it is 
actually a more thorough formulation of it.
Both questions raised above have been answered. Ideals, 
like other conceptions of the good, are chosen because they 
satisfy particular desires. But autonomous individuals are not 
compelled by their desires (of whatever order) to act in 
particular ways. They have the essential ability to identify 
and reflect on them and weigh one against the other before 
they go on to devise a rational plan of action.
It follows from all this that no particular conception of 
the good is essential to being a person. Regarding some 
conceptions as more valuable than others, would be making them 
part of the essentialist account which is the foundation of 
justice. However, this is not to say that all conceptions of 
the good are valued equally in every area of human 
interaction. Since the foundationalist morality is to govern 
only the institutional structure of society, there are various 
other contexts in which the evaluation and categorization of 
conceptions of the good are inevitable. The criteria by which 
conceptions of the good are measured for value are, of course, 
contingent.
It might be argued, however, that certain criteria for 
the evaluation of conceptions of the good can be found within
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the neo-Kantian foundationalist position itself. I shall 
mention here three such standards of evaluation. The first one 
has already been mentioned and pertains to Rawls' so-called 
"Aristotelian principle" which is one of the "laws of human 
psychology". According to this principle, "...a person prefers 
the [activity] that calls upon the greater number of more 
subtle and intricate discriminations."10 If we apply this to 
Dworkin's example, we arrive at the conclusion that the life 
of contemplation is clearly superior to the indolent life of 
TV-watching and beer-bibbing. Does this mean that justice 
requires the unequal distribution of rights to the adherents 
of the two differing conceptions?
Unlike the two classifications that follow, this one 
poses no serious problems. What Rawls calls "laws of human 
psychology" do not have the same status as the central aspects 
of his essentialist account (i.e. autonomy, personal 
distinctness, plurality and the desire for primary goods). The 
Aristotelian principle is not, therefore, a moral criterion— a 
dictate of foundationalist morality— but part of the effort to 
chart the process of rational choice-making. Choosing more 
elaborate or complex activities is not, in other words, 
essential to being a person and, therefore, the apparent 
inferiority of beer-drinking and TV-watching to the life of 
contemplation is neither a derivative nor a concern of 
justice.
A second classification can be made by employing a 
feature of Kantian moral philosophy, namely the categorical 
imperative.
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Conceptions of the good that are adopted by the individual, 
not only in order to satisfy his personal preferences, but 
because he wills them to be adopted by everyone, could be 
regarded as having a special status, as being superior to 
preference-satisfying conceptions. Clearly the implication 
here is that preferences should be universalized. Although the 
Kantian nature of this view is unmistakable, the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist does not endorse it. Instead, his response is 
that this view is incompatible with the neo-Kantian 
essentialist account and more particularly with the notion of 
pluralism.
A third possible foundationalist classification of
conceptions of the good could, perhaps, be made on a wholly 
different basis. Conceptions of the good are placed into two 
categories, the first of which includes conceptions that allow 
one to revise one's initial choice and make further autonomous 
choices, whereas the second contains those conceptions that 
preclude further choices and compromise one's autonomous 
nature. This is a distinction between "autonomous" and "non- 
autonomous" conceptions of the good.11 To choose a conception 
of the latter kind, is to inflict harm upon oneself, to
consciously relinquish one's essence of personhood. If this 
classification can be made, then does justice allow the choice 
of non-autonomous conceptions, or does it require the 
introduction of "morals laws" prohibiting their adoption?0 In
c"Morals Laws" are defined as "laws forbidding certain 
powerfully seductive and corrupting vices [and which] can help 
one to establish and preserve a virtuous character"; Robert 
George, Making Men Moral (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1983), p.
14. These can either be interpretivist principles or
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order to answer this question, I will introduce David 
Richards' formulation of neo-Kantian foundationalism.
4.2 Vices as Conceptions of the Good
David Richards is, perhaps, the only exponent of a state 
constraint position who does not dilute the foundationalist 
character of his work in order to make it more palatable to 
his audience. As I have explained, Rawls' foundationalism in 
A Theory of Justice is only latent and often combined with an 
interpretivist approach which Rawls explicitly endorses in his 
more recent writings. Richards, whose doctoral thesis was 
supervised by Rawls, never revised his neo-Kantian position, 
but undertook the exploration of its implications. In his Sex. 
Drugs. Death and the Law, he focuses on conceptions of the 
good that are widely regarded (at least in Western societies) 
as vices, and argues, along strict foundationalist lines, that 
their prohibition is contrary to the dictates of justice.
Richards' "principle of (equal) respect for autonomy (or 
personhood)" is none other than the neo-Kantian principle of 
state constraint.12 Richards argues that institutional 
arrangements governed by principles that derive from 
contingent moralities (or what he calls "perfectionist 
ideals")— whether or not they treat autonomy as among human 
goods protected by rights to, say, freedom of speech, religion 
and assembly— are unacceptable since they may compromise the 
autonomous nature of the individual. As he puts it,
principles derived from an essentialist account that is 
different from the neo-Kantian.
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[t]he idea of 'human rights' respects this capacity 
of persons for rational autonomy, their capacity to 
be, in Kant's memorable phrase, free and rational 
sovereigns in the kingdom of ends. Kant 
characterised this ultimate normative respect for 
the reasonable choice of ends as the dignity of 
autonomy, in contrast to the heteronomous, lower- 
order ends (pleasure, talent) among which the person 
may choose...[T]he concern embodied in the idea of 
human rights is not with maximising the agents' 
pursuit of any particular lower-order ends [i.e. 
conceptions of the good], but rather with respecting 
the higher order capacity of the agent to exercise 
rational autonomy in choosing and revising his ends, 
whatever they are.13
Richards, like Rawls, expresses the view that what quells 
autonomy is not facing practical problems (e.g. lack of 
resources or knowledge) with the execution of a chosen plan, 
but living in a society whose basic institutional structure is 
governed by coercive principles that derive from contingent 
moralities exhorting the maximization of the "pursuit 
of... particular lower-order ends." At the same time, Richards 
explains in what sense this impairs or compromises autonomy: 
when the basic structure is governed by a contingent morality, 
individuals' liberty rights are violated. This does not affect 
directly their capacity to choose rationally.d Rather, it has 
a negative effect on the individuals' self-esteem, on the 
sense of dignity that they derive from being who they are. 
This is what Richards calls "the dignity of autonomy" and what 
Rawls calls "the primary good of self-respect". As has been
dA person whose liberty rights are violated is as likely 
to lose his capacity for rational choice-making as an 
individual who is persistently and systematically called 
abusive names is likely to lose his sense of identity. What is 
more easily lost is the sense of dignity that the individual 
derives from being who he is.
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mentioned, according to Rawls' second foundationalist 
argument, self-respect is conditional on the fulfilment of the 
essential want for primary goods. It seems, however, that 
self-esteem is also built into the notion of autonomy of the 
first foundationalist state constraint argument and that it, 
therefore, is a fundamental element of the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist position.
There is no doubt that Richards' Sex. Drugs. Death and 
the Law is an application of the neo-Kantian state constraint 
position. Richards goes beyond the guarded, non-committal 
foundationalism of A Theory of Justice to give the neo-Kantian 
view on issues such as the legality of pornography and the use 
of narcotic drugs. His main objective is to present what we 
may perceive as vices or social problems as valid objects of 
rational choice-making. With respect to pornography he avers 
that
[it] can be seen as the unique medium of a vision of 
sexuality, a 'pornotopia', a view of sensual delight 
in the erotic celebration of the body, a concept of 
easy freedom without consequences, a fantasy of 
timelessly repetitive self-indulgence... [It] 
affords the alternative idea of the independent 
status of sexuality as a profound and shattering 
ecstasy.14
In the same spirit Richards gives an account of drug use and 
claims that
the psychological centrality of drug use for many 
young addicts in the United States may, from the 
perspective of their own circumstance, not
unreasonably organize their lives and ends... [T]he 
moral criticism implicit in the concept of drug
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abuse fails to take seriously the perspective...of 
the addict, often substituting competencies and 
aspirations rooted in the critic's own background
and personal aspirations to organize a self- 
respecting social identity, which may only 
exceptionally require drug use... [E]ven 
psychological devotion to drugs may express not a 
physiological bondage, but critical interests of the 
person.15
Richards' intention clearly is to articulate specific, 
"reasonable" preferences and then show that the perceived 
vices are activities or lifestyles that satisfy these 
preferences. This qualifies them as conceptions of the good, 
that is, as valid objects of rational choice.
In doing this Richards emphasizes the contingency of both 
the vices qua conceptions of the good and the morals laws that 
prohibit adherence to these conceptions. Pornography, he 
claims, is not valuable to everyone nor could it be so. It can 
simply be regarded as a "unique medium of a vision of 
sexuality". Similarly, the use of drugs does not constitute an 
ideal way to organise one's life, but many people may 
certainly feel that it suits them best. The moral outlook that 
rejects or prohibits these conceptions is also contingent. For 
Richards, "there is something morally perverse in condemning 
drug use as intrinsic moral slavery when the very prohibition 
of it seems to be an arbitrary abridgement of personal 
freedom."16 The overriding morality is clearly the 
foundationalist morality deriving from the neo-Kantian 
essentialist account.
Before I address directly the question about the 
existence of non-autonomous conceptions of the good and their
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place in foundationalist state constraint theory, I will 
briefly discuss four criticisms of Richards' position which 
fail to grasp the significance of the fact that his argument 
is strictly foundationalist.
According to Robert George, Richards' is a "strategy of 
arguing from the value of something to a right [and, 
therefore, it] is perfectionist."17 In George's view, this 
same strategy is followed by the legislators who are in favour 
of the prohibition of drug use, pornography and prostitution. 
It is, in other words, because Richards regards these 
particular activities as intrinsically good (as good for 
everyone) that he adopts the state constraint principle.
As I have already explained, Richards does not regard 
pornography or drug use or any of the other activities and 
lifestyles that he discusses as "positive moral goods", but as 
options available to people in specific circumstances, with 
"reasonable" preferences and perspectives. It is the rational 
choice-maker who is "respected" by the higher-order morality 
of justice and not the object of the choice. Only when an 
individual's actions are in violation of others' freedom 
(protected by the liberty and harm principles) is punitive or 
repressive state action warranted.
Eventually George admits that Richards' position can also 
be interpreted as an "autonomy-based understanding of moral 
personality".18 He then makes a second point. He avers that 
Richards' argument leads to counter-intuitive, unpalatable 
results by allowing practices that most people would regard as 
offensive and contrary to any sense of decency and propriety.
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George does not seem to be conscious of the fact that 
foundationalist political philosophy does not draw from the 
ideas and values that are prevalent in any actual society. The 
fact that Richards' prescriptions are deemed utterly immoral 
by many people does not discredit his argument. In fact 
George's point is reminiscent of the reaction of the cave- 
dwellers of the Platonic fable to the teachings of their 
travelled companion. However, at the same time George 
challenges the neo-Kantian contention that the foundationalist 
morality is compatible with contingent moral outlooks and that 
it can, therefore, regulate the actions of their adherents.
Rawls provides us with the means to respond to this 
criticism. In his view, we can talk of compatibility only at 
a higher (meta-theoretical) level of analysis. When we turn to 
specific societies we are bound to observe conflicts between 
certain conceptions of the good and the foundationalist 
morality. Racism and Puritanism are examples of conceptions 
which, were they to be predicated of the basic institutional 
structure of society, would lead to distributions of rights 
very dissimilar to the distribution stemming from Rawls' 
essentialist account. And yet, Rawls claims, such conceptions 
may be held and shared in the extra-political (i.e. private) 
world. A racist, for example, can choose to take residence in 
an area inhabited by members of his own race or refrain from 
socialising or working with members of other races. He can 
even join exclusive clubs that admit members on the basis of 
race or gender etc. . The puritan can lead an austere, celibate 
life and associate with people who share the same values. Only
121
the activities that violate the harm principle are prohibited 
and not the systems of values that may lie behind them.
But does Richards make this same move? Does he recognise 
that individuals are free to express their other-regarding 
preferences in the extra-political sphere? On first 
inspection, it seems that he does not. He not only criticises 
the distribution of rights in accordance with contingent 
moralities, but also the expression of contingent moral values 
outside the political sphere. With respect to the social 
treatment of prostitutes, for example, he states that
the moral condemnation of the prostitute rests on 
and expresses such isolation and denial, disfiguring 
the reasonable perception of the form sex takes in 
our lives, drawing sharp moralistic distinctions 
between the decent and the indecent when in fact 
there is a continuum of varying personal modes of 
sexual expression and fulfilment... When we extend 
to prostitutes concern and respect for their 
equality as persons we can see the source of the 
previous misperception. The failure to see the moral 
and human dignity of the lives of prostitutes is a 
moral failure...19
He goes on to say that drug addicts should not only be 
permitted to pursue their conception of the good, but also to 
"organize a self-respecting social identity..."20 Those of a 
puritanical bent, we are told, should not snub or isolate 
prostitutes and drug addicts, but treat them as respectable 
individuals.
There are two possible interpretations of this point. 
First, it can be regarded as the same application of the 
categorical imperative put forward by Rawls in the case of 
racists. We have already seen what kinds of problems this view
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entails.
Second, it could be the case that like Mill, Richards 
believes not only in the distribution of rights in accordance 
with foundationalist morality, but in a social reform, an 
introduction to the social sphere of a moral outlook that will 
vie against the Millian "tyranny of custom". Although the 
institutional structure does not directly play any part in 
this rivalry, the principles of foundationalist morality 
become also a lower-order morality to compete in the social 
sphere. I believe that this view has little to do with the 
foundationalist argument itself.
A third criticism focuses on Richards' notion of 
autonomy. Its author, J. Finnis, claims that this notion of 
autonomy— contrary to what Richards himself claims— is not at 
all Kantian because, according to Kant, "one has autonomy just 
insofar as one does in fact make one's choices not on the 
basis of one's interests, but out of respect for the demands 
of [the shared] morality."21 In his "Legal Enforcement of 
Duties to Oneself: Kant versus Neo-Kantians", Finnis quotes 
extensively from Kant's moral writings in order to support his 
claim. His argument is based on the distinction between 
personal preferences and "reasons for action".22 In his view, 
Kant, unlike Rawls and Richards, regards existing, shared 
moralities as the only providers of reasons for action. The 
upshot of this argument is that being spurred to action by 
desires and preferences is being abandoned to internal 
disorder, and since autonomy is about taming internal demons—  
as much as it is about staying free from external coercion—
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the Neo-Kantian conception of autonomy is seriously flawed.
To the extent that the argument seeks to do damage simply 
by severing the links between state constraint foundationalism 
and Kantian moral philosophy, it is bound to be ineffective 
and superficial. When, however, Finnis links action triggered 
by desires with the kind of internal disarray that is the very 
opposite of autonomy, the neo-Kantian foundationalist, as we 
have seen, responds that the autonomous agent deals with 
internal demons by articulating his preferences, forming 
second-order volitions and internalizing value-structures. The 
latter, however, being contingent, cannot be elevated to the 
status of a morality that regulates public life. After all, 
the very essence of foundationalism is the belief that there 
can be a universal morality applicable to all societies 
irrespective of their history and culture.
George is the author of the fourth criticism of Richards' 
view. He claims that prescribing "duties to oneself" is an 
essential characteristic of every moral position. Since 
Richards' autonomy-based position does not include such 
duties, it does not qualify as a morality. Although the view 
that "duties to oneself" are essential to a morality is 
arbitrary (at least in the eyes of the foundationalist who has 
a different view of the moral and who claims to have knowledge 
of the true, coherent morality), it points to a possible 
inconsistency in Richards' words: If autonomy is the essence 
of personhood, should a person be allowed to relinquish his 
autonomy? Should not choices that preclude further choices be, 
somehow, prohibited? Don't we all have the duty to choose
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autonomous conceptions of the good?
First of all, what has to be determined is whether there 
actually are any non-autonomous conceptions of the good. Not 
all philosophers accept the idea that one can rationally 
choose to relinquish one's capacity to choose rationally.6 I 
will consider this view as I discuss specific examples of 
putative non-autonomous conceptions of the good.
My starting-point will be the case of voluntary slavery. 
Does the principle of constraint (and more specifically its 
component principle of liberty) allow one to choose to become 
a slave, to relinquish one's liberty and forgo any future use 
of it beyond this single act of choice-making? Mill's response 
to this question is that the liberty principle (i.e. the 
principle of On Liberty) "cannot require that [one] should be 
free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to 
alienate [one's] freedom."23 Mill's argument seems to be along 
the following lines: the liberty principle seeks to guarantee 
that each individual can choose what is good for him without 
being coerced by others. Given that the abdication of one's 
liberty precludes the possibility of further uncoerced 
choices, it cannot be permitted by the liberty principle.
Gerald Dworkin has argued that this line of argument is 
flawed and that Mill cannot proscribe voluntary slavery 
without contradicting his own foundationalist position. In an 
argument reminiscent of Richards' attack on the laws
eSusan Mendus, for example, states that "...certainly 
individual decisions within our lives may be autonomously or 
non-autonomously made. Nevertheless, that we may, so to speak, 
'choose an autonomous lifestyle' is paradoxical," Toleration 
and the Limits of Liberalism, p. 106.
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forbidding drug use, prostitution and pornography, Dworkin 
describes slavery as a "reasonable" conception of the good. He 
claims that there is nothing incoherent in a person saying, "I 
want to be the kind of person who acts at the command of 
others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes 
and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave."24 
Dworkin seems to be saying that, if we accept Mill's claim 
that liberty is prescribed because it protects autonomy, we 
have to face the fact that in this particular case autonomy 
simply has no need for liberty; it does not require its 
protection.
But what if the voluntary slave eventually comes to the 
conclusion that acting at the command of his master is no 
longer good for him? Surely, this is not an impossible 
development. The autonomy of the person who relinquished his 
liberty is not impaired as long as he wills to obey his 
master's commands. His self-respect (his "dignity of 
autonomy") is intact as long as he thinks that what he does is 
good for him.f His liberty (if he had not relinquished it) 
would protect his autonomy only at the point where he changed 
his mind about his wanting to be a slave and his master 
refused to release him on the grounds that he was bound by 
contract to remain always his slave.® It is, therefore, at 
this point that he "needs" his right to liberty and not during
fFor example, professional soldiers do not lose their 
self-respect by obeying orders. In fact they take pride in 
doing so. It would be absurd to claim that professional 
soldiering somehow compromises one's autonomy.
8In fact one could argue that it is only at this point 
that he becomes a slave.
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his term as a voluntary slave. It is at this point that the 
liberty principle becomes relevant.
David Archard's interpretation of the Millian view on 
voluntary slavery is compatible with this view. According to 
Archard, Mill suggests not that society should attach 
penalties to the signing of a slavery contract, but that such 
a contract should not be legally enforced.25 Strictly 
speaking, Mill does not say that we have a duty not to 
abdicate our liberty. Rather, his point is that if the liberty 
principle governs the basic social structure, the idea of 
choosing slavery as a conception of the good is absurd.
The second case of a commonly reputed non-autonomous 
conception of the good is the lifestyle of the drug user. As 
in the case of the voluntary slave, the prospective drug 
user's decision to take narcotic drugs has to be respected as 
an autonomous choice. As Harry Frankfurt explains it is 
possible for a drug user to retain his capacity for autonomous 
choice-making even when addicted to drugs (see previous 
section). It is, however, possible (and some would say, 
probable) that some time after his initial decision the user 
falls in a stupor which, given his physical dependency on the 
drug, leaves him only one choice: to keep taking the drug. The 
basic difference between his case and that of the voluntary 
slave is that his autonomy can be compromised by internal 
disorder and not by external coercion. The autonomous addict, 
who has formed the second order volition to slough off his 
addiction, can easily make his intentions known to others and 
seek their help. But the autonomous addict, who sticks by his
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original decision to take drugs, is virtually 
indistinguishable from the non-autonomous one who keeps taking 
them for purely physical reasons. The neo-Kantian 
foundationalist cannot, therefore, proscribe the use of drugs 
as a non-autonomous conception of the good.
The last putative non-autonomous conception of the good 
that deserves mention is suicide/euthanasia. Unlike the 
voluntary slave and the drug user, the person who puts an end 
to his own life will certainly be unable to re-evaluate his 
position and revise his decision. It, therefore, appears that 
if there is any non-autonomous conception of the good that a 
person could choose, it is death.
But is this view compatible with the foundationalist 
state constraint position? A neo-Kantian foundationalist could 
very well argue that the person who deliberately takes his own 
life is not choosing not to be autonomous. What he chooses is 
to cease to exist and this can hardly fit into the notion of 
a conception of the good. It, therefore, follows that the 
principle of constraint does not hold in this particular case. 
As Archard puts it, "suicide brings about a situation in which 
the 'liberty principle' no longer applies."26
Straightforward though it may appear, this point fails to 
answer an important question: does the foundationalist
morality allow individuals to leave its jurisdiction? The 
foundationalist's most fundamental assumption is that public 
life should be regulated by a morality that protects (and in 
certain cases this only means "respects") what is essentially 
human. Given that being alive is implicit in the essentialist
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account, why should the act of suicide be permissible?
A possible answer is that the individual who chooses 
death has first lost the dignity of autonomy (e.g. through 
incurable physical pain, chronic depression or dishonour). If 
it is possible to lose one's dignity of autonomy in a just 
society (and I believe most neo-Kantians would find that it 
is) , then it is possible to lose the willingness to act 
autonomously and to seek death as the only option. If this is 
so, then justice can neither detect nor prevent this from 
happening. This point is alluded to by Archard himself who 
avers that "it could...be rational for individuals to end 
their life...because of [their liberty's] value being 
outweighed by the evils that such individuals must unavoidably 
suffer."27 The evils Archard implies here are not the evils of 
injustice, but the pain and disabilities of illness and the 
internal disorder which they bring about.
Although there is no agreement among neo-Kantian 
foundationalists on whether this view is compatible with the 
two main constraint arguments, there is consensus on one very 
important point: the constraint principle does not classify 
any conceptions of the good as non-autonomous.
4.3 Culture and Conceptions of the Good
I shall now turn to a different kind of conception of the 
good, one that is much broader in scope than any other 
discussed so far. Conceptions of the good of this kind are 
commonly referred to as "cultures" or "cultural structures". 
Critics of neo-Kantian foundationalism have suggested that the
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good of cultural membership (being a communally shared good) 
is lost to the members of a society whose basic structure is 
governed by the state constraint principle. Given that the 
principle guarantees each individual's freedom to revise, 
modify or change his conception of the good and that cultures 
are sets of values, priorities or activities that people feel 
obliged to perform, respect and adhere to, it appears that the 
citizens of the neo-Kantian state would hardly take the 
trouble to subscribe to them over long periods of time. This 
clearly means that in a society governed by the neo-Kantian 
morality, cultures would dwindle through lack of committed and 
long-term support. The crux of this view is not only that the 
principle of constraint discriminates against these particular 
conceptions of the good and fosters asocial individualism, but 
that the loss of cultural membership is the loss of an 
essentially human attribute.
The most notable response to this position is offered by 
Will Kymlicka. Unlike Richards, whose attack on morals laws 
strengthens the impression that atomism is built into the neo- 
Kantian foundations, Kymlicka seeks to accommodate the 
communitarian critique by arguing that cultural membership is 
an indispensable element of the neo-Kantian position and that 
it should be made explicit in the formulation of the 
constraint principle. His position will, therefore, be the 
main focus of this section. My main point will be that 
Kymlicka overstates his case and contradicts his commitment to 
autonomy-based foundationalism. Nevertheless, the remedy can 
be found within his argument, and my aim is to redress it and
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set it in line with the foundationalist constraint position.
Kymlicka's commitment to the autonomy-based 
foundationalism of Mill and Rawls is beyond doubt. In his 
"Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality", he defends 
Rawlsian state constraint along foundationalist lines and 
claims that the state should not interfere with the pursuit of 
communal goods. As he puts it, "...liberals believe that 
people naturally form and join social relations and forums in 
which they come to understand and pursue the good. The state 
is not needed to provide that communal context and is likely 
to distort the normal processes of collective deliberations 
and cultural development".28 And yet, in his Liberalism. 
Community and Culture. Kymlicka changes his mind on the issue 
and maintains that the preservation of minority cultures 
through the distribution of minority rights to all cultural 
minorities is a dictate of justice.29 In his view, this is the 
conclusion that a neo-Kantian foundationalist is bound to 
reach once he acknowledges the fact that the context of 
autonomous choice is a particular cultural structure. As he 
puts it, "in deciding how to lead our lives, we do not start 
de novo. . . "30 We examine ideals and lifestyles that have 
already been developed by others before us and we adopt them 
or modify them so as to fulfil our preferences and satisfy our 
desires. The articulation of our desires and the development 
of our preferences are achieved in terms of the available 
systems of value and the local language which, itself, is "not 
a neutral medium for identifying the content of certain 
activities."31 To this, Kymlicka adds that
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[t]he processes by which options and choices become 
significant for us are linguistic and historical 
processes. Whether or not a course of action has any 
significance for us depends on whether, or how, our 
language renders vivid to us the point of that 
activity. And in the way our language renders vivid 
these activities is a matter of our cultural 
heritage.32
Kymlicka mistakenly draws the conclusion that the individual's 
autonomy depends on the security of his culture (his index of 
choices, as it were) and that the security of the latter must, 
therefore, be guaranteed.33 The flaw in the argument is that 
once autonomy is accepted as a foundation, the view that the 
individual is embedded in his own culture can only be held in 
a particular way. It cannot mean that the self is only defined 
by his culture or society.h To suggest so is to reject 
foundationalist philosophy and embrace interpretivism instead, 
which is something that, I assume, Kymlicka is not willing to 
do. His mistake, therefore, is that in trying to placate the 
communitarian critics of neo-Kantian foundationalism, he tried 
to combine two very different, irreconcilable positions: neo- 
Kantian foundationalism and the interpretivist thesis. This is 
picked up by Jeremy Waldron, who asserts that "...in 
developing his case, Kymlicka is guilty of something like the 
fallacy of composition.1134
hWhen not accompanied by some account of what is 
essentially human, the claim that the individual is somehow 
"attached" to his culture becomes a meta-theoretical 
statement, a rejection of the universalist essentialism of 
foundationalism, an echo of Herder's much quoted phrase "Not 
a man, not a country, not a people, not the past of a people, 
not a state are like one another. Consequently, the true, the 
beautiful and the good in them are also not alike" (quotation 
from Christopher Berry, Human Nature, p. 69).
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This is not to say that the neo-Kantian foundationalist 
does not appreciate the significance of cultural membership. 
In fact, although he cannot prescribe the protection of 
cultural minorities or assign rights to all of them, there are 
cases in which he finds that the assignment of minority rights 
is warranted. Furthermore, he takes the view that the state 
can, indeed, contribute to cultural enrichment, but without 
assuming a protectionist role.
I believe that it is possible to interpret Kymlicka's 
recent argument along these lines. Although he overshoots his 
target and promises his audience more than he can actually 
derive from his foundations, this less protectionist position 
is compatible with most elements of his recent argument and 
fully in line with the earlier one.
In his Liberalism. Community and Culture. Kymlicka asserts 
that the morality that should govern the basic structure of 
society is not to be found in any particular cultural 
structure or structures, but to be derived from the neo- 
Kantian essentialist account. In his view, cultural structures 
have instrumental value: they provide their members with the 
range of choices that is needed for the exercise of autonomous 
choice-making. In Kymlicka's own words, we
...should be concerned with the fate of cultural 
structures, not because they have some moral status 
of their own, but because it's only through having 
a rich and secure cultural structure that people can 
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options 
available to them, and intelligently examine their 
value.35
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But what does being "concerned with the fate of cultural 
structures" mean to the neo-Kantian foundationalist? To answer 
the question we must first examine Kymlicka's use of 
"culture", "cultural structure", "cultural enrichment" and 
"conception of the good".
Apparently, Kymlicka uses the first two of these terms as 
synonyms. He takes them both to mean the sum of shared values, 
customs, habits, conventions and activities (i.e. the sum of 
particular conceptions of the good) of a linguistic or ethnic 
group. Kymlicka refers to Quebecois culture, Inuit culture, 
Islamic culture and even to English culture (with reference to 
Lord Devlin's views on the "dangers" to the English values and 
way of life). This means that, in Kymlicka's view, a cultural 
structure is a set of particular, integrated conceptions which 
is insulated from the outside world. To use Jeremy Waldron's 
phrase, a cultural structure, for Kymlicka, is a "snapshot 
version of it".36 Accordingly, "cultural membership" means 
having exclusive access to an integrated set of conceptions of 
the good. It follows, that when Kymlicka talks about "being 
concerned with the fate of cultural structures", he suggests 
that the neo-Kantian foundationalist morality requires the 
protection of cultures qua integrated, sequestered sets of 
conceptions of the good.
Nevertheless, implicit in Kymlicka's argument is the 
notion of "cultural enrichment" which comports poorly with his 
notion of cultural structure and cultural membership. Kymlicka 
clearly believes that a rich cultural structure is a condition
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of autonomous choice-making since it provides a variety of 
means by which the individual can articulate his preferences 
and plan their fulfilment. This means that he does not have to 
and, indeed, cannot accept the narrow sense of "cultural 
structure"; he cannot think of a culture as a stylized, ready­
made lifestyle that has to be protected by means of minority 
rights. Instead, a culture must be understood as a structure 
into which individuals may bring elements of different or even 
rival cultures as they revise, modify and develop its values 
and practices through their autonomous choices.
Kymlicka must, therefore, conclude that "being concerned 
about cultural structures" does not mean preserving each and 
every one of them separately by assigning separate 
jurisdictions, but guaranteeing freedom of choice for the 
members of cultural minorities and widening the range of 
options by encouraging individuals to play an active role in 
the development of their culture.
Not surprisingly, Kymlicka has not excluded this 
conclusion from his mixed argument. On one occasion he states 
clearly that "the government [should] ensure...an adequate 
range of options by providing tax credits to individuals who 
make culture-supporting contributions in accordance with their 
personal perfectionist ideals."37 More significantly, he 
rejects the view of a cultural structure as a "favourite 
snapshot" when he asserts that the reactionary (defensive) 
face of Islam is not its true or genuine expression and that 
the fundamentalists who claim that without restriction on the 
freedom of speech, press, religion, sexual practices etc. of
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its own members, their culture will disintegrate, should not 
be taken as the true spokesmen for Islam nor as its true 
adherents. To this he adds that "...it is wildly implausible 
to suppose that allowing individuals freedom of religion or 
sexual practices would lead to the breakdown of that [i.e. the 
islamic] community, be it in England or Iran."38 This is a 
view of a cultural community that an uncompromising 
interpretivist would reject. As it stands, however, it would 
get the endorsement of many a neo-Kantian philosopher.1
It is, therefore, my view that despite Kymlicka's attempt 
to appease the communitarian critics of state constraint by 
ascribing minority rights, his neo-Kantian foundationalism is 
difficult to conceal. In fact, one could say that his argument 
is but a juxtaposition of the interpret ivist thesis and the 
neo-Kantian position and that it cannot, therefore, yield his 
conclusions.
Now, although neo-Kantian foundationalism does not call for 
the distribution of cultural minority rights to each and every 
cultural minority within society, it does warrant the 
assignment of minority rights in specific circumstances. I 
will now argue that the Kymlicka of Liberalism. Community and 
Culture reaches this conclusion, but decides, rather 
unjustifiably, to go beyond it and prescribe minority rights
‘Thus stated, Kymlicka's position is what Waldron calls 
"the cosmopolitan alternative" in his "Minority Cultures and 
the Cosmopolitan Alternative", in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The 
Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1995), pp. 93-122. It is also no different from the view 
expressed by Allen Buchanan in "Assessing the Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism", Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 852-882.
136
for all cultural minorities.
In Liberalism. Community and Culture Kymlicka actually 
proffers a reformulation of the second foundationalist 
constraint argument. As I have already explained (see 3.6), 
the starting-point of the second foundationalist constraint 
argument is that individuals qua rational choice-makers have 
the essential desire for primary goods. Kymlicka now claims 
that cultural membership is one such good. As he puts it, 
"[t]he primary good being recognised is the cultural community 
as a context of choice, not the character of the community or 
its traditional ways of life, which people are free to endorse 
or reject."39 Given that primary goods are actually conditions 
required for the pursuit of any particular chosen goal,
cultural membership, as a "context of choice", must be
regarded as such a good.
This addition to the class of primary goods yields not 
just the Rawlsian harm and liberty principles, but what I will 
call the "cultural harm" principle. The argument itself, like 
the second foundationalist constraint argument, is quite 
straightforward: if, indeed, cultural membership is a primary 
good, a person who is "undeservedly" deprived of his cultural 
membership is entitled to some form of restitution. But what
exactly constitutes an undeserved loss of cultural
membership?
First of all it is important to understand what does not 
constitute the loss of cultural membership in Kymlicka's view. 
To do so one has to appreciate the role of the market in 
foundationalist constraint theory. The second foundationalist
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constraint argument, as it is presented in this chapter, binds 
together the notions of autonomy, equality and responsibility. 
Individuals making autonomous choices from a position of 
(near) equality of primary goods are responsible for the 
outcome of their choices and are not eligible for compensation 
granted from the institutional structure. All foundationalists 
discussed in this chapter claim that the market, under certain 
conditions, is consonant with this foundationalist picture. 
Kymlicka himself asserts that
...given certain background conditions, the market 
assesses the cost to others of my choices. Under 
these conditions, an efficient market distribution 
of resources is a fair one...[Foundationalists] 
value the market (or something that replicates the 
results of the market) not because maximizing wealth 
or preferences is a good itself, but because markets 
provide a way of measuring what is in fact 
equitable.40
Kymlicka not only endorses the market, but talks about the 
"cultural marketplace"41, where cultural membership is bought 
or sold at a price. Within the market individuals quite 
literally "shop for culture". They make choices responding to 
the realities of the market as well as to their own personal 
preferences, and in so doing, they transform their culture 
(e.g. in order to minimize the cost of membership) , convert to 
rival cultures by buying membership to them or, as so often 
happens, by assimilating particular features (conceptions) of 
different cultures. One can, therefore, belong to what may be 
called English culture, but, at the same time, follow Oriental 
religious practices, read Russian literature, cook Chinese
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food and collect African tribal art. In this context, the 
decline of a particular "snapshot version" of a culture is 
quite possible, and even probable.j But does it entail the 
loss of cultural membership? And if it does, are the members 
of a cultural community responsible for it and, therefore, 
ineligible for compensation?
Kymlicka's answer is that cultural decline, or 
transformation, does not involve the loss of membership at 
all. Members revise or move away from their culture gradually. 
When, in the eyes of the conservative members of the cultural 
group, the culture appears to be in a crisis, most members 
have already opted for a revised version of it or have secured 
membership to a neighbouring or rival culture.
For Kymlicka, French Canada is a case in point. A radical 
transformation of the Quebecois culture began in the 1960s. 
Slowly but steadily members of the local culture moved away 
from institutions which traditionally characterised French 
Canadian life (e.g. the Roman Catholic Church, the Union 
Nationale party, parochial schools) and in parallel the number 
of Anglophones grew. Membership was not lost because the fate 
of Quebecois culture was actually determined by the autonomous 
choices of its members, who freely chose a specific
j0f course, what declines is a particular expression of 
the culture which has been recorded in time and not the 
culture itself. For the neo-Kantian foundationalist, 
therefore, cultural decline is not an unintended or 
undesirable development. It simply is a consequence of the 
autonomous choices of individuals who rationally form 
preferences and respond to the ever-changing realities of the 
cultural marketplace. The neo-Kantian would, therefore, 
understand decline as transformation. It is only to the 
reactionaries within each cultural group that decline has 
negative connotations.
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interpretation of what they perceived as their culture. Those 
with a nostalgic view of earlier stages in the development of 
the culture have no right, according to foundationalist 
morality, to impose their favourite version of the culture on 
others.
But if cultural membership is not lost with the demise of 
a culture within the cultural marketplace, then how is it lost 
and when does its loss warrant compensatory measures? 
Kymlicka's answer is straightforward: membership is lost with 
the violent expansion of rival cultures.
The destruction of the native North American cultures is 
a case in point. Native Americans were never given the option 
of revising their culture and making it viable in a cultural 
marketplace. Their traditions and ways of life were destroyed 
by the invading armies of a culture that regarded them as 
savages. As a result, they undeservedly lost both the good of 
cultural membership and that of self-respect. Since this was 
not the result of any individually or collectively made choice 
of the American Indians themselves, the neo-Kantian concludes 
that native Americans are entitled to a form of compensation 
that will bring about a situation approximating the status quo 
ante.
For Kymlicka, this can be achieved only through the 
introduction of the kind of minority rights that are presently 
in place in Canada and the United States. These rights aim at 
the protection of native Americans qua members of their 
violated culture and involve the establishment of "special 
political jurisdictions over which Indian communities have
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certain guaranteed powers, and within which non-Indian 
Americans have restricted mobility, property and voting 
rights."42 This unequal distribution of rights is a dictate of 
foundationalist morality and more specifically of a "cultural 
harm" principle which could be formulated in the following 
way:
encroachments made upon a cultural community outside 
the cultural marketplace warrant the issuing of 
minority rights that compensate its members for 
losing the primary good of cultural membership.
To attribute this argument to Kymlicka is to say that, 
despite his official position in favour of group rights for 
all cultural minorities, he does not understand personal 
choices to be confined within a single culture. The fact that 
individuals revise and develop their own cultural structure 
does not mean that they choose only between the different 
conceptions of the good that can be found within it. Instead, 
they choose features of other cultures and seek to incorporate 
them into their own. In the end, the cultural borders may 
become virtually indiscernible through a process of what 
Salman Rushdie calls "change-by fusion, change-by- 
conjoining".43 The outcome of this process does not concern 
the neo-Kantian foundationalist.
In my view, therefore, the neo-Kantian Kymlicka goes no 
further than the conditional assignment of minority rights and 
this makes his position defensible against John Danley's 
criticism.
In his article "Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and
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Cultural Minorities", Danley claims that Kymlicka fails to 
show the significance of culture in liberal philosophy and 
politics and asserts that Mill's On Liberty is more 
successful, in that respect, than Kymlicka's book. Danley 
clearly fails to discern Kymlicka's reformulation of the 
second foundationalist constraint argument and concludes that 
"for Kymlicka the relevant difference [between native American 
cultures and other ethnic cultures] is that the aboriginal 
cultures are more vulnerable and hence require more drastic 
measures for their protection."44 But if aboriginal cultures 
are vulnerable, he says, so are the Italian, German, Irish and 
other ethnic cultures of North America. And if indeed minority 
rights are awarded to all vulnerable cultural minorities, the 
result will be the "Balkanization" of the United States, the 
creation of "a crazy quilt of different jurisdictions and 
different languages, a jumble of different sets of rights."45
This would have been the right conclusion, had Kymlicka 
not made it clear that cultures, according to neo-Kantian 
foundationalism, are more resilient than the conservatives 
within each cultural community tend to think. The line 
separating Indian from Western European ethnic cultures is not 
drawn arbitrarily. European immigrants to the Americas could 
not have hoped to maintain their cultural heritage and pass it 
on intact to the next generation as if they had never left 
their native lands. They knowingly and willingly entered the 
cultural marketplace in the new countries.k The Indians, on
kIn his discussion on the claims and grievances of the 
Pakistani minority in Britain, Bikhu Parekh regards the view 
that by emigrating to Britain Pakistanis consented to its way
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the other hand, were given no choice. After invasion and 
denigration, the remnants of their communities could not 
possibly have been expected to compete in the cultural 
marketplace. In fact, the very rules of the market were never 
in place where they were concerned.
Of course, Danley's understanding of Kymlicka's position 
is understandable for, as has been mentioned, Kymlicka 
overshoots his target by endorsing the "embededness thesis" 
which is irreconcilable with the autonomy-based element in his 
position. Nevertheless, the main point to be made here is that 
the notions of culture and cultural development are not alien 
to neo-Kantian foundationalist philosophy. Individuals 
transform the cultural structures within which they are 
brought up by forming the second-order desire to experiment 
with, adopt and pursue conceptions of the good which are 
external to their culture. By exploring this idea, the neo- 
Kantian Kymlicka broadens the scope of foundationalist state 
constraint.
of life and incurred an obligation to abide by its laws, norms 
and values, as totally inaccurate and misleading. He states 
that Britain recruited Pakistanis "to help re-build its post­
war economy in full knowledge of who they were and what they 
stood for." He, therefore, concludes that it is Britain who is 
under an obligation to respect and protect Islamic 
culture.(Bikhu Parekh, "The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda 
for Political Philosophy", in Will Kymlicka, The Rights of 
Minority Cultures, p. 310). This kind of argument bears little 
relevance to the neo-Kantian position expressed here, since 
the British state is not governed by the constraint principle 
(for instance, it has a blasphemy law applicable only to 
Christian belief). For the neo-Kantian, it is not a particular 
way of life that the newcomers are expected to conform to, but 
the higher-order morality that derives from an account of what 
is essentially human. By doing so they are bound to be more 
exposed to the influence of other cultures than they would be 
in a single-culture society.
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CHAPTER 5 
Interpretivist State Constraint
Having presented state constraint as a foundationalist 
position, I now turn to interpretivist state constraint, i.e. 
the view that the state constraint principle is latent in the 
political practices of Western democratic societies, or, to 
put it differently, that it depends for its formulation and 
justification on the specifically political ideas that are 
prevalent in Western democracies. I specifically focus on two 
interpretivist arguments: first, what I call the "direct"
argument and, second, the Rawlsian constructivist argument. In 
the former the interpretivist philosopher presents what he 
regards as widely shared ideas and general expectations, as 
well as historical and sociological facts, as evidence in 
support of the view that (his formulation of) the state 
constraint principle is latent in Western political practices. 
I attribute this argument to Rawls despite the fact that he 
never puts it forward in a systematic fashion. My reason for 
making this move is the following: I believe that Rawls'
official, constructivist argument is offered as an improvement 
on the direct argument but is, as I will argue in 5.2, suspect 
from a meta-theoretical point of view. Rawls' interpretivist 
state constraint position is, therefore, safer only in the 
form of a direct argument similar to the one I piece together
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drawing from A Theory of Justice and Rawls' later writings.
The constructivist argument, presented in the second part 
of the first section, is far more elaborate than the direct 
argument and incorporates various levels of interpretation. 
Rawls argues that members of democratic societies share 
certain moral views and self-perceptions which include the 
idea of the "moral person". He then constructs a hypothetical 
process, the Original Position, which incorporates his 
interpretivist findings as well as what he regards as two 
important elements of the democratic process: representation 
and proceduralism. In the Original Position the fictitious 
representatives of "actual persons" assemble to decide on 
principles that would govern the basic structure of a 
democratic society. One of these principles is that of state 
constraint (or, to put it differently, the liberty and harm 
principles).
The constructivist argument differs from the direct 
argument in that it is a system of interpretive findings 
interacting with one another in accordance with a process 
which seems to be characteristic of Western democratic 
societies.
Now, portraying Rawls as an interpretivist philosopher is 
not putting forward a far-fetched interpretation of his 
philosophy. In recent writings Rawls explicitly endorses 
interpretivism when he states that "the aim of political 
philosophy, when it presents itself within the political 
culture of a democratic society, is to present it [i.e. the 
democratic society] with certain conceptions and principles
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congenial to its most essential[a] convictions and historical 
traditions.111 Rawls now avers that the principles that he 
suggests should govern the basic structure of society are 
characteristic of contemporary Western political culture, a 
culture that comprises "the main institutions, the historical 
traditions [and] the shared fund of implicitly recognized 
basic ideas and principles."2
As has been mentioned, although many of the arguments in 
A Theory of Justice are interpretivist in character, the Rawls 
of A Theory of Justice does not seem to be committed to any 
one view of political philosophizing. The recent, self- 
conscious move towards interpretivism aims at satisfying those 
critics who having read Rawls' book as a foundationalist 
treatise, accused its author of showing disregard for the on­
going, lived-in character of Western social and political 
tradition.15 However, for some commentators, this move is also 
a self-critique. Rawls accepts the interpretivist critique 
based on the foundationalist reading of his book, endorses 
interpretivist meta-theory and offers a restatement which is
“The use of the word "essential" in the context of an 
interpretivist argument is ill-advised. Although the 
interpretivist studies the historical development of moral and 
political practices, ideas and self-perceptions and the 
circumstances under which they became prevalent, he does not 
believe that there are any permanent, immutable features that 
are unique to the society he investigates. For him, a 
tradition is under constant (however slow or subtle) change. 
Rawls is not always conscious of this point. It may, however, 
be the case that by "essential" he simply means prominent.
bHere I have in mind Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, 
especially in Sources of the Self (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1990), and Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1982) .
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meant to be free of all foundationalist (universalist) 
elements.3
It appears, therefore, that in the light of these recent 
developments it does make sense to attribute to Rawls both a 
foundationalist and an interpretivist state constraint 
principle. The latter is, of course, bound to be formulated 
and justified in a different manner. Interpretivist state 
constraint must be shown to be characteristic of Western 
(American) political culture, to be tacitly recognized or 
already (partially) institutionalised and to be consonant with 
shared meanings and self-perceptions of the members of modern 
democratic societies. I will now present the direct constraint 
argument as a Rawlsian position.
5.1 The Direct Interpretivist Constraint Argument
From a methodological point of view, the direct argument is 
quite straightforward. The interpretivist philosopher presents 
evidence intended to prove that a specific principle of 
justice is latent in the public morality of the particular 
society he investigates. The argument of Michael Walzer's 
Spheres of Justice, for instance, is such an argument. Walzer 
defends principles of justice which, first, circumscribe 
different "distributive spheres" or "domains" and, second, 
dictate how goods should be distributed within each domain.0
cIt should be made clear that the spheres are not related 
to the explanationist's philosophical conceptions (understood 
sub specie aeternitatis). For the interpretivist a "sphere" is 
the scope (or jurisdiction) of a prescribed principle rather 
than a conceptual whole (e.g. the Oakeshottian civitas) 
comprising essential features (or postulates).
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Throughout his book Walzer maintains that the proposed 
principles are latent in Western (American and European) 
public moralities. He presents historical, sociological and 
even anthropological evidence to prove his point. He focuses 
on the history of the development of social institutions but 
also draws material from literature and mythology. Although 
Rawls offers only fragments of a direct interpretivist 
argument he endorses Walzerian methodology when he declares 
that "[t]he reasons...I give for my view are historical and 
sociological. . . What. . .1 hold is that we must draw the obvious 
lessons of our political history since the Reformation and the 
Wars of Religion, and the development of modern constitutional 
democracies.I|4
Of course, the similarity with Walzer is not strictly 
methodological. Like Walzerian principles of justice, the 
Rawlsian principle of state constraint can be seen both as a 
distributive principle (governing the distribution of 
liberties to citizens) and as a principle marking the limit 
between two separate distributive domains: the political and 
the social or extra-political. I would, therefore, say that 
there is a distinct Walzerian flavour in the direct 
interpretivist constraint argument, whereas the constructivist 
argument, as we shall see later on, is an attempt on Rawls' 
part to produce an interpretivist style of his own and at the 
same time to deal with the main weakness of interpretivist 
philosophy, namely the lack of fixed, external criteria of 
evaluation.
As we saw in the previous chapter, neo-Kantian
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foundationalist morality does not dictate the prohibition or 
restriction of any conceptions of the good. The foundationally 
derived state constraint principle grants everyone the 
"greatest equal liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others" and allows all individuals to adopt, develop, and 
pursue the conceptions of the good that they autonomously 
choose. Only "modes of conduct" which interfere with the 
liberty of others ought to be restricted or prohibited. The 
crux of the argument in support of this principle is that 
prohibitions against the adoption and pursuit of conceptions 
of the good compromise the autonomous, essential character of 
those who choose them.
The formulation/justification of the interpretivist state 
constraint principle (and the component principles of liberty 
and harm) is quite different. This time "liberty" is not taken 
in the gross and regarded as a general idea meaning the 
absence of moral (and physical) coercion, but a list of basic 
liberties drawn from the political culture of modern 
democratic societies. In Rawls' words, the interpretivist 
philosopher must show "that the scheme of basic liberties as 
a family is part of a coherent and workable conception of a 
democratic regime and, moreover, a conception that is 
congruent with its most essential[d] convictions."5
Rawls' list of basic liberties include "political liberty 
(the right to vote and be eligible for public office) together 
with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and
dOnce again, it is important to emphasize that "essential" 
in the context of interpetivist philosophy means prevalent or 
widely shared.
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freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right 
to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.”6 
These are presented as liberties that make sense to the 
members of democratic societies; they are features of a living 
political tradition with its own "thick” moral/political 
vocabulary. It can, therefore, be said that there is a tacit 
consensus on the relevance and significance of these liberties 
in modern democracies. With regard to the freedom of speech, 
for example, Rawls states that "within our tradition there has 
been a consensus that the discussion of general, political, 
religious and philosophical doctrines can never be censored."7
The interpretivist liberty principle, therefore, takes 
the following form:
Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal liberties which is compatible with 
a similar scheme of liberties for all.
The harm principle is, of course, adapted to this formulation 
of the principle. Justice now requires the prohibition, 
restriction and punishment of modes of conduct which interfere 
with the basic liberties and non-injuries of others.
What is not clear in all of this is why the basic 
liberties are individuated (i.e. distributed to individuals) 
and distributed equally. The answer is that, in terms of the 
direct argument, individuation and equal distribution are 
simply included in the shared meaning of liberty in democratic 
societies. Liberty as a "scheme of basic liberties" is equally
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allotted to every citizen because the members of democratic 
societies traditionally understand it or tacitly acknowledge 
it to be so. The alternative interpretivist way to justify the 
equal distribution of liberty is to show that citizens 
actually understand themselves as equals and that this notion 
of equality somehow translates into an equal distribution of 
the basic liberties. It is this alternative route that Rawls 
takes in his constructivist argument and which I will examine 
in the next section.
Now, as Rawls avers, "basic liberties... take certain 
questions off the political agenda."9 What this means is that 
the constraint principle can be presented not only as a 
liberty/harm principle (in which case emphasis is given to its 
distributive function) but as a principle that, using the 
terminology of Michael Walzer, guards the limits of distinct 
distributive domains. As has been mentioned, Rawls finds that 
there are only two such domains, the political and the extra­
political. The distribution of goods in the former cannot be 
based on some evaluation of conflicting conceptions of the 
good because that would violate the individuals' basic 
liberties. Questions about the cogency of (foundationalist) 
philosophical positions, about the existence of God and the 
propriety of lifestyles and principles of personal virtue are, 
therefore, left out of the political agenda. Hence, state 
constraint is presented as an exclusionary principle that 
reads as follows:
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[T]here is no political... evaluation of conceptions 
of the good within the limits permitted by 
justice.10
It should be emphasized that the state constraint principle 
(in either of the two formulations) is not derived from some 
position of moral/religious scepticism or any other conception 
of the good. Rather, the argument is that in Western 
democracies conceptions of the good are not perceived as 
political principles that could govern the distribution of 
what the state is tacitly expected to distribute— namely 
liberties, powers, wealth, income and opportunities. With 
respect to this point Rawls avers in A Theory of Justice that 
in Western democratic societies conceptions of the good are 
tacitly recognized to be "imprecise as political principles 
and their application to public questions...to be unsettled 
and idiosyncratic.1,11 The fact that the main political forces 
in Western democracies are "catch-all" political parties 
rather than sectarian organizations can be offered as evidence 
in support of this point. What has been branded as "sectarian 
politics" (e.g. in Northern Ireland) should be regarded as an 
historical aberration and the interpretivist cannot draw from 
there valid political principles. This, of course, does not 
mean that the members of sectarian groups are not entitled to 
the scheme of basic liberties mentioned above. It only means 
that the liberty and harm principles (along with the Rawlsian 
second principle of justice) are derived not from any 
particular religious and philosophical doctrines but from a 
specifically political conception governing the distribution
155
of particular goods which are widely regarded as necessary to 
the adherents of all conceptions of the good. All such
conceptions administer non-political goods which are 
prescribed by philosophical truth, religious belief and 
conceptions of personal virtue or character. Hence, the 
distinctly political conception is thought to have a limited 
range (or jurisdiction) and to lack the authority to evaluate 
the differing, non-political conceptions of the good. In
Rawls' own words, "...there are no resources within the 
political view to judge conflicting conceptions [of the 
good] .,|12
It clearly follows that when state officials evaluate 
conceptions of the good, they contravene the principles 
implicit in the public morality and operate outside the 
political domain. They take sides in the disagreement between 
the advocates of different conceptions of the good and
practically enforce (or help to enforce) one or some of these 
conceptions either by means of propaganda, or by distributing 
goods (like divine grace) which are not perceived to be 
suitable for state distribution, or by distributing the proper 
goods, but with regard to individuals' religious or 
intellectual partisanship. In all these cases there is 
interference with the basic liberties of individuals.
Rawls offers the following interpretivist argument in
support of this view. First, he notes the fact of pluralism 
and avers that Western societies harbour a "...diversity of 
religious, moral, intellectual and philosophical doctrines, 
which adhere to conflicting ideals of personal virtue which
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are to govern all parts of one's life."13 He then states that 
the fact of pluralism can only be altered by "the oppressive 
use of state power," and maintains that such use of state 
power is not congruent with the specifically political 
conception which is prevalent in Western democracies. One 
could also add to this that the actual institutional structure 
of democratic societies maintains and even enhances pluralism 
and that, therefore, the principle seems to be already 
institutionalized.
Conceptions of the good are, of course, evaluated in the 
non-political domain. Within religious sects, academic 
circles, cultural groups, clubs and associations theories are 
scrutinized, lifestyles criticized, moral outlooks taken on 
faith or rejected out of hand. Social organizations often link 
the distribution of non-political goods (e.g. divine grace, 
knowledge of philosophical truths, physical fitness, inner 
peace, companionship) with their members' acceptance of 
particular values and compliance with specific directions. 
Each member is, however, at the same time, a citizen and as 
such has an equal right to the scheme of basic liberties. 
These protect him both against state interference and against 
harm inflicted to him in the non-political domain.®
cFor instance a religious group cannot deprive its members 
of any of the liberties mentioned above. The threat of 
expulsion from the group is the usual means of inducing 
members to fall into line but it does not constitute harm. As 
long as the option to leave is open to all members, the 
principle is not violated. Of course, in many Western 
societies it is often the case that religious or ethnic groups 
seek to punish or reform members who have sought to distance 
themselves from them. For instance certain Muslim communities 
in Britain exercise pressure to those (especially the women) 
who have opted for lifestyles regarded as incompatible with
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According to Rawls, the fact that we can distinguish 
between the political and the non-political and that we obtain 
principles of justice from the former does not mean that 
"...the participation by everyone in democratic self- 
government is regarded as a pre-eminent good for fully 
autonomous citizens.1114 He avers that the view that political 
life should have a central place in Western societies "...is 
but one conception of the good among others" and is derived 
from a particular (Aristotelian) philosophy. Rawls' point is, 
I believe, congruent with his interpretivism. The growing 
political apathy among citizens in the United States does not 
prove that the specifically political conception (implicit in 
which is the state constraint principle) is no longer a 
feature of Western public morality.
A more thorough formulation of this argument would be the 
following: within the political domain there is disagreement 
as to "...how more exactly to draw the basic liberties when 
they conflict...; how to further interpret the requirements of 
distributive justice and finally...questions of policy..."15 
Traditionally, disagreements are resolved through reasoned
their religious dogmas. This, of course, is in violation of 
the principle. A more controversial case is that of prominent 
members (e.g. authors and artists) who, without always 
exiting, try to revise the group's conception of the good and 
to introduce changes that may weaken the group's cohesion or 
change its structure. Being distinguished, influential people, 
they are thought by the conservative elements to be a threat 
to the group's existence even after they have been expelled. 
Thus leaders of Muslim communities in France have issued the 
fatwa against prominent Muslim scholars and in Britain the 
Rushdie affair kindled a militant tendency within the Muslim 
minority. But clearly the revisionists do not commit harm 
since they do not violate the liberties (as these are 
understood in Western democracies) of their co-religionists 
and any attempt to silence them constitutes harm.
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discussion (in which the proponents of different distributive 
proposals and policies state their case in an effort to 
convince others and gain their support) and voting (which 
determines which proposal has the widest support). The 
arguments presented in support of different distributive plans 
during this process do not connect the proposed distribution 
with a particular conception of the good. They do not, in 
other words, present the distribution as a dictate of a 
conception of the good (a religious, philosophical or 
intellectual doctrine) or as a prerequisite for the 
realization of such a conception. Rather, the arguments in 
favour of or against any proposals are presented in terms of 
the specifically political conception which is characteristic 
of Western democratic culture. This is not related with the 
levels of political participation (the voting and debating) in 
these societies. The fact that participation dwindles does not 
mean that the distinction between the political and the non- 
political is no longer acknowledged by the members of Western 
societies. It could mean that unresolved, political issues 
concern a diminishing number of citizens, but not that the 
political conception comprising the principles of justice is 
no longer prevalent/
This discussion of Rawls' direct interpretivist argument
fIn "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", p. 14, Rawls 
suggests that political participation and the development of 
"political virtues" are of instrumental value since they can 
help guard against abuses of power (i.e. violations of the 
state constraint principle). Clearly this is a political (as 
opposed to philosophical-interpretivist) consideration and is 
in no way incompatible with the interpretivist state 
constraint position.
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would be incomplete without mention of the notion of "public 
reason". In Rawls' view, the distinctly political conception 
includes, along with the principles of justice, "...certain 
guidelines of inquiry and publicly recognized rules of 
assessing evidence" governing the application of the 
principles of justice. More specifically, it includes "...the 
shared methods of, and the public knowledge available to, 
common sense, and the procedures and conclusions of science" 
which are not controversial.16 Implicit here is the view that 
although in Western societies there are more than one 
scientific perspective and one notion of common sense (all of 
them undergoing changes over time), the differences between 
them are not deep enough to suggest that there is no single 
one, distinctly Western, notion of public reason.
Before I conclude this discussion of the direct state 
constraint argument, I should touch on the subject of the 
"priority of liberty" over the other goods distributed through 
the basic institutional structure. Over the years Rawls has 
offered different arguments in support of this view. In A 
Theory of Justice, for example, the priority of liberty is 
based on the disputable claim that beyond a fairly minimal 
point, the strength of the preference that people have for an 
increase in liberty diminishes less rapidly than that which 
they have for an increase in wealth. One could argue that this 
universalist claim is better suited to the foundationalist 
argument discussed in Chapter 3 in the sense that it can more 
easily be incorporated into an essentialist account rather 
than be presented as a characteristic of the members of
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Western democratic societies. I will not, therefore, examine 
the validity of this claim within the context of 
interpretivist state constraint.
In "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" Rawls 
proffers two further arguments which picture the priority of 
liberty as an essential aspect of the democratic political 
tradition. One of these fits into the direct interpretivist 
approach whereas the other is better suited to Rawlsian 
constructivism and will, therefore, be discussed in the next 
section.
In Rawls' view, constitutional history "suggests that 
principles to regulate economic and social inequalities, and 
other distributive principles, are generally not suitable as 
constitutional restrictions."17 By contrast the liberty/harm 
principle has been regarded as a suitable constitutional 
restriction and has been inscribed in various written 
constitutions. For Rawls this is an indication that the 
priority of liberty over the other public goods is 
characteristic of Western political morality.
But is all this an accurate "reading" of Western 
democratic society? Does Rawls interpret correctly its social 
meanings and, more importantly, is state constraint part of 
these meanings? Is the direct interpretivist argument, with 
all the evidence provided there, accurate? According to the 
sceptic (see also 2.3), without any fixed, external criteria, 
the interpretivist cannot offer a definitive or correct 
picture of his own culture and society. He exposes shared 
understandings and self-perceptions and backs his position
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with certain facts about the historical development of his 
society. Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine what is 
a prevalent conception and what is a historical aberration or 
transient phenomenon, without any fixed external criteria. One 
could, for example, argue that the distinction between the 
political and the non-political does not reflect the true 
character of democratic societies and that Rawls' presentation 
of full political participation as one among many conceptions 
of the good is based on a gross misunderstanding of the 
political process.
For the non-sceptical interpretivist it is not impossible 
to distinguish the good (true) interpretation from the bad one 
on the basis of the evidence presented. Nevertheless, if he 
wants to speak the language of persuasion and appeal even to 
the sceptics in his audience, he is likely to find that the 
direct interpretivist argument is not always the most 
effective means of exerting influence. For this reason, Walzer 
suggests, as we saw in Chapter 2, that the interpretivist 
argument must have an edge, must be radical enough to capture 
the imagination of the audience. Rawls has tried another way 
of making his interpretivist prescriptions attractive, one 
which is less likely to compromise the (interpretivist) truth 
(however uninteresting or mundane it may appear) in order to 
leave a lasting impression on the audience. This new 
interpretivist route is the constructivist argument which I 
will now examine closely.
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5.2 The Constructivist State Constraint Argument
The first level of interpretation in the constructivist 
argument involves the design of two "model conceptions" which 
incorporate ideas latent in the thick language of democratic 
societies and familiar to their members. Having established 
these conceptions as the terms in which we could understand 
the problem of social justice, Rawls constructs a hypothetical 
situation, the Original Position, which incorporates certain 
elements of the democratic process.
As we shall see, the Original Position is, to a large 
extent, simply a matter of presenting Rawlsian prescriptions 
as the outcome of a familiar political procedure: delegates 
convene to decide on principles which will be binding on 
themselves and on their constituents, principles which will 
govern the institutional basis of their society. This 
hypothetical situation is meant to resemble a constitutional 
convention or a legislative assembly so that it can appeal to 
our moral/political intuitions and thus gain the same degree 
of authority and respectability which we presumably recognise 
in such law-making procedures. I believe that this is why 
Rawls calls the Original Position a "device of 
representation".18
At the same time, however, the Original Position can be 
seen as itself a device of interpretation, as a precursor to 
the constitutional, legislative and judicial levels of social 
interpretation. It binds together the model conceptions in a 
manner appropriate to Western democratic societies and what 
it, therefore, yields is not simply principles of justice but
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a more coherent procedure of further specification of these 
principles. In 6.2 I will argue that Rawls' intention to 
appeal to our intuitions by way of presenting familiar 
pictures drawn from public life in democratic societies, does 
little to demonstrate that his prescribed principles are 
really implicit in the moral and political practices of these 
societies.
The starting point of this discussion will have to be the 
first one of Rawls' model conceptions, namely the idea of the 
"moral person" or of the "person qua citizen". Rawls makes it 
clear from the outset that this idea is not founded on a 
metaphysical doctrine, but is "a political conception of the 
person" latent in Western political culture.19
In his recent writings Rawls offers a portrayal of the 
person qua citizen drawing from characteristically Western 
self-perceptions, moral intuitions and shared meanings. His 
first point is that citizens "...are free in that they 
conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral 
power to have a conception of the good."20 Furthermore, the 
citizens' public identity as free persons is not affected by 
changes over time in their conception of the good and, 
therefore, there can be no loss "...of what we may call their 
public identity as a matter of law."21 Rawls hastens to add 
that this is not the case in societies where there is a 
different political conception of the person. As he puts it, 
"[w]e can imagine a society (indeed, history offers numerous 
examples) in which basic rights and recognized claims depend on
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religious affiliation, social class and so on."22
A second characteristic of persons qua citizens is that 
they have the "capacity for an effective sense of justice."23 
This means that they can accept, live by and defend principles 
governing the basic institutional structure of society. The 
capacity for a sense of justice is not connected with some 
essentialist human urge to justify one's actions, ends and 
aspirations to others, but with two self-perceptions which are 
widely shared in Western democratic societies.
First, as Rawls himself puts it, "...citizens view 
themselves as free in that they regard themselves as self- 
originating sources of valid claims." Rawls makes it clear 
that this is not the case in societies with different 
political conceptions, where individuals' claims have weight 
only insofar as they can be "derived from peoples' duties and 
obligations owed to society, or from their ascribed roles in 
the social hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic 
values. "24
Second, citizens are regarded as free in the sense that 
they are capable of taking responsibility for their ends. The 
idea here is that, given certain conditions of equality (which 
the interpretivist seeks to determine and incorporate into his 
principles of justice), individuals "...are thought to be 
capable of adjusting their aims and aspirations in the light 
of what they can reasonably expect to provide for. Moreover 
they are regarded as capable of restricting their claims in 
matters of justice to the kinds of things the principles of 
justice allow."25 So responsibility here means bearing the
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cost of pursuing one's aims under certain conditions of 
equality, and accepting these conditions as mutually binding. 
Again this can be regarded as a point of contrast with 
existing societies where the claims of the members of specific 
groups or social classes are not assessed in this manner. In 
an aristocracy, for instance, the members of the ruling class 
are spared at least some of the cost of pursuing their aims 
and aspirations while members of lower classes can only pursue 
specific aims even if they can afford the cost of higher (more 
expensive) ones.8
In connection with this model conception Rawls discusses 
the issue of primary goods, that is, the social conditions and 
all-purpose means which enable individuals to pursue their 
determinate conceptions of the good and to develop and 
exercise their two moral powers. To determine these goods 
(which are to be distributed, directly or indirectly, through 
the institutional structure) "...we must look to social 
requirements and to normal circumstances of human life in 
democratic society."26
As in the direct argument, the determination of primary 
goods invokes knowledge of the general circumstances and 
requirements of social life in Western societies. But in the 
constructivist argument it does so only in the light of "[the 
political] conception of the person". This means that instead 
of getting the index of primary goods only in the Walzerian
8Rawls' idea of contrasting the self-perceptions that are 
prevalent in Western societies with those that are predominant 
elsewhere does not sit very well with his interpretivism since 
it suggests indirectly that these are categorical differences 
between essentially distinct, immutable worlds.
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manner (by looking for the shared meaning of social goods in 
language, literature and the Western history of institutional 
development), Rawls crosschecks the findings of a Walzerian 
investigation with the features of his first model conception. 
It seems that, for Rawls, the latter method renders his 
argument more coherent and defensible.
Nevertheless, one might argue that deriving the meaning 
of social goods from a conception of the person (even from a 
specifically political, parochial one) is not philosophizing 
as an interpretivist. This, the critic might say, is 
foundationalist deductionism in disguise, a way of deriving 
everything from a specific view of human nature which is 
presented as an interpretivist finding.
I believe that the best response to this criticism that 
is available to Rawls is the following: The design of the 
model conceptions, and of the conception of the "moral person" 
in particular, is itself an interpretivist project carried out 
in parallel with the Walzerian examination of the meaning of 
social goods. The two findings are subsequently juxtaposed in 
order to determine whether they are congruent with each other. 
The underlying idea is that by having a political conception 
of the person the interpretivist can crosscheck the index of 
social goods which he has uncovered and achieve a coherence of 
the whole of shared meanings which he examines. To put it 
differently, it is the design of a conception of the person 
jua citizen (based on shared self-conceptions and familiar 
moral/political ideas like freedom and responsibility) that 
sonfirms the findings of the Walzerian (i.e. the direct)
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method.
To clarify this point it is useful to compare 
interpretivist political philosophy with Schleiermacher's 
theory of literary hermeneutics. According to the latter, the 
literary critic must reconcile all the different parts of a 
text and show how these work together to compose a well- 
integrated meaning. If certain parts of the text contradict 
others, the initial presumption is that one or some of the 
parts have been misunderstood. It is the idea of the 
comprehensive unity of meaning that guides interpretivist's 
critical understanding and gives him a sense of direction.1 
The idea of the person qua citizen purports to do exactly 
that; to enable the political philosopher to choose the 
"proper" interpretation of the meaning of social goods.
But even if this method is not incongruous with 
interpretivist meta-theory, it simply cannot serve as the 
missing criterion by which one can arrive at a single, 
accurate interpretation. In Rawls' case, it simply transfers 
the problem: Since the model conception is itself the outcome 
of an interpretivist project its accuracy is now in doubt. 
Ultimately the whole argument rests on the optimistic 
assumption that an interpretation of the character of the 
person qua citizen in Western societies is rather
hAs Georgia Warnke points out in her Justice and 
Interpretation (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1992), p. 21, even 
deconstructionists implicitly concede that interpretation
involves a holistic understanding of the text. As she puts it,
" [d] econstructionists must have an idea of what the intention 
or meaning is that is undermined by the text's language and
structure and it must have acquired this idea from an
appreciation of how various parts of the text at issue are 
meant or attempt to compose a unified whole."
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straightforward.
Rawls' second model conception is the idea of a "well-ordered 
society". Rawls calls this "the overarching, fundamental 
intuitive idea" and claims that it encompasses certain ideas 
about the ideal social arrangement which are implicit in 
democratic political culture. These ideas are presented as 
features of the second model conception.
First, there is "cooperation" among the members of 
society. Cooperation is regarded as distinct from "merely 
socially coordinated activity" and is guided by publicly 
recognized rules and procedures regulating the conduct of 
those who are cooperating.27 Second, cooperation involves the 
idea of "fair terms of cooperation", that is, terms that each 
participant may accept provided that everyone else does the 
same and which specify "an idea of reciprocity or mutuality: 
all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as 
the rules and procedures require are to benefit in some 
appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison.1,28 The fair terms of cooperation are turned into 
principles of justice when they are predicated of the basic 
institutional structure of society.
An implication of the existence of fair terms of 
cooperation is that the conception of justice is publicly 
known and generally acknowledged. It follows from Rawls' 
definition of cooperation that if this condition does not 
hold, cooperation itself becomes problematic if not 
impossible. This point will be discussed at length later on.
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Finally, the idea of social cooperation "...requires an 
idea of each participant's rational advantage, or good."29 
Each participant tries to achieve some conception of the good 
through social cooperation and therefore the significance of 
such conceptions to the well-ordered society is great. This 
point as well as the previous ones are presented in this 
rather sketchy manner not because a more detailed picture 
would be difficult to compose, but because Rawls' plan 
involves breaking down the interpretive project into smaller 
tasks whose results are then combined so that they interact 
with one another to produce the intended effect. More about 
the rationale behind constructivist methodology will be said 
along this presentation of the constructivist argument.
The link between the two model conceptions presented 
above is the hypothetical process Rawls calls the Original 
Position: An unspecified number of "moral persons" gather
together to decide on principles for a well-ordered society. 
These fictitious characters are thought to be the 
representatives of actual individuals, that is, of individuals 
with a set identity (gender, colour), with particular 
interests and conceptions of the good.
The Original Position incorporates two ideas which Rawls 
finds characteristic of Western democratic societies: First, 
representation (i.e. having delegates, whose purpose is to 
serve the interests of their constituents, confer in order to 
reach common decisions binding to all) and, second, 
proceduralism (the idea that whatever principles are chosen or 
decisions reached in a certain kind of situation are proper or
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"just") .*
It is, I think, clear that the Original Position is 
itself meant to be a distinct interpretive element, a third 
model conception which could have been dubbed "proper 
procedure". The Original Position is the proper procedure 
because it models the ideas of representation and 
proceduralism which characterize the legislative and judicial 
procedures in modern democratic societies.30
One of the most widely advertised features of the 
Original Position is the idea of the "veil of ignorance". 
According to this idea, the delegates who take part in the 
proceedings in the Original Position are not to know the 
particular identity (the gender, colour and conceptions of the 
good) of those whom they represent. This point raises the 
following question: In what sense are the delegates to mind 
the interests of their constituents if they know nothing about 
them? The answer here is this: Even behind the veil of
ignorance the delegates have some information about their 
constituents. They know that like themselves they have two 
moral powers, the power to have a conception of the good and 
the power to have an effective sense of justice. Their 
mission, therefore, is to protect these powers, to treat them 
as three distinct "interests": a higher-order interest in
forming, revising and rationally pursuing a conception of the 
good, a higher-order interest in having an effective sense of 
justice, and a high-order interest "...in protecting and
‘Of course, for the interpretivist "just" belongs to the 
thick moral/political vocabulary of the society in question.
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advancing their conception of the good as best they can,
whatever it may be."31
The question that arises at this point is why Rawls 
imposes the veil of ignorance on the moral persons who take 
part in the Original Position instead of asking them to decide 
on principles according to their own "interests" (which 
coincide with those of actual people seen through the veil). 
There are, I believe, three reasons for this.
First, if Rawls were to derive principles of justice from 
the conception of the moral person alone, he would be accused 
of contradicting his proclaimed interpretivism. Although the 
first model conception is the result of an interpretivist 
investigation, deducing principles from this conception alone 
would be using it as a foundation.j The design of such a 
character may be useful to the interpretivist philosopher, but 
it cannot encapsulate all the predominant shared meanings, 
moral ideas and principles that are latent in a living social 
and political tradition. In other words, no single model 
conception, and, more specifically, none of those proffered by 
Rawls, can lift the weight of a whole interpretivist theory.
j0f course, according to the taxonomy of Chapter 2, the 
foundations are universal essences and, therefore, Rawls' 
model conceptions (being self-perceptions and ideas that are 
dominant in a particular society at a given time) can never be 
regarded as such. Nevertheless, the idea of deducing all 
moral/political principles from a single conception has a 
distinct foundationalist flavour. This does not mean that if 
it were applied by Rawls, it would make his position 
foundationalist in character. Rather, the point is that it 
would make his interpretivist argument very superficial and 
would raise doubts about his commitment to interpretivist 
meta-theory— the latter being some source for concern for 
Rawls, who has repeatedly denounced foundationalist 
philosophy.
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Rawls is conscious of this point. The constructivist approach 
enables him to let the model conceptions (which are separate, 
not very detailed interpretive pictures) interact with each 
other and thus avoid the controversy that a single, detailed 
interpretive picture would give rise to.
Second, for Rawls, the veil of ignorance itself is the 
modelling of a certain moral outlook latent in the political 
practices of Western societies which roughly holds that the 
distribution of certain (social) goods among individuals or 
groups of individuals should not reflect the relative 
advantage (physical, social, economic or arithmetic) of any of 
these individuals or groups. There clearly is a certain 
affinity between this idea and two others which have been 
built into the model conceptions: The idea of "responsibility 
for one's aims" and the idea of "fair cooperation". The three 
of them are closely related and complement each other to form 
the crux of the Rawlsian conception of justice.
Third, without the veil of ignorance, the ideas of 
representation and proceduralism would have to be left out of 
the Original Position. For the interpretivist Rawls this would 
be unthinkable. In his view, representation and proceduralism 
are two very prominent features of the political conception of 
Western democracies and cannot possibly be omitted from his 
interpretivist picture. He uses them to construct a 
hypothetical situation which facilitates the interaction 
between the two model conceptions in a manner that resembles 
the three actual levels of social interpretation and conflict- 
resolution in Western societies, namely the constitutional,
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the legislative and the judicial.
Nevertheless, one might argue that there is only a formal 
resemblance between the Original Position and the actual 
constitutional and legislative procedures. Representation, for 
example, does not help to shape the actual outcome of the 
hypothetical choice situation and would not be included were 
not Rawls keen on incorporating into the Original Position 
some of the outward characteristics of the democratic process. 
In my view, this is not the case.
The ideas underlying representation (e.g. equality, 
reciprocity, responsibility) in parliamentary democracies are 
already built into the two model conceptions and contribute to 
the formulation of the principles of justice. It is, however, 
true that formal resemblances to actual processes are 
important to Rawls for reasons that are not related to the 
pursuit of philosophical truth: As somebody who speaks the 
language of persuasion, Rawls is interested in presenting the 
prescribed set of principles of justice as the outcome of a 
(hypothetical) process whose features are familiar to his 
audience. To reiterate a point made earlier, the 
constructivist argument is also (perhaps primarily) a 
political argument, an attempt on Rawls' part to make his, 
already formed, interpretivist conclusions attractive to more 
people.k This must have been one of the considerations that
kIt is important to note that an interpretation that 
captures the prominent moral/political features of a 
particular society is very likely to appeal to most of its 
members. However, this does not mean that the interpretivist 
offers the interpretation that is more likely to satisfy the 
widest possible majority within society. An interpretivist 
position is not informed by public opinion polls nor is it
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shaped the Original Position of the later Rawls.
Let us now turn to the formulation of the state constraint 
principle by the participants in the Original Position. Each 
participant must distinguish between three kinds of 
considerations: First, considerations concerning the
particular conception of the good which his constituents hold 
and which is unknown to him personally, second, considerations 
concerning his constituents' capacity for choosing, revising 
and pursuing a conception of the good, and third, 
considerations concerning their capacity for a sense of 
justice.
At this point a list of liberties drawn up by the 
interpretivist (who has already searched for ideas latent in 
the practices of Western democracies and for the presumed 
meaning of public goods) is made available to the participants 
in the Original Position. The delegates are supposed to 
crosscheck the findings of the interpretivist philosopher by 
justifying each one of the liberties in the list in terms of 
any of the three kinds of considerations mentioned above. In 
his "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" Rawls 
demonstrates how the participants in the Original Position 
examine and accept liberty of conscience. First of all, they 
decide in favour of liberty of conscience because they do not 
know whether the conception of the good of their constituents 
is a minority or a majority conception, that is, whether the
supposed to predict the outcome of a process of negotiation 
between competing interest groups or moral outlooks. This 
point is discussed in more depth later on.
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supporters of that conception are more numerous and therefore 
more capable of taking coercive action against heterodox 
minorities or less numerous and therefore more vulnerable. The 
delegates endorse liberty of conscience because they think it 
minimises the risk of their constituents becoming the victims 
of moral coercion.
Second, and in connection with the capacity for a 
conception of the good, the delegates take the view that 
liberty of conscience enables their constituents to revise 
their chosen conception. As Rawls puts it, "[t]here is no 
guarantee that all aspects of our present way of life are the 
most rational for us and not in need of at least minor if not 
major revision.1132 In other words, re-evaluation and revision 
of chosen conceptions of the good is an aspect of the first 
moral power. It is for this reason that the delegates in the 
Original Position deem liberty of conscience suitable for 
their constituents. Furthermore, they find that their 
constituents may want to strive to appreciate why their 
conceptions of the good are true or valuable or suitable for 
them. They may want, as Mill would say, to make their 
conception of the good "their own" instead of accepting it 
ready-made from their close environment or social peers.33 
Liberty of conscience enables them to achieve this.
Now, liberty of conscience cannot be justified in terms 
of the capacity for a sense of justice, but this is not 
necessary for it to be incorporated into the scheme of equal 
liberties. As has been mentioned, the delegates endorse the 
liberties which promote or secure the exercise of any one of
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the two moral powers (capacities). The equal political 
liberties and freedom of thought, for instance, are not 
directly related with the capacity for a conception of the 
good, but with the capacity for a sense of justice. As Rawls 
puts it, they "...secure the free and informed application of 
the principles of justice, by means of the full and effective 
exercise of the citizens' sense of justice, to the basic 
[institutional] structure11.34
The participants in the Original Position also seek to 
establish that the set of principles of justice they decided 
on is as a whole advantageous to all and, therefore, 
acceptable to their constituents. Rawls lists three reasons 
why the principles of justice (and not simply a particular 
liberty or set of liberties) are advantageous to the 
constituents of the participants in the Original Position. 
First, they enhance self-respect since they entail a situation 
in which citizens need not feel fear or shame for adhering to 
a particular conception of the good. Second, they contribute 
to social stability by providing ample space for the pursuit 
and achievement of many different conceptions of the good and, 
finally, they conduce to the development of an all-inclusive, 
comprehensive good, "a social union of social unions11.35
It should be noted here that the idea of the principles 
of justice being accepted by all on the basis of being 
advantageous to all is not fully congruent with interpretivist 
meta-theory. The interpretivist's objective is not to 
accommodate the interests and loyalties of all members of 
society but to set out moral/political principles which he
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finds dominant in the society he investigates. Whether or not 
his prescriptions will be accepted by the majority of citizens 
as advantageous is not something that he takes into 
consideration during his investigation. Rawls is not totally 
oblivious of this point. According to his argument, the 
constituents cannot reject or ignore the sense of justice that 
took shape in the Original Position because they are 
"reasonable", that is, they do not only know and pursue what 
is good for them personally, but also will to conform to 
principles of justice.1
What comes out of the interpretivist apparatus of the 
Original Position is the same liberty and harm principles 
presented during the discussion of the direct argument. What 
is, however, different is the argument in favour of the 
priority of the liberty principle over the second principle of 
Rawlsian justice. As the commentator Rex Martin notes, the 
basic liberties are now regarded as necessary means or 
essential parts of realizing the two higher-order interests 
whereas the rest of the primary goods (opportunities, powers, 
income and wealth) are associated with lesser interests and 
appear in a quite different argument (the idea of a collective 
asset) that makes no clear reference to the two moral powers 
of the person qua citizen. Liberty can thus be thought to have 
a sort of generic priority over the other primary goods.36 
This priority is not latent or implicit in moral and political 
practices, but is a result of the interaction between the
*As we shall see later on, even this disinterested 
acceptance of the prescribed principles is no proof that the 
philosopher's interpretation is accurate.
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different interpretive elements of the constructivist 
approach.
In order to understand the process of specification of the 
liberty and harm principles, it is important to further 
clarify the interpretive role of the Original Position. As has 
been mentioned, the Original Position is supposed to bare the 
outward characteristics of a legislative assembly because 
through it the interpretivist does not only aspire to 
articulate regulative principles implicit in Western 
moral/political practices, but also, by doing that, to align 
the different levels of law-making (i.e. the constitutional 
and the legislative) , to have the outcome of the first level 
constrain the participants in the next level. To put it 
differently, Rawls puts together his interpretive findings to 
construct the initial, hypothetical level of law-making that 
precedes and constrains all lower levels of law-making and 
thus renders the actual process of law-making in democratic 
societies more coherent and congruent with their social 
meanings. Parties in the Original Position are constrained by 
the veil of ignorance or rather by what Rawls calls "the 
reasonable conditions built-in the Original Position" in order 
to decide on principles of justice which will then constrain 
the parties taking part in a constitutional convention. The 
latter yields a constitution which along with the principles 
of justice constrains the parties in the legislative stage. 
Both of the actual stages of law-making are levels of 
specification of the principles of justice and, like the
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Original Position, they are different levels of social 
interpretation.
In attempting to specify the liberty and harm principles 
formulated in the Original Position one must, therefore, 
answer the following question: "What more particular
liberties, or rules of law, are essential to secure the free, 
full and informed exercise of the moral power for a sense of 
justice ?"37 As Rawls asserts, one must not proceed "...from 
a general definition that singles out these liberties, but 
from what the history of constitutional doctrine [itself a 
tradition of social interpretation] shows to be the fixed 
points within the central range..." of each particular 
liberty.38
In "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" Rawls 
examines the cases of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press, both of which have been traditionally regarded as 
requirements of the freedom of thought and the equal political 
liberties which themselves secure, according to the 
constructivist argument, the exercise of the moral power for 
a sense of justice. The history of constitutional doctrine 
shows that there are three fixed points within the central 
range of the freedoms of speech and the press. First, there is 
no such thing as the crime of seditious libel, second, there 
are no prior constraints on freedom of the press and, third, 
there is full protection of revolutionary, subversive 
doctrines.39
In connection with the issue of seditious libel Rawls 
states that
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[t]he history of the use by governments of the crime 
of seditious libel to suppress criticism and dissent 
and to maintain their power demonstrates the great 
significance of this particular liberty [i.e. 
freedom of speech] to any adequate scheme of basic 
liberties. So long as the crime exists, the public 
press and free discussion cannot play their role in 
informing the electorate. .. .Thus the great 
importance of N.Y. Times vs. Sullivan in which the 
Supreme Court not only rejected the crime of 
seditious libel but declared the Sedition Act of 
1798 unconstitutional....It [i.e. the Sedition Act] 
has been tried, so to speak, by the court of history 
and found wanting.40
It is obvious that Rawls finds the use of the crime of 
seditious libel by Western governments as a historical 
aberration rather than a prominent feature of the public 
morality of Western democracies. What is important to note 
here is that Rawls accepts the ruling of the U.S. Supreme 
Court both as a valid, direct interpretivist argument and as 
the outcome of a procedure in which the participants are 
constrained by the principles of justice. Once again, the 
direct argument is incorporated into the constructivist 
position and is constrained by it.m
Until this point Rawls would have us believe that what 
constituted harm in a democratic society was the violation of 
the basic and secondary personal liberties as well as the 
rights of the individual connected with the second principle
mIt should, however, be noted that Rawls' view on the 
role of the U.S. Supreme Court is not very clear. Supreme 
Court judges are not constrained in the same way that 
participants in a legislative assembly or a constitutional 
convention are. Their position is closer to that of the 
interpretivist philosopher himself, who interprets without any 
constraints imposed on him, than to that of the congressman or 
member of parliament.
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of social justice. What he now avers is that liberties are 
also self-limiting. In connection with freedom of speech, for 
instance, he states that "...there must be some point at which 
political speech becomes so closely connected with the use of 
force that it may be properly restricted..."41 In other words, 
there is a point beyond which political speech constitutes 
harm, not to particular individuals (since no-one's individual 
rights and liberties are necessarily violated) but implicitly 
to every citizen since the stability and existence of the 
(just) institutional arrangement is under threat. Rawls avers 
that a situation in which the existence of just institutions 
is threatened by political speech, and especially by the 
advocacy of revolutionary or subversive doctrines, is hardly 
imaginable. After all, if political speech is guaranteed, the 
serious grievances of any social groups do not go unrecognized 
or suddenly become highly dangerous. Nevertheless, as Rawls 
himself notes, there is a certain rule, known as the "clear 
and present danger rule", which has an important place in the 
history of constitutional doctrine in the U.S., and which 
concerns the content of political speech. According to one 
formulation,
The question.. .is whether the words are used in such 
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.42
The use of certain words in political speech and under
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specific circumstances may, therefore, be regarded as harmful 
in the sense that it incites others to take action which will 
destroy just institutions and deprive everyone of their basic 
liberties. But if the citizens of a democratic society, whose 
basic structure is governed by the principles of justice, can 
be goaded into, or rather, talked into taking action to 
subvert just institutions, if, in other words, consensus on 
the Rawlsian conception of justice crumbles or the principles 
of justice are rejected by public opinion and given that, 
according to Rawls, the interpretivist must prescribe 
principles which are acceptable to a large majority of 
citizens, it follows that any substantial shift in public 
opinion suggests the need for revisions and reforms rather 
than the enforcement of an outdated conception of justice and 
the censoring of any expression of strong dissent.
The reason why Rawls does not arrive at this conclusion, 
is that he does not regard sudden changes in public opinion as 
an indication (or as sufficient indication) that social 
meanings, the widely shared, tacitly acknowledged ideas and 
principles, have changed. What, therefore, warrants censorship 
in particular circumstances is the need to protect 
institutions governed by principles which (still) capture 
these prevalent meanings.1 This point is fully compatible with
“There are two more interpretations of Rawls' argument in 
favour of censoring certain uses of political speech. 
According to the first, Rawls is saying that the dissemination 
of subversive ideas should be restricted because it undermines 
social peace. Commentators who attribute this argument to 
Rawls find a strong Hobbesian element in his more recent work. 
For instance, Kukathas and Pettit claim Rawls' position has 
assumed a "decidedly Hobbesian flavour, since he now ties his 
conception of justice...[to] order." [in Rawls: A Theory of
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the distinction (made in Chapter 2) between the philosophical 
and the political. Political discontent like political apathy 
(see 5.1) is no sure indication that social meanings have 
changed, that the prescribed principles are no longer implicit 
in practice or tacitly accepted. In fact, it is often the case 
that rampant rioting and outbreaks of civil disobedience are 
caused by what are perceived by the protestors as deviations, 
on the part of state officials, from the prevalent, already 
institutionalized conception of justice.
But what exactly are the circumstances under which the 
restriction of certain uses of political speech is warranted? 
The problem here is that if the answer to this question is not 
clear enough, the state constraint principle loses its 
significance and becomes open to various interpretations. What 
can now constitute harm is not only the violation of the 
rights and liberties of others, but conduct (political speech) 
that is deemed likely to lead to the collapse of the
Justice and its Critics (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1989) , p. 
140] In my view this argument is not sufficiently well 
incorporated into Rawls' interpretivist position and, if it is 
to be attributed to Rawls at all, should be seen as part of 
his political (as opposed to strictly philosophical) argument.
According to the second interpretation, Rawls is saying 
that the principles of justice are essential characteristics 
of Western democratic tradition. Any serious threat to the 
institutions governed by these principles threatens the 
democratic tradition itself. Such arguments are regularly 
employed by those who speak the language of persuasion. (For 
instance the self-proclaimed defenders of the "American way" 
who brand their political rivals' positions as "unamerican" in 
order to discredit them, use this type of argument.) In terms 
of the taxonomy of Chapter 2, such arguments make for bad 
explanationist philosophy since they have a strong normative 
flavour. If Rawls' argument in favour of qualified censorship 
is indeed such an argument, he employs it in order to make his 
overall (interpretivist) position more attractive to his 
audience.
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institutions of justice. Rawls hastens to add that freedom of 
speech can only be restricted in the name of liberty. This 
point hinges exclusively on the assumption that the subversion 
of just institutions will ultimately deprive most citizens of 
their liberty. Although this may be a valid assumption, there 
have to be safeguards against the suppression of dissenting 
minorities. In order to stress the non-partisan character of 
his state constraint position Rawls comes up with one simple 
principle according to which
. . .free political speech cannot be restricted unless 
it can be reasonably argued from the specific nature 
of the present situation that there exists a 
constitutional crisis in which democratic 
institutions cannot work effectively. . ,43
According to Rawls, a constitutional crisis is a situation in 
which the institutional structure has broken down and where 
the distribution of political (primary) goods becomes 
problematic. In those societies with a long democratic 
tradition such situations can arise when their "...people and 
institutions are simply overwhelmed from the outside."44 Any 
restrictions on liberty are, therefore, meant to make possible 
the transition to the original state of effective operation of 
the just institutions when outside pressure is relaxed. Rawls 
concludes his discussion of the clear and present danger rule 
stating that "for practical purposes, in a well-ordered 
democratic society under reasonably favourable conditions, the 
free public use of our reason in questions of political and 
social justice would seem to be absolute."45 This conclusion
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is presumably reached through a direct argument showing that 
the near-absolute character of the constraint principle is 
part of the conception of justice which is dominant in modern 
democracies.
Before I conclude this chapter, I should touch on the 
interpretivist Rawls' distinction between what he calls "an 
overlapping consensus" and "a modus vivendi". a distinction 
which is meant to clarify his interpretivist position but 
which itself needs further clarification.
In his recent work, Rawls has claimed that the 
philosopher must propose a conception of justice which best 
captures the social meanings of modern, democratic societies 
and at the same time a conception on which the vast majority 
of citizens can agree. Agreement on interpretivist principles 
that could govern the institutional structure of society is 
what Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus", a "consensus 
including the opposing religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a society 
effectively regulated by that conception of justice."46 For 
Rawls, the important point here is that while his conception 
of justice is not identified with any particular conception of 
the good (or comprehensive doctrine) those supporting 
different conceptions each have different grounds for 
accepting it. Rawls contrasts the idea of an overlapping 
consensus with what he calls a modus vivendi. that is, with 
the idea of justice as a compromise between comprehensive 
doctrines or as an arrangement justified in purely
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instrumental terms.
The first question that arises here is whether Rawls 
understands modern, Western societies (and the U.S. in 
particular) as examples of modus vivendi arrangements or as 
societies where there exists an agreement on political 
principles without an agreement on the grounds for them. On 
many occasions Rawls talks of an overlapping consensus as 
something that is yet to be achieved. As he puts it, "...we 
hope to make it possible for all to accept the political 
conception as true, or as reasonable, from the standpoint of 
their own comprehensive view whatever it may be."47 But 
elsewhere Rawls talks of past and present constitutional 
stability (at least in the U.S.) and avers that "...history 
shows that democratic institutions are quite resilient in the 
U.S.". He also refers to historically "successful democratic 
constitutions" and to "constitutions that work".48 Are we to 
infer from this that an overlapping consensus is already a 
reality or that constitutional stability and a modus vivendi 
are not mutually exclusive situations? Clearly if he thought 
the overlapping consensus a reality, Rawls would not be 
seeking to achieve it. This, however, does not necessarily 
mean that he understands Western democracy as a modus vivendi. 
or, to use his term, a "mere modus vivendi" (what he also 
refers to as "unwilling, resentful compliance"). In a fast 
changing, increasingly pluralistic society Rawls sees the need 
for a re-interpretation, a fresh articulation of the 
moral/political principles implicit in moral/political 
practices. It is clear, however, that in his view these
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principles must be articulated and presented in such a way as 
to make them acceptable to the largest possible majority of 
citizens. Citizens must be enabled to find reasons within 
their own moral outlook to accept the proposed political 
conception of justice. Given that justice is a specifically 
political conception and that social divisions are not (yet) 
too deep, Rawls hopes that the supporters of comprehensive 
doctrines will not have reasons to reject it. As for those who 
do not belong to any organized group of adherents of a 
particular doctrine (a church, a club, a cultural or ethnic 
community etc.) Rawls seems to believe that they can be 
regarded as supporters of neo-Kantian foundationalist 
philosophy (in which case they would accept Rawlsian 
interpretivist justice because it prescribes principles very 
similar to those of neo-Kantian justice).
It should be emphasized that Rawls seeks to make his 
interpretivist position acceptable by presenting it in a 
particular way and not by altering the content of his 
regulative principles so that he satisfies the supporters of 
as many conceptions of the good as possible. It is true that 
on many occasions he seems to be suggesting that the most 
accurate interpretation is the one which achieves the highest 
level of acceptability, or, alternatively, the one which 
locates those elements that are common to most of the 
comprehensive doctrines held by members of democratic 
societies. And yet Rawls does not manipulate his 
interpretivist position in order to make his audience 
agreeable to it (although he does present it in a purportedly
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persuasive manner) and does not think of it as the area where 
most disparate ideals of the good life overlap because if that 
were the case he would not be talking of a specifically 
political conception.0
One could, however, argue, as I believe Rawls does, that 
agreement on general principles governing the institutional 
structure of society is itself a requirement of the Western 
conception of justice. If this is so, how can the 
interpretivist philosopher prescribe principles without 
heeding the opinions and expressed views of the members of the 
society he investigates? How can he ignore their interests and 
loyalties?
The answer has already been given: the social meanings 
and self-perceptions which the interpretivist takes into 
consideration in the formulation of regulative principles 
cannot be found at the level of public opinion. Neither the 
interests nor the opinions of actual individuals can affect 
social meanings or the ideas implicit in practice. Mechanisms 
through which consensus on moral/political principles are to 
be achieved can be prescribed by the interpretivist, but 
cannot be built into the interpretivist argument itself and 
cannot influence the outcome of the interpretive project. As
°The use of the term "overlapping consensus" is, I 
believe, unfortunate because it obscures one of Rawls' main 
points: justice is a specifically political conception
independent of all comprehensive doctrines and not an area 
where comprehensive doctrines overlap. However, I believe that 
Rawls consciously adopts this term in order to make a 
favourable impression on the members of minority (mainly 
cultural and religious) groups who resentfully conform to the 
political conception he has identified. Judging from the 
popularity that the term now enjoys, this political move has 
been successful.
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I have already mentioned, the very construction of the 
Original Position confirms this point. The opinions and 
particular interests of the constituents are not taken into 
consideration in the formulation of the principles by their 
representatives. But then, the question arises, why is Rawls 
so keen on presenting the principles of justice as 
advantageous to all, as principles that everyone could find 
reasons to accept? Rawls is not only interested in disclosing 
the truth but in exerting influence, in persuading his 
audience and outmanoeuvreing his critics. He, in other words 
is a politician who has proven to be at least as competent as 
he is a political philosopher.
The constructivist approach of building interpretivist 
findings into a hypothetical situation resembling a 
legislative assembly where principles of justice are decided 
is a political argument in so far as it makes use of imagery 
and terminology which is familiar to the citizens of Western 
democracies in an attempt to make the Rawlsian position 
attractive to them. But it is also a philosophical argument. 
Instead of offering a single, direct interpretivist argument 
in support of the principles of justice, Rawls combines the 
findings of separate interpretivist projects (e.g. the notion 
of the moral person, the idea of a well-ordered society, the 
notions of representation and proceduralism) into a 
construction which yields principles of justice. In other 
words, he divides his interpretivist project into smaller ones 
whose results he then combines to reach his final conclusion. 
Of course, this approach cannot provide a criterion of
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accuracy (i.e. a criterion by which to distinguish true social 
meanings from mere accidents or from tendencies which have 
already expired) since it is dependent on direct 
interpretivist arguments. One could, therefore, conclude that 
from a meta-theoretical point of view neither of the two 
interpretivist approaches is preferable to the other.p
Following the discussion and analysis of foundationalist and 
interpretivist state constraint, I should now be turning to 
explanationist state constraint. There is, however, an 
important reason why I should do so after I discuss the 
neutrality debate: since the debate itself is an argument
between normativists, explanationist state constraint (which, 
unlike the two views already examined, is a non-normative 
position) is not involved in it and can, therefore, be 
examined separately.
In order to take a close look at the neutrality debate it 
is important to re-insert "neutrality" in the place of "state 
constraint" for the simple reason that this is the term most 
of the participants use. Recognizing the difficulties caused 
by the contextuality of "neutrality" (see Chapter 1) some of 
them give elaborate definitions of state neutrality in an 
attempt to avoid misunderstandings.
pIt could be argued, however, that the way the particular 
interpretivist findings are incorporated into the Original 
Position is arbitrary because it is devised by the philosopher 
himself. This would be a reason to prefer the direct approach 
to the constructivist. Rawls' response to this would be that 
his interpretivist findings interact in a way that is itself 
implicit in the practices of Western democratic societies.
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Part III: The Neutrality Debate
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CHAPTER 6 
State Neutrality
The state constraint positions discussed in the last three 
chapters are usually placed under the single heading of "state 
neutrality" without distinction of meta-theoretical 
background. The political philosophers I presented as authors 
or defenders of these positions are self-proclaimed 
neutralists. David Richards, for instance, thinks of his 
position as a "moral neutrality with regard to the many 
disparate visions of the good life". According to him, 
neutrality holds that "the concern embodied in the idea of 
human rights is not with maximizing the agent's pursuit of any 
particular lower-order ends, but rather with respecting the 
higher-order capacity of the agent to exercise rational 
autonomy in choosing and revising his ends, whatever they 
are."1 In other words, the moral principles to be predicated 
of the institutional structure (i.e. of the state) are neutral 
between particular conceptions of the good. In similar fashion 
Ronald Dworkin states that "the government must be neutral on 
what might be called the question of the good life."2 Will 
Kymlicka defends what he calls "liberal neutrality" against 
certain criticisms and attributes its authorship to Rawls.3 
Rawls himself, while in his interpretivist phase, calls his 
theory of justice "procedurally neutral".4 Bruce Ackerman, 
whose view on the proper limits of the moral authority and
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responsibility of the state is similar to those discussed in 
Part II, claims that he has helped "popularize the notion that 
something called Neutrality [is] at the heart of contemporary 
liberalism."a
In my view both the foundationalist and the 
interpretivist advocates of what I have called "state 
constraint" adopted the notion of neutrality for the same 
reason. They saw in its intuitive appeal a way to make their 
position more intelligible, more accessible to more people and 
thus to cover the distance between theory (the foundations or 
the abstract principles derived through social interpretation) 
and policy quickly and effortlessly. One could, therefore, say 
that the adoption of "neutrality" discloses the political 
ambition of the aforementioned philosophers and shows that 
popularizing their positions and turning them into forceful 
ideologies is for them a priority that ranks second only to 
the discovery of philosophical truth.
Now, as I mentioned in chapter 1, "neutrality" has a 
broad semantic range as it appears in many different contexts. 
The fact that it also belongs to the language of international 
relations makes its meaning even more difficult to determine 
(see Chapter 1) . Interpretivists, being more aware of these 
facts, are more reluctant to adopt "neutrality". The
“Bruce Ackerman, "Neutralities" in Douglass, Mara, 
Richardson (eds.), Liberalism and the Good. (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 29. From a meta-theoretical point of view 
"liberalism" means either a particular interpretation of 
western democratic tradition or a particular foundationalist 
position. In politics this distinction is not significant, but 
for the philosopher who seeks to defend or criticize a 
particular (either foundationalist or interpretivist) position 
it makes a world of difference. (See also 6.3).
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interpretivist Rawls is a case in point. Although he does not 
abandon "neutrality" he states that "the term...is 
unfortunate; some of its connotations are highly misleading, 
while others suggest altogether impracticable principles. . .But 
with due precautions taken and using it only as a stage piece, 
as it were, we may clarify..." the state constraint position.5
Soon foundationalist advocates of state constraint became 
egually cautious. In his Liberalism. Community and Culture 
Kymlicka hardly ever uses the term. In his recent writings 
Ackerman appears apologetic for adopting neutrality in his 
Social Justice in the Liberal State without making important 
qualifications.6 Dworkin shows caution in using the notion of 
"state independence" in conjunction with "neutrality".7 
Nevertheless, none of the neutralists or their critics ever 
abandoned the idea of neutrality altogether. This means that 
it is impossible to quote and discuss the arguments of the 
participants in the so-called "neutrality debate" without re­
inserting "neutrality" in the place of "state constraint". Of 
course, this is not to say that a careful application of the 
notion of neutrality is preferable to its replacement. 
Neutrality is a term whose particularism is unsuitable for the 
foundationalist and whose meaning is too unsettled for the 
interpretivist to turn into a normative principle.
It is for these reasons that many philosophers have 
attempted to map out the different possible meanings of "state 
neutrality". However, the distinctions and clarifications 
offered do not include the vital meta-theoretical distinctions 
of Chapter 2. My main objective in this chapter is, therefore,
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ito amend the map of all the different notions of "state 
neutrality" that are present in the literature by 
Incorporating into it the distinction between interpretivist 
and foundationalist state constraint as well as the 
distinction between philosophical and political argument. This 
will help to clarify the positions of both the advocates and 
the critics of neutrality.
6.1 Neutralities
The most elaborate account of the different possible meanings 
of state neutrality is proffered by Rawls in "The Priority of 
Right and Ideas of the Good".8 Rawls distinguishes between two 
main state neutralities: First, what he calls "procedural
neutrality" (what Kymlicka more appropriately dubs 
"justificatory neutrality"9) , according to which the 
institutional structure and government policy are justified 
"neutrally" and, second, what he calls "neutrality of aim" 
according to which "the aims of the basic institutions and 
public policy are neutral."10 With respect to the former, 
Rawls states that "neutral justification" can mean either 
justification "by appeal to neutral values", or justification 
"without appeal to any moral values at all", or justification 
by appeal to values underlying the principles of free rational 
discussion.11 Given that the last one of these three possible 
justifications can easily be incorporated into the first one, 
we are left with two alternatives: justification in terms of 
something called "neutral moral principles", and what we 
could call "amoral justification".
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A couple of questions arise immediately: What exactly is 
a neutral moral value or principle? And how is it possible to 
offer an amoral justification for public policy or for a 
particular arrangement of the institutional structure? Rawls' 
answer to the first question is that neutral are "...values 
such as impartiality, consistency in the application of 
general principles to all reasonably related cases (compare 
the judicial principle that cases similar in relevant respects 
are to be treated similarly), equal opportunity for the 
contending parties to present their cases and the like."12
For a more complete answer one has to make use of the 
distinction between foundationalist and interpretivist 
philosophies of philosophy. Rawls' answer is offered during 
his interpretivist period. This is evident in the passage 
quoted above: Certain values are neutral because they are
tacitly acknowledged as such by being characteristic of 
particular social practices or institutions (e.g. the 
judiciary) in democratic societies. The constructivist 
interpretivist in particular holds that we should regard these 
values as elements of a specifically political, 
characteristically Western morality which is distinguishable 
from the non-political moral outlooks of much wider scope, 
namely philosophical truths, religious beliefs and conceptions 
of personal virtue or character.
The foundationalist neutralist's position is rather 
different. He also maintains that there are two different 
kinds of moralities and that only the values of a particular 
kind of morality are actually neutral. His taxonomy, however,
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is different. On the one hand there is the morality which is 
derived from what is essentially human and on the other there 
are all those lower-order moral outlooks and visions of the 
good life that are contingent. The values and principles of 
the essentialist morality are neutral because they do not 
conflict with those of contingent moralities as they are not 
their alternatives. A person or group can hold any particular 
moral outlook or conception of the good without violating the 
principles of essentialist morality. It is the enforcement of 
the latter that justifies social policy and the institutional 
structure of society.
One could say that the essentialist morality is an 
overarching, higher-order system of values whereas the 
specifically Western political morality is a set of values 
adapted for a particular purpose, namely the interaction 
between people qua citizens. The end result, however, is the 
same in both cases. Both moralities regulate the pursuit of 
the various conceptions of the good and are regarded as 
compatible with them.
Now, Rawls' answer to the second question posed earlier 
is that an amoral justification, i.e. a justification which 
could also be regarded as neutral between different moral 
outlooks, "...seems impossible, since showing something 
justified [in our case social policy and the general 
institutional arrangement] appears to involve an appeal to 
some values..."13 Most participants in the neutrality debate 
share this view. A notable exception is Raz, who criticizes 
amoral justification but treats it as a well-established
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position. Since, however, Raz' account of different notions of 
state neutralities does not coincide with that of Rawls, I 
will turn to it in the next section. To complete
Rawls' account of the different possible meanings of "state 
neutrality" we must now turn to "neutrality of aim", that is, 
to the view that the objectives of governmental policy and 
institutional operation must be neutral towards the differing 
conceptions of the good. For Rawls neutrality of aim has three 
different meanings. According to the first one, which we could 
call "neutrality of opportunity"b, the state "is to ensure for 
all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of 
the good they freely affirm".14 According to the second 
meaning, neutrality of aim holds that the state is to do 
nothing intended to favour or promote any particular 
conception of the good over another, or to give special 
assistance to those who pursue it. A suitable title for this 
kind of neutrality is "neutrality of intentions".0 The third 
meaning of neutrality of aim is what Rawls himself calls 
"neutrality of effect".d According to this, the state is to do 
nothing that makes it more likely that individuals will choose
bIt is William Galston who coins this term in his Liberal 
Purposes. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991), p. 
100. Galston clearly attributes neutrality of opportunity to 
Rawls.
cThe term is used by Susan Mendus in her Toleration and 
the Limits of Liberalism. (Macmillan: Hampshire, 1989) , p. 
130. Galston refers to neutrality of intentions as "neutrality 
of aim" without distinguishing between the different meanings 
of the latter.
dIn the literature this also appears as "neutrality of 
influence", "neutrality of outcome" and "consequential 
neutrality".
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one conception of the good rather than another unless steps 
are taken to cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of 
policies or institutional mechanisms that do this. When it 
comes to ethnic cultures this view often appears in a 
different, stricter form: the state is to take measures to 
maintain the level of support that each conception of the good 
enjoyed before all conceptions became the objects of 
individuals' choice within a competitive (market) 
environment.6 Ethnic communities of immigrants often claim 
that neutrality involves giving them the means to avoid 
assimilation by the dominant culture and maintain roughly the 
same membership/
It is important to clarify the relation between 
neutrality of aim and procedural neutrality and connect them 
with the positions discussed in the previous chapters. Does 
the one entail the other, or can each one hold independently? 
Richard Arneson thinks that the latter is true and offers the 
following two examples:
An example of a state policy that satisfies 
neutrality of procedure but not neutrality of aim 
would be a policy of state establishment of religion 
based not on the judgement that the favoured 
religion is intrinsically superior to its rivals but 
rather on the estimate that promoting one religion 
over its rivals will facilitate the maintenance of 
civil peace. An example of policy that satisfied 
neutrality of aim but not neutrality of procedure
eI take it that this stricter form is what Kymlicka has 
in mind in "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" when 
he talks of "consequential neutrality". This point was made in 
the discussion of Kymlicka's foundationalism in Chapter 4.
f0r, more precisely, that their membership should depend 
only on the birth and death rate within the community.
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would be a policy of broad religious toleration that 
aims to favour no religion over another and that is 
justified by appeal to the judgement that Quakerism 
is the true religion and among the tenets of 
Quakerism is the principle that there should be 
broad religious toleration and no tilting by the 
state in favour of any one religion.15
Two points should be made in connection with this view. First, 
it is evident that Arneson has in mind a particular neutrality 
of aim, namely neutrality of intention. Perhaps the narrowness 
of his view is determined by his choice of example, i.e. 
Quakerism. Unlike the distinctly political morality of Rawls' 
interpretivist phase, Quakerism is not associated with a 
scheme of distribution of resources and opportunities and, 
therefore, the claim that Quakerism upholds neutrality of 
opportunity or neutrality of effect would be absurd.
Second, as an example of neutral justification (i.e. 
procedural neutrality) Arneson offers justification in terms 
of a single, reputedly neutral, value, namely civil peace. Now 
it could, perhaps, be argued that civil peace is not neutral 
in the sense that it is not attributed the same importance by 
all the different conceptions of the good. Certain Christian 
sects (e.g. the Quakers) think of it as more important and are 
willing to make more compromises in its name than, say, 
Moslems do. Perhaps this is an effective argument against the 
view that single values can be used in neutral justifications 
of policies or institutional arrangements. This, however, is 
not the point I want to make here. Rather, the point is that 
in contrast with the Quakers and pacifists of Arneson's 
example, the philosophers discussed in the last two chapters
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justify policies and institutional arrangements in terms of 
sets of principles or systems of values which they regard as 
higher-order (in the case of neo-Kantian foundationalism) or 
specialized (in the case of Rawlsian, interpretivist, 
distinctly political position) moralities rather than in terms 
of individual values.
So the conclusion we have to draw at this point is that 
according to the positions examined in the previous chapters 
the state is neutral neither because it is manned by people 
who subscribe to a tolerant conception of the good (and which 
remains but one conception among the many competing ones, e.g. 
Quakerism) nor because its functions are justified in terms of 
a value which is presumed to be common to all conceptions of 
the good (e.g. civil peace). Instead, it is neutral because it 
draws on a morality of a different kind, one which is in some 
sense compatible with all the differing conceptions of the 
good.
Having clarified the relation between procedural neutrality 
and neutrality of aim, it is important to examine whether the 
two state constraint positions (i.e. the foundationalist and 
the interpretivist) uphold the three different senses of 
neutrality of aim. First, are they both neutralities of 
opportunity? Rawls partly answers this question in his recent 
writings stating that his (interpretivist) position 
"...excludes the first meaning of neutrality of aim [i.e. 
neutrality of opportunity], for it allows only permissible 
conceptions (those that respect the principles of justice) to
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be pursued." Nevertheless, he adds that "...that meaning can 
be amended to allow for this; as thus amended, the state is to 
secure equal opportunity to advance any permissible 
conception. In this case, depending on the meaning of equal 
opportunity, justice as fairness may be neutral in aim."16
It is clear that, in Rawls' view, subversive conceptions 
of the good are to be struck off the list of conceptions that 
the state allows its citizens to pursue without any kind of 
interference or restriction. But does this apply to the 
foundationalist reading of his position? As we saw in chapter 
3 it is only "modes of conduct" that the state can prohibit or 
punish and not adherence to particular conceptions of the 
good. It appears, therefore, that Rawls' interpretivist state 
constraint position is less inclusive (of conceptions that are 
to be treated neutrally) than the foundationalist reading of 
his state constraint position. However, I believe that this is 
not the case. Although it is true that in some Western 
democratic societies certain moral/political conceptions8 are 
regarded as unacceptable and that others are thought to be so 
radically opposed to the principles latent in political 
practice that cannot be regarded as valid choices of the free 
and equal members of a democratic society, such outlooks would 
not be regarded as conceptions of the good by either the neo- 
Kantian foundationalist or the Rawlsian constructivist 
interpretivist. This is because in both views conceptions of 
the good are not thought to be reducible to harmful activities
gCertain forms of organized racism, for instance the neo- 
Nazi political groups of Western Europe or the Ku Klux Klan in 
the U.S., are the obvious examples.
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or subversive programmes and because both the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist and the Rawlsian interpretivist find that 
there is space for all conceptions of the good within a 
society governed by the principles of justice.1 It seems, 
therefore, that Rawls' latest statement on the status of 
subversive conceptions is a direct interpretivist argument 
which is not fully in tune with his wider argument because it 
includes a different definition of "conception of the good".
However, one could claim that there is no real difference 
between discriminating against subversive conceptions of the 
good and prohibiting harmful modes of conduct. After all, what 
constitutes a harmful action depends either on the 
foundationalist's essentialist account (from which his harm 
principle is derived) or on the interpretivist's 
interpretation of the concept of harm latent in the particular 
political culture under investigation. Kymlicka, for instance, 
suggests that pornography constitutes harm because it 
contributes to the creation and propagation of stereotypes 
which set limits on the liberty and thus compromises the 
autonomous nature of women.17 In similar fashion Raphael 
Cohen-Almagor avers that "psychological offence is on a par 
with harm."18 Thus the neo-Nazis holding a non-violent march 
in a predominantly Jewish suburb of an American city are
h0f course there is a significant difference between the 
interpretivist and the foundationalist notion of a conception 
of the good: the Rawlsian interpretivist thinks of neo-Kantian 
foundationalism as yet another conception of the good.
206
considered to be violating the harm principle.1 The
implication of this view is that the bigots' (political)
actions should not only be restricted when in violation of 
criminal law (e.g. when they can be classified as arson or 
assault and battery) but should be seen in the context of 
their declared subversive intentions. The question that arises 
here is whether we can accept this view and at the same time 
maintain that the bigots are as free as all others to pursue 
their conception of the good.
Oddly enough those authors who believe that bigots should 
be discriminated against or be altogether expelled from 
society acknowledge the significance of the distinction 
between subversive modes of conduct and conceptions of the 
good associated with such actions. For instance Cohen-Almagor 
states that "some people may adopt a conception that they see 
as a conception of the good, but that we regard as one of 
evil. If its consequences are harm to others, then we should 
not tolerate that conception.1,19 This point is completed when
Cohen-Almagor states that "fascists exclude themselves from
liberal society not because they hold undesirable beliefs. 
Instead, the combination of holding illiberal beliefs and 
acting in accordance with them affords grounds for 
exclusion."20 Taking these two statements in conjunction one 
concludes that it is only harmful actions that the state 
prohibits and punishes and not adherence to particular 
conceptions. Racists may receive welfare benefits, run for
‘Cohen-Almagor refers to the Skokie incident which took 
place in 1977 in the town of Skokie of the Chicago greater 
area (The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance, pp. 132-147).
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public office under a racist manifesto (take for example the 
British National Party and the Front Nationale in France), 
vote and publish their views provided they do not violate the 
harm principle of the neutral, higher-order morality. Like 
Rawls (see chapter 3) and Cohen-Almagor, Barry is officially 
in favour of discriminating against the bigots but on one 
occasion comes close to accepting the view that it is certain 
actions and not subscription to particular conceptions that 
warrant the restriction of the bigots' liberty. He states that 
"the only response worth making [towards the bigots] is to try 
to defeat them politically, and if necessary, seek to repress 
them by force."21 In the first half of this sentence it is 
made clear that if the bigots are to be subdued this will have 
to be done in accordance with the principles and rules 
predicated of the basic institutional structure and applying 
to the adherents of all the differing conceptions of he good. 
In the second half, however, Barry states that "if necessary" 
the bigots must be dealt with as if they were not equal 
members of society. This is an idea that was discussed in the 
context of Rawls' foundationalism in Chapter 3 and again as 
part of his constructivist argument in Chapter 5. When the 
subversive elements become strong enough to jeopardize the 
smooth operation and existence of the just institutions their 
suppression is warranted. In terms of the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist argument this point could be interpreted in 
two ways. First, it could mean that the bigots' autonomous 
pursuit of their conception of the good ranks second to the 
proper function of the institutions which exist in order to
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maintain the essential character of each individual member of 
society. The bigots are denied their liberty so that more 
people can pursue their conceptions of the good uncoerced, 
being the recipients of primary goods distributed so as to 
offset undeserved inequalities between individuals.j
As far as neo-Kantian foundationalism is concerned, there 
are two problems with this interpretation. First, it appears 
to be incoherent. How can foundationalist morality require the 
deprivation of certain individuals (e.g. those holding racist 
conceptions of the good) of those rights and goods which they 
are entitled to qua essential human beings? If the main 
foundationalist meta-theoretical assumption is that there are 
certain essentially human characteristics and that 
foundationalist morality (which is to govern the institutional 
structure of society) should treat all those who bear these 
characteristics as equals, arguing for the repression of 
bigots along foundationalist lines means regarding them as 
less than human, as less than autonomous (rational) human 
beings. Although this is exactly how some people regard 
members of neo-Nazi organizations in Western democratic 
societies, the implication for the foundationalist is that one 
of the essentially human characteristics is choosing from a 
limited class of conceptions of the good. In other words, 
subscribing to these "permissible" conceptions is part of
^"Undeserved1 are inequalities that result from the 
arbitrary distribution of physical and intellectual 
attributes, social position and wealth that takes place at 
birth as well as those inequalities that cannot be traced back 
to an autonomous (rational) choice made after the 
rectification of puerperal inequalities.
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human nature. I do not believe that neo-Kantian 
foundationalism (at least as it was presented in Chapter 3) 
includes this premise. Instead, what the neo-Kantian 
philosopher regards as essential to being human is the 
capacity to autonomously choose and pursue any conception of 
the good.
Barry and Rawls could respond that the security of the 
institutional arrangement takes priority over the maintenance 
of the bigots' essentially human character only in special 
cases, namely when the bigots become so influential or so 
powerful as to interfere with the operation of just 
institutions. It is only then that the liberty of the many 
(dependent on the existence of institutions governed by the 
principles of foundationalist morality) can be weighed against 
the liberty of the few. This is the second possible neo- 
Kantian interpretation of the quote by Barry. Those who 
subscribe to racist or chauvinist conceptions are indeed 
autonomous, rational human beings and as such they partake of 
the distribution of primary goods (whether these are just 
liberties, in accordance with the first foundationalist 
constraint argument, or liberties connected with 
opportunities, powers and income in accordance with the second 
foundationalist constraint argument). They are not to be 
persecuted or discriminated against for what they are (i.e. 
adherents of particular conceptions), but for acting in ways 
that cause harm to others. As Kymlicka argues in Liberalism. 
Community and Culture, no conception of the good is reducible 
to coercive, proselytizing modes of conduct. Surely it is
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conceivable that a racist is against violence of any form or 
even against the very idea that the distribution of primary 
goods through the institutional structure should be colour- 
sensitive. What Barry and Rawls seem to be saying, however, is 
that if we think of the bigots as a homogeneous group aiming 
at the replacement (either by legal or by illegal means) of 
the institutions of justice with an alternative arrangement, 
justice requires that they are repressed before they achieve 
their aim. So bigots are respected qua essential characters 
until they come close to achieving their aim of toppling the 
institutions of foundationalist justice.
This point may not be fully compatible with the 
foundationalist state constraint position presented in Chapter 
3 and may be taken to imply that foundationalist state 
constraint does not constitute neutrality of opportunity. 
However, the significance of this point is minimal because 
although the issue of subversion is a real one and has 
concerned a number of theorists and lawyers in Western 
democratic societies, what certain people seek to undermine in 
the actual world is not the neo-Kantian, foundationalist 
institutional arrangement since that has not been (fully) 
established. Juxtaposing an actual problem with a prescribed, 
foundationalist "to be" in order to determine the implications 
of the latter seems absurd. This distinction is, I believe, 
what Rawls has in mind when he states that in a just society 
people will have the propensity not to adopt subversive 
conceptions.22 His point really is that subversion in a 
society whose basic structure is governed by neo-Kantian
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principles of justice is an issue that we cannot (or need not) 
fully address.
Despite Rawls' recent claim that his interpretivist state 
constraint does not grant equal opportunities to the advocates 
of subversive doctrines, we have to conclude that his 
interpretivist constraint principle is as inclusive as the 
neo-Kantian foundationalist principle. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Rawls finds that Western constitutional 
history shows that within the central range of the freedom of 
political speech there is no such thing as seditious libel, 
there are no prior constraints on the freedom of the press 
and, most importantly, there is full protection of 
revolutionary and subversive doctrines. It, therefore, appears 
that Rawls' recent rejection of this position is an attempt at 
appeasing his anti-neutralist critics.
Now, one might argue that the Rawlsian state constraint 
is not a neutrality of opportunity because the primary goods 
it distributes equally to all individuals are not equally 
useful in the pursuit of all conceptions of the good. For 
instance, those who wish to form a community and live apart 
from others in accordance with some religious truth or 
philosophical truth and those who choose the life of 
asceticism are arguably being discriminated against for having 
opted for these particular conceptions. The Rawlsian 
liberties, for example, enable one to forsake the demanding, 
restricted life of the religious community from the very early 
stages of initiation. But even those who remain within the 
community, who brave the adversities and come close to the
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achievement of their chosen conception can easily opt out and 
shed all responsibility towards the rest of the community. 
This very fact alters the nature of the experience of living 
within such a community, distorts its meaning and reduces its 
significance. The individual himself, unlike those who choose 
non-communal conceptions, is hardly encouraged to persevere 
with the pursuit of his chosen goal. Relatedly, the ascetic is 
provided with the safety net of the Rawlsian distributive 
scheme which undermines his austere lifestyle and contradicts 
his severe self-denial.
This is an interesting argument against the view that 
foundationalist and interpretivist constraint are neutralities 
of opportunity and as it is closely connected with other lines 
of anti-neutralist criticism it will be more thoroughly 
discussed in the context of my critical examination of anti­
neutralism in Section IV. For the time being it suffices to 
say that both the foundationalist and the interpretivist 
neutralist can easily respond to this point. The former can 
argue, as Kymlicka actually does (see 4.3), that the 
impossibility of exiting a community of adherents of a 
particular conception of the good (e.g. a religious community 
or a monastery) should never be regarded as an essential 
element or requirement of that conception. The revisability of 
all conceptions is derived from the essentialist account and 
is, therefore, built into the very definition of a conception 
of the good. In this view, religious fundamentalism is not an 
essential aspect of any religion; it is simply a policy 
pursued by some of its adherents, a policy which violates the
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foundationalist principles predicated of the institutional 
structure of society. The fact that justice does not call for 
the (temporary) revocation of certain liberties in order for 
some to achieve their chosen conceptions (as they perceive 
them to be) does not mean that justice does not provide them 
with an equal opportunity to achieve these conceptions.
The interpretivist, on the other hand, may respond that 
in modern democratic societies individuals have a want for 
Rawlsian primary goods. Those individuals choosing conceptions 
like the monastic life or life in a commune (conceptions which
are rather unpopular among the members of modern, Western
societies) are not necessarily rejecting the primary goods as 
goods which ought to be distributed by the state. Their chosen 
conception is meaningful or valuable to them mainly because it 
involves a kind of withdrawal, a self-denial, the undertaking 
to carry burdens which they do not expect others to bear. 
Testing one's limits is linked with such choices and requires 
the availability of an opt-out clause which is in fact
provided by the liberty principle.
The point can be extended to all communal conceptions of 
the good: in Western societies communal life has changed
significantly. Walzer, who, although a critic of state 
neutrality, gives some credit to interpretivist state 
constraint, admits that "there cannot be much doubt that we 
(in the United States) live in a society where individuals 
are...continually separating from one another— continually in 
motion, often in solitary and apparently random motion..."23 
For the interpretivist advocate of state constraint this kind
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of social mobility implies a widely shared want for Rawlsian 
primary goods. The just distribution of the latter does not 
impede the pursuit of communal conceptions of the good. In 
fact primary goods are as useful in the pursuit of communal 
conceptions (as these are now understood) as they are in the 
pursuit of individualist conceptions.
The question that I must now answer is whether the 
foundationalist and the interpretivist constraint positions 
are neutralities of outcome. In his recent writings Rawls 
states that
... it is surely impossible for the basic structure 
of a just constitutional regime not to have 
important effects and influences on which 
comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents 
over time, and it is futile to try to counteract 
these effects and influences, or even to ascertain 
for political purposes how pervasive they are. We 
must accept the facts of common-sense political 
sociology.24
This reference to "common-sense political sociology" is clear 
indication that Rawls has in mind his interpretivist position. 
The argument here is that in democratic, pluralist societies 
it is impossible to offset the effects of the market or of the 
institutions of democracy on certain conceptions of the good. 
Some of them will perish, others will remain on a subsistence 
level and some will become dominant. Any principle designed to 
offset the various effects and influences on them is foreign 
to the political culture of Western societies and would 
clearly conflict with the interpretivist liberty principle.
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The same conclusion must be drawn about foundationalist 
state constraint. As was explained in Chapter 3, the neo- 
Kantian foundationalist starts with his essentialist account 
which includes the ideas of separateness, autonomy and 
equality. He then avers that in order for an individual to be 
treated justly he has to be treated qua essential character, 
that is as someone who exhibits the essentially human 
characteristics. This involves offsetting the effects of the 
initial— arbitrary— distribution of social position, wealth, 
talent and physical attributes (so that the essential equality 
is upheld) before holding individuals responsible for their 
choices (qua separate, autonomous beings). A market system 
operating after the rectification of the effects of the 
initial distribution is, according to this view, a just 
institution. As Kymlicka explains in "Liberal Individualism 
and Liberal Neutrality", conceptions of the good can be 
thought of as marketable goods. Individuals conceive of them 
or adopt them, develop them, advertise them and above all 
pursue them. But the pursuit and achievement of any conception 
costs money in accordance with the weight of the burden it 
imposes on others. Kymlicka makes clear that the pursuit of 
some conceptions will unavoidably be expensive and this is 
something that people are bound to take into account as they 
choose their conception (in conditions of "democratic 
equality"). This means that such conceptions will become 
unpopular and remain, so to speak, on the shelf. Given that 
initial, undeserved inequalities have been rectified, there is 
no reason whatsoever why the state should interfere to boost
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those conceptions' chances of becoming popular or as popular 
as rival conceptions. Foundationalist state constraint is, in 
this sense, not a neutrality of outcome.
To illustrate the main points in this discussion let us 
take the example of the son of Bangladeshi immigrants who 
claims that neutrality requires that the British government 
takes measures to protect his chosen conception which is the 
culture of his parents' native country. The initial assumption 
here is that such a conception is quite expensive to pursue 
because it involves learning a foreign language, practising a 
religion which is not as well established as others and 
following unusual customs. If by "protection" the particular 
individual means the provision of particular primary goods 
(such as freedom of religion, freedom of movement, the 
opportunity to seek and to hold positions and to train for 
economic offices or vocations that guarantee income and 
wealth, the distribution of income so as to offset undeserved 
inequalities etc.) which will enable him to responsibly pursue 
his conception of the good, then what he really requests the 
British government to do is to uphold neutrality of 
opportunity. If, however, "protection of his conception" is 
taken to mean the adoption of policies that will give his 
conception the same chances of being chosen that the more 
established (and therefore cheaper) conceptions have, then his 
request is an altogether different one. He now requests that 
the state interferes with the operation of the market not in 
order to offer him as good a chance to achieve his chosen 
goals (whatever those may be) as others have, but in order to
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promote a particular conception of the good until it is 
equally well established as the already popular conceptions. 
Clearly the adoption of such policies cannot be traced back to 
the neo-Kantian foundationalist's essentialist account. 
According to the latter, conceptions of the good are not the 
rather inflexible systems of beliefs and sets of priorities 
put forward by some authority or group (e.g. a religious 
organization or a political party). As Kymlicka points out, by 
choosing autonomously the individual elaborates and modifies 
a particular conception.25 He does not accept it in toto or 
carries it in a "correct" way. The particular conception of 
our example does not have to be held in the same way the 
immigrant parents once held it nor does it contain some 
"essential" elements which have to be necessarily observed if 
he is to be regarded as a true adherent (say, holding Friday 
as a holiday dedicated to prayer). The "cultural marketplace", 
to use Kymlicka's term, will inevitably lead to changes and 
modifications. Making adjustments rather than holding on to 
reactionary interpretations is the only way a cultural 
minority can buttress up its conception in a competitive 
market environment. After all the willingness to adapt is 
assumed of all immigrants who willingly enter such an 
environment.
But what if the request for a neutrality of outcome is 
made by someone who has not yet chosen a conception of the 
good, by someone whose loyalties are not (yet) partisan? His 
point would be that letting economic considerations interfere 
with one's choice of conceptions of the good amounts to saying
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that such conceptions are mere preferences with no moral value 
attached to them. Furthermore, economic considerations are 
determined by contingent factors (such as the fact that before 
Britain opened its doors to immigrants the major religion 
there was Christianity). Letting the economy determine which 
conceptions become or remain established is an acceptance of 
what is contingent rather than of what is essential and this 
is something that apparently contradicts foundationalist meta­
theory .
This argument is based on a couple of misconceptions. 
First, the most basic morally relevant entity in neo-Kantian 
foundationalism is the individual and not any community of 
adherents to a conception of the good or the conception itself 
viewed as a complete, self-sufficient entity. Individuals do 
not get attached to conceptions of the good. The latter are 
either devised by the individual or taken as (often strong) 
suggestions. As individuals are essentially equal qua 
autonomous choice-makers who have an essential want for 
particular goods, the foundationalist higher-order morality 
requires that they are held responsible for the consequences 
of their choices when those are made after the rectification 
of undeserved inequalities (the accidents of birth). The 
market achieves exactly this: it holds individuals responsible 
for their choice of conceptions of the good. The differences 
in the popularity that the various differing conceptions 
attain, consequent upon the operation of the market, are 
irrelevant as far as the foundationalist higher-order morality
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is concerned.k
Second, unlike the foundationalist morality, which is 
derived from the essences, conceptions of the good are
contingent moralities and as such cannot be predicated of the 
institutional structure of society. This means that although 
they have moral significance for those who hold them, they are 
indeed on a par with mere preferences where justice is
concerned.
The third and final question I have undertaken to discuss 
in the present section is whether the two different kinds of 
state constraint (i.e. foundationalist and interpretivist) are 
neutralities of intention; whether, that is, they hold that 
the state is not to take action intended to favour or promote 
a particular conception of the good over another or to give 
special assistance to those who pursue it. In his "The 
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", Rawls makes clear 
that his interpretivist position is not only a (qualified) 
neutrality of opportunity but that it also is a neutrality of
intention "...in virtue of the features of a political
conception: so long as the basic structure is regulated by 
such a view, its institutions are not intended to favour any
kIn Chapter 4, I examined Kymlicka's claim that the 
individual must be provided with a rich cultural environment 
from which to choose his conception of the good. This I called 
the "cultural enrichment principle" and claimed that it is 
meant to be an amended version of the first foundationalist 
state constraint argument. So the state does have reason to 
interfere with the "cultural marketplace", but not in order to 
protect or support particular conceptions. The cultural 
enrichment principle involves the adoption of policies which 
do not refer to any single conception or group of conceptions. 
Tax exemptions for those who get involved with or contribute 
to any society or association pursuing a conception of the 
good is a case in point.
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comprehensive doctrine."26 The neo-Kantian foundationalist 
position is also a neutrality of intention in the sense that 
the state— governed by the morality deriving from what is 
essentially human— does not purposely promote particular 
conceptions of the good. It is, however, crucial to reiterate 
one crucial point: According to the interpretivist who,
because of his specific meta-theoretical perspective, regards 
conceptions of the good as the tenets and dogmas of the actual 
groups, associations, religious organizations, political 
parties and schools of thought of his society, the neo- 
Kantian, foundationalist position is just another 
"comprehensive doctrine" and cannot, therefore, be neutral 
between other conceptions of the good. For his part the 
foundationalist would argue that it is the interpretivist's 
political morality that cannot be neutral since it is 
contingent and parochial.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that 
the two positions hold different views both of the neutral 
morality (the one to be predicated of the neutral state) and 
of what this morality treats neutrally (i.e. of the idea of a 
conception of the good). Although they can both be described 
as procedural neutralities and as neutralities of opportunity 
and intention, they cannot be defended or criticized along the 
same lines. Before I examine the anti-neutralist critique in 
the light of this clarification, I will focus on a different 
kind of neutrality which I will try to fit into the 
foundationalist/interpretivist distinction.
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6.2 Welfarism: The Other Neutrality
As was mentioned during the discussion of procedural 
neutrality, Joseph Raz offers his own account of the different 
meanings of state neutrality (or what he calls "anti- 
perfectionism") , an account which differs significantly from 
that of Rawls. First of all he gives three "interpretations of 
political neutrality"1 which correspond to the three Rawlsian 
neutralities of aim and are listed as follows:
1. No political action may be undertaken or 
justified on the ground that it promotes an ideal of 
the good nor on the ground that it enables 
individuals to pursue an ideal of the good.
2. No political action may be undertaken if it makes 
a difference to the likelihood that a person will 
endorse one conception of the good or another, or to 
his chances of realizing his conception of the good, 
unless other actions are undertaken which cancel out 
such effects.
3. One of the main goals of governmental authority, 
which is lexically prior to any other, is to ensure 
for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their 
lives and promote in their societies any ideal of 
the good of their choosing.27
It is quite obvious that the first of these meanings of state 
neutrality is identical with what Rawls calls "neutrality of 
intentions", the second with "neutrality of outcome" and the 
third with the Rawlsian "neutrality of opportunity". Of course 
this is hardly surprising. As Rawls himself makes clear in 
"The Priority of Right" his account of the different
!What Raz calls "political neutrality" is what I refer to 
as "state neutrality". In the next section I will argue that 
there is a conception of neutrality which is not philosophical 
at all. It is that conception that I will call "political 
neutrality".
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neutralities "draws on Raz's formulations" so that he can 
respond to Raz' misrepresentation of his position."1 What is, 
however, surprising is that Raz' equivalent to Rawls' 
"procedural neutrality" (to the idea that the institutional 
structure and government policy are justified neutrally, that 
is either in terms of neutral, moral values or in terms of no 
moral values at all) is a quite distinct idea which Raz calls 
"welfarism"." According to welfarism, "governments...[are] 
required to promote the goals that people have, without 
discrimination based on their moral merit."28 This position 
can be regarded either as the crux of the single, neutral, 
higher-order morality which can govern the basic structure and 
provide the proper basis for governmental action (in the same 
way the neo-Kantian, foundationalist morality and the 
Rawlsian, distinctly political, interpretivist morality are 
regarded by their authors to be suitable for that purpose), or 
as an amoral principle adopted in the conviction that there 
are no valid moral values. Raz dubs the former interpretation 
of welfarism "political welfarism" and the latter "moral 
welfarism" .29
Moral welfarism is, I believe, easy to dispense with. 
First of all, if it is indeed true that there are no valid
“John Rawls, "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the 
Good", p. 2 62. It should be noted that Raz understands Rawls 
to be an advocate of neutrality of outcome; Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom, pp. 117-18.
"The principle of welfarism as a basis for governmental 
action was first introduced by Brian Barry in Political 
Argument. (Harvester & Wheatsheaf: London, 1990), pp. 38-43. 
It is, however, the case that Barry uses the term "want- 
satisfaction" rather than "welfarism".
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moral values or, to put it in terms of the foundationalist and 
interpretivist meta-theories, that there are no moral 
principles that can be derived from the essences or discovered 
lying under shared practices, there seems to be no reason why 
the satisfaction of people's preferences should be the state's 
main purpose. It is, in other words, impossible to link a 
radical, moral scepticism with the welfarist thesis without 
making certain essentialist (or interpretivist) assumptions. 
This means that moral welfarism boils down to political 
welfarism. Raz takes the opposite view when saying that 
”[al]though their political results are identical, the two 
doctrines represent radically different views of both morality 
and politics." To illustrate his point he offers the example 
of those If[m]oral welfarists who object to the proscription of 
so-called deviant sexual practices or of marijuana [and who] 
sometimes appeal to principles denying the state the right to 
enforce 'private morality', whereas what they mean is the 
denial of the state's right to enforce the wrong morality."30 
In this view the reason why the moral welfarist assumes the 
mantle of the political welfarist is because he does not need 
to show his true colours to promote his political agenda. 
According to Raz, appearing as a political welfarist "...will 
serve [the moral welfarist's] purpose just as well."31 In my 
view moral welfarism is a political welfarist tactic, an 
argument formulated in order to gain the support of those who 
are reluctant to accept the foundationalist or interpretivist 
arguments in favour of welfarism. The reason why moral 
welfarists often appear as political welfarists is not because
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they want to avoid unnecessary controversy, but because they 
are themselves political welfarists. Whether they choose to 
conceal their foundationalist or interpretivist positions in 
order to render the principle of welfarism more attractive to 
their audience is not relevant from a philosophical point of 
view.
What, therefore, remains to be examined in this section 
is political welfarism or— since there is no longer need to 
distinguish it from moral welfarism— simply "welfarism". As 
has already been mentioned, this can either be foundationalist 
or interpretivist. Foundationalist welfarism holds that the 
principle of welfarism should govern the institutional 
structure of society because it is derived from what is 
essentially human, whereas interpretivist welfarism affirms 
that the reason it should be predicated of the basic structure 
is that it is latent in the practices of Western democratic 
societies.
Although Raz does not distinguish between interpretivist 
and foundationalist welfarism, he does, briefly, discuss the 
main interpretivist welfarist argument according to which, 
"[t]he principles of representative government... entail a 
commitment by the democratically constituted authorities to 
act on welfarist considerations."32 Raz does not make clear 
what he means by "principles of representative government", 
but we can safely assume that he means the election of 
representatives to a legislative assembly, where they are 
expected to vote on and pass legislation satisfying their 
constituents' preferences. Voting itself is thought to be
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linked with the welfarist principle. Since it is impossible to 
satisfy all preferences, the government aims at satisfying as 
many preferences as possible or at achieving the greatest net 
balance of pleasure. Voting, either through representatives or 
directly, by means of referenda and Gallup polls, is 
instrumental in doing this. According to the argument, the 
operation of representative democracy in Western societies 
shows that welfarism is latent in their political culture.
In Justice as Impartiality Brian Barry explores this idea 
further. In his view, it is not voting per se that is relevant 
in determining whether welfarism (or what he prefers to call 
"want-satisfaction") is a tacitly acknowledged principle in 
Western democracies, but the rationale on which referenda and 
public-opinion polls are based in these societies. Do citizens 
vote, or respond to questions concerning, say, environmental 
issues posed to them by pollsters, as consumers (whose views 
about the importance of environmental protection projects are 
turned into costs with a notional cash value and compared with 
the costs of alternative projects which are not friendly to 
the environment) or do they feel the need to express their 
opinions on what is the right thing to do? Barry argues at 
some length that the latter is true. People who vote on issues 
in western societies assume that they are called upon to 
express views which are of moral significance and not to 
simply give information concerning their relevant levels of 
utility.33 Barry's is, therefore, an anti-welfarist, 
interpretivist argument.
Like Barry, Raz also claims that welfarism is not latent
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in Western, political practices. As he puts it, "[t]he 
principles of representative government guarantee some measure 
of control by the population over those in authority...[and] 
do not entail a commitment by the democratically constituted 
authorities to act on welfarist considerations alone."34 
Although this argument is rather elliptical, there is no doubt 
about its interpretivist character.
This interpretivist welfarism is, of course, 
distinguishable from foundationalist welfarism. The latter can 
take many different forms, but I will concentrate only on one 
which derives from two foundationalist assumptions. According 
to the first, what constitutes the basis of human nature is a 
certain sort of consciousness or experience, namely want- 
satisfaction. This is the satisfaction of having one's 
preferences and plans of life fulfilled. It follows that the 
foundationalist morality, which (axiomatically) is the only 
one that is fit to govern the basic structure of society, 
calls for the satisfaction of people's preferences without 
discrimination based on their (contingent) moral merit.
According to the second essentialist assumption of this 
foundationalist position, all individuals are equal in the 
sense that distinguishing characteristics (talents, physical 
attributes, sex etc.) are irrelevant where the foundationalist 
morality is concerned. One possible conclusion that can be 
drawn from this is that want-satisfaction is to be distributed 
in the most egalitarian way possible. This can be taken to 
mean that the aim of governmental policy should be the 
achievement of that average level of utility which shows the
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highest level of those with the least.0
Whatever the actual formula to be prescribed, it is 
imperative that individuals' preferences and utility levels 
are made available to be processed. For that reason monitoring 
consumer choice, surveying public opinion and counting votes 
are essential for the operation of the institutional structure 
in accordance with the welfarist, foundationalist morality.
Now, it is not my intention to discuss the validity of 
the interpretivist and foundationalist welfarist positions. 
Rather, my point is that although welfarism appears in the 
literature as a neutralist position,p and although "welfarism" 
appears in discussions of Rawlsian justice,35 the position 
examined in this section is not compatible either with neo- 
Kantian foundationalist neutrality or with Rawlsian 
interpretivist neutrality.
The differences between welfarist foundationalism and 
neo-Kantian foundationalism are rather obvious. First of all, 
the former, unlike the latter, does not call for the provision 
of means (e.g. the Rawlsian primary goods) that are regarded 
as useful in the pursuit of any chosen goal, but for direct, 
made-to-measure assistance. What the welfarist state
°A similar point is made by Barry in Justice as 
Impartiality, p.13 6. Nevertheless, Barry does not regard want- 
satisfaction as a foundationalist position and this is why he 
regards the introduction of egalitarian considerations into 
want-satisfaction theory as a flaw.
pRaz distinguishes between neutrality and welfarism but 
places both under the heading "anti-perfectionism" and talks 
of a close relation between them. Similarly, Barry regards 
want-satisfaction (the equivalent of Raz's "welfarism") as one 
of "two kinds of Neutrality", Justice as Impartiality, pp.139- 
45.
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distributes is not a common currency which is to be used by 
all individuals in their pursuit of their conceptions of the 
good, but want-satisfaction, i.e. the satisfaction of 
achieving a held conception whatever that may be.
Second, in welfarist foundationalism the fact that all 
individuals are equal does not mean, as it does in neo-Kantian 
neutrality, that they have the right to choose and pursue 
their conceptions of the good from a position of near 
equality— where the accidents of birth have been offset by the 
proper distribution of primary goods— but that they all 
deserve to have their conceptions satisfied even if these 
conceptions were adopted in a state of inequality of 
resources, liberties and powers.
Third, according to welfarism, the individual qua 
essential character does not come by his conception of the 
good in a particular way. His conception is not necessarily 
the object of choice but could be constitutive of him, 
inculcated in him, or adopted simply for lack of alternatives.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these differences 
is that the two foundationalist positions are hardly 
compatible with each other. For the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist it is not only the process of choice-making 
that is essential to being human, but the pursuit of the 
chosen goal as well. In fact the two are inseparable since by 
pursuing his conception of the good one modifies or even 
transforms this conception. Both the choice and the pursuit of 
a conception are, in fact, connected with the idea of 
responsibility. Once all undeserved inequalities have been
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rectified or compensated for, the individual is left to deal 
with the consequences of his choices. This is not the case 
with welfarist foundationalism where individuals are 
responsible only for providing accurate information concerning 
their preferences before this information is processed in 
accordance with a welfarist formula. It follows that any 
combination of the essentialist assumptions of these two 
foundationalist positions is bound to lead to problematic 
conclusions.q
Why is it, therefore, that, according to certain critics, 
Rawls should (given his essentialist account) prescribe the 
distribution of welfare rather than the distribution of 
primary goods? The argument goes along the following lines: 
since individuals are to be treated as essentially autonomous 
choice-makers, they can only be held responsible for their 
choices and not for accidents of birth or blows of bad luck. 
G.A. Cohen and Richard Arneson are among those who maintain 
that people who are inefficient in converting primary goods 
into chosen aims and whose inefficiency does not reflect any 
already made choices (e.g. being in physical pain caused by a 
genetically inherited illness), suffer an undeserved "welfare 
deficiency1 .r What is then required is the elimination of such
qThe same can be said of interpretivist neutrality. Given 
that responsibility for one's choices is one of the main 
findings of the interpretivist Rawls, it follows that the two 
arguments of Chapter 5 cannot possible incorporate welfarist 
elements.
rThe term belongs to G.A. Cohen who amends Arneson's 
principle of "equal opportunity for welfare" in his "On the 
Currency of Egalitarian Justice", Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 906- 
944. Cohen claims that Rawls undermines his egalitarianism as 
he fails to understand that his principles of justice
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deficiencies. Although this view has been branded as 
"welfarism", it quite obviously different from the welfarism 
described above. Whereas the welfarism Raz has in mind equates 
welfare with utility, the welfarism of Cohen simply appends to 
the neo-Kantian essentialist account a number of essential 
conditions. Barry, who notices the difference between the two 
welfarisms, suggests that these conditions include "the 
presence of adequate food, clothing and shelter, freedom from 
pain and suffering..."36
The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that 
utilitarian welfarism is a markedly different notion of state 
neutrality, one that is very rarely addressed by the 
participants in the neutrality debate. For this reason I will 
leave it here and move on to a non-philosophical notion of 
state neutrality, one that is not derived from an account of 
what is essentially human or discovered in the moral/political 
conceptions of modern democratic societies or thought to be an 
essential feature of Western political tradition, understood 
as an immutable, autonomous sphere of interrelated ideas (see 
Chapter 8). This state neutrality is distinctly political.
6.3 Liberalism and Political Neutrality
Dworkin's neutralist position will serve as an introduction to 
the notion of political neutrality. Although Dworkin's 
argument is, as I will now argue, foundationalist in 
character, its formulation paves the way for the presentation
penalizes those who are blamelessly inefficient in their use 
of their share of primary goods (pp. 912-916).
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of political neutrality.
Dworkin has written extensively on the issue of legal and 
social interpretation and for this reason his work is often 
regarded as a contribution to "hermeneutic political 
philosophy11.37 However, his general outlook, and more 
specifically his neutralist position, is hardly interpretivist 
in terms of the meta-theoretical distinction of Chapter 2. 
This is made clear in "Foundations of Liberal Equality" where 
he expresses his views on interpretivism
Can we adopt this idea, that principles have 
categorical force when they figure in the best 
interpretation of political history, to supply 
categorical force for a political conception of 
justice constructed so as to embody principles with 
that pedigree? I doubt it. No set of principles 
constructed by a philosopher can fit all parts of 
any community's traditions and history perfectly, 
because...the history of any community includes 
controversy as well as tradition. Two very different 
political conceptions, which would justify very 
different political decisions now, might each fit 
the record and rhetoric of a community's political 
history roughly equally well...We can only decide 
which principles are latent when we already have in 
hand some conception of justice whose categorical 
force we can defend in some other way, as not 
dependent on or derived from its congruence with the 
community's traditions.38
What Dworkin says here is that the philosopher must choose the 
interpretivist position which prescribes principles coinciding 
with, or being closer to, his foundationalist principles. The 
"conception of justice whose categorical force we can defend 
in some other way" is, therefore, none other than the 
Dworkinian foundationalist morality. An interpretation whose 
findings are evaluated in accordance with foundationalist
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principles is not really an interpretivist philosophical 
position since interpretivist philosophy rejects 
foundationalist meta-theory. Hence, what Dworkin calls "the 
interpretation of political history" is actually a feature of 
his foundationalist argument which I will now examine.
As was argued in Chapter 3, the foundationalist's first 
move is to lay down the foundations, the essentially human 
characteristics which he has discovered. He then formulates 
moral/political principles which are presented as dictates of 
human nature (e.g. the Millian liberty principle) and, 
finally, offers more detailed political prescriptions (a 
political agenda) by elaborating his abstract moral 
principles. This is not to say that a foundationalist argument 
is a clear-cut, three-stage strategy, but that it is a process 
of specification, of determining the implications of having 
particular characteristics as human beings and that it is 
useful, from a methodological point of view, to think of it as 
having separate, well-defined stages.
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the process of 
specification has to be completed without the introduction of 
elements which are not traceable to the foundations. This 
usually means that the more elaborate the foundationalist's 
prescriptions are, or rather, the longer the line connecting 
his prescriptions (his view of the just society) with the 
essentialist account, the more ad hoc they are bound to look 
and the more controversial the argument as a whole is bound to 
be. Dworkin's simple suggestion is that in order for the 
foundationalist to make sure that his detailed prescriptions
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are indeed derived from the intermediate, abstract principles 
without the introduction of elements which cannot be traced 
back to the essentialist account, he should retrace his steps, 
that is start from the third and final stage of specification 
and move backwards to establish the connection with the 
intermediate stage.8
Although these meta-theoretical points are not explicitly 
made in "Foundations of Liberal Equality", they are actually 
applied in "Liberalism". Dworkin's objective there is to find 
the "constitutive element", the one abstract, general moral 
principle which constitutes "the nerve of liberalism".39 
Liberalism itself is taken to be a particular institutional 
arrangement, dubbed "the liberal settlement".
Not surprisingly Dworkin's proposed constitutive 
principle of liberalism is the principle of neutrality (i.e. 
the state constraint principle discussed in the previous 
chapters). Dworkin claims that the most fundamental 
assumption— shared by most of the foundationalist positions 
that are popular in Western democratic societies— is that 
individuals are essentially equals. This means that "the 
government [should] treat all those in its charge as 
equals."40 Now, this point acquires different meaning within 
each one of the differing foundationalist views. According to 
the foundationalist position which yields the liberal 
arrangement, it takes the form of the principle of neutrality
sThe connection between the abstract principles and the 
essentialist account does not interest Dworkin. He regards 
this early part of the foundationalist argument as rather 
straightforward.
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which reads as follows:
Since the citizens of a society differ in their 
conceptions [of the good], the government does not 
treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to 
another, either because the officials believe that 
one is intrinsically superior, or because one is 
held by the more numerous or more powerful group.41
According to Dworkin liberalism endorses the market economy 
and representative democracy, regarding them both as basically 
egalitarian. Nevertheless, the principle of neutrality (as a 
specific interpretation of the requirements of equality) 
warrants a number of liberal principles which are meant to 
preclude or offset certain forms of favouritism resulting from 
the operation of these two institutions. The market economy 
tends to benefit those who are better endowed and those who 
belong to the upper socio-economic classes. Such people are 
more capable of achieving their conceptions of the good, or, 
to put it differently, their conceptions are bound to be 
better established than those of the untalented and those of 
the members of the lower classes. The principle of constraint 
is quite explicit here: the government should not prefer the 
conception "held by the...more powerful group" to the 
conceptions of other groups. Liberal endorsement of state 
intervention for the reduction of unemployment and the 
provision of services that would not otherwise be provided, as 
well as (liberal) support for racial equality and approval of 
governmental intervention to secure it, can be seen in this 
light.
Representative democracy can also favour some conceptions
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of the good over others: A majority of
legislators/representatives can pass morals laws branding 
certain conceptions of the good illegal not because their 
pursuit involves the violation of the rights of others, but 
because they are regarded as intrinsically inferior by the 
majority of citizens (or the majority of the representatives 
themselves). For this reason the state constraint principle 
warrants limitations on majority rule: The government should 
not favour a conception which is "held by the more numerous 
group" or a conception which is regarded as "intrinsically 
superior" by state officials. A number of liberal political 
positions is based on this point: rejection of all morals
laws; opposition to the regulation of speech, sexual conduct 
and literature; imposition of procedural constraints and 
devices (e.g. rules against the admissibility of confessions) 
which reduce the extension of the provisions of criminal law 
to conduct of controversial morality and thus safeguard 
against the introduction of morals laws through the back door.
According to Dworkin, the principle of neutrality is 
indeed the intermediate principle which he set out to specify 
since it meets three basic criteria: it is "sufficiently well 
tied to the...liberal settlement," it is sufficiently detailed 
so as to discriminate liberalism from other egalitarian 
foundationalist moralities, and it is a comprehensive and 
frugal scheme that has great explanatory power and can, 
therefore, "provide...a fairer test of the thesis that it
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precedes and survives particular settlements."1
Although the argument of Dworkin's "Liberalism" is a 
foundationalist argument, there is no denying that it is a 
rather unusual one. The idea that the foundationalist has 
somehow forgotten how he arrived at the various principles he 
prescribes and has to retrace his steps back to his first 
principles is rather paradoxical. The most likely explanation 
is that the argument is actually addressed to those 
"liberals", i.e. to those members of Western societies who 
accept most of these secondary principles (e.g. the regulation 
of the market and the rejection of morals laws), who do not 
know how these principles are related to one another. Dworkin 
argues that what links all of them together is the principle 
of neutrality.
Dworkin's view of neutrality as the constitutive element 
of liberalism should be contrasted with Brian Barry's view of 
neutrality as a mere support-seeking strategy. In his "How Not 
to Defend Liberal Institutions" Barry relates how liberals 
have been addressing different arguments to non-liberals in 
order "to show them that they too have good reason to support 
liberal institutions".42 First, there was "the argument from 
social peace" inspired by and put forward after the European 
Wars of Religion. According to this, in order for social peace 
to be achieved, the adherents of any one conception of the
‘Dworkin adds a fourth criterion that should be met by the 
intermediate, foundationalist principle: it must yield
"...positions that it makes sense to suppose might be 
constitutive of political programs for people in our culture" 
(A Matter of Principle, pp. 186-7). This apparently confuses 
the argument and obscures the distinction between 
foundationalism and interpretivism.
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good, and more particularly of any one religious dogma, have 
to adopt a policy of tolerance towards the heterodox members 
of society. According to Barry this argument fails because it 
assumes that all factions attribute a high value to social 
peace and that, therefore, society is already secularized.
Second, there was "the argument from prudence" according 
to which the adherents of a single religious dogma have to be 
tolerant towards the heterodox for fear that after pursuing an 
open conflict they are defeated and have an alien set of 
beliefs imposed on them. The argument clearly suggests the 
adoption of a risk-minimizing strategy and its weakness is, as 
Barry notes, that it assumes the existence of a balance of 
force within society. Liberalism's concern for minorities is, 
therefore, not consonant with this argument.
A third argument is the Lockean "argument from
inefficacy" according to which religious persecution is
pointless because religious belief cannot be coerced but can 
only be reached from within. In order to extend the force of 
the argument over all kinds of conceptions of the good and 
thus bring it up to date, we would have to say that
conceptions of the good are only held when they are "made
one's own", when they are adopted and pursued voluntarily and 
out of conviction. Barry points out that the adherents of many 
conceptions of the good do not share this view; instead they 
regard coercion as an effective means of bringing conviction 
(or religious belief) into line with performance. Such people 
cannot possibly be convinced in this way to adopt a more 
tolerant posture.
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For Barry the principle of neutrality (state constraint) 
belongs to this long tradition of arguments "...that can be 
addressed to non-liberals to induce them to support liberal 
institutions while retaining intact their non-liberal 
attitudes.1143 In his view, such arguments are support-seeking 
(or, more accurately, consent-seeking) strategies. The 
political party upholding the liberal agenda promises to 
refrain from favouring one conception of the good over another 
so as to gain the support of the adherents of all conceptions 
of the good— including the support of the dogmatists. Barry 
avers that this policy is bound to fail because no dogmatist 
would ever endorse the liberal agenda. Islamists, for 
instance, would never subscribe to the "be and let be" message 
implicit in the principle and would accept nothing less than 
a Muslim organization of society which would, at the very 
least, involve making the teaching of Muslim customs and 
values part of public schools' curriculum, banning sexual 
literature, making illegal certain forms of sexual conduct and 
limiting the rights and opportunities of women. For Barry, 
such an arrangement is in direct conflict with the liberal 
social blueprint and so pursuit of neutrality seems to be the 
equivalent of unilateral disarmament on the part of 
liberalism.
Barry claims that there are clear indications that non­
liberals will not hesitate to take advantage of this 
situation. As he puts it, "...the evidence is there for all to 
see. The churches that have made the biggest concessions to 
liberalism are losing ground while those that strain credulity
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the most gain the most adherents.... The popular press in 
Britain...reinforces and makes respectable the more atavistic 
impulses of its readers. The idea is gaining ground that 
schools should teach what parents want taught. And so on."44 
Liberals themselves are, therefore, bound to denounce 
neutrality on the basis that it is a potentially disastrous 
vote-winning strategy.
If neutrality is indeed a reward that non-liberals are 
promised for supporting the liberal agenda (or, in simpler 
terms, for voting liberal) and if the non-liberals' intentions 
are those described above, one has to accept Barry's 
conclusion. It should, however, be noted that in "How Not to 
Defend Liberal Institutions" Barry is concerned with the 
practicalities, the actual chances, of getting from "what is" 
to the liberal "to be". The kind of neutrality he criticizes 
is, therefore, different from those of chapters 3, 4 and 5. It 
is a political, rather than a philosophical, neutrality.
Political neutrality need not necessarily be a dictate or 
a corollary of the foundationalist, higher-order morality or 
a principle latent in moral and political practices. It can be 
a means of reaching the social arrangement dictated by a 
particular foundationalist or interpretivist position, a means 
of moving from the existing, not fully realized liberal 
arrangement to the one prescribed by political philosophy. 
This means that it may be external to the philosophical 
argument itself.u What is certain is that it is a concern of
uFor example, it may be to liberalism what the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is to Marxist communism.
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those statesmen who live in an imperfect world (where the
institutions of justice are not yet fully in place) and who
subscribe to neo-Kantian foundationalism or to Rawlsian 
interpretivism.
It is, of course, the case that both "philosophical 
neutrality" and "political neutrality" refer to the same 
principle of state constraint. It is, however, clear that the 
former applies to a society where the institutions of (either 
foundationalist or interpretive) justice are fully operative 
whereas the latter does not. Barry could be interpreted as 
saying that although neutrality may be the "nerve of
liberalism", as Dworkin suggests, it is a bad policy in the
sense that if applied in modern democratic societies, it will 
fail to bring about the neutral, liberal, social arrangement 
prescribed by liberal philosophy.
To avoid any misunderstandings, I should make clear that 
both neo-Kantian foundationalism and Rawlsian interpretivism 
assume that the higher-order, neutral morality is acceptable, 
or can be made acceptable, to a large majority of citizens. 
However, the need to make the philosophical prescriptions 
acceptable to a large majority of citizens does not affect the 
content of these prescriptions. The philosopher does not 
prescribe policies and arrangements which— he hopes— will be 
acceptable to the adherents of all conceptions of the good nor 
does he revise them when they are rejected as non-neutral. Any 
arguments, except his own, that are offered in justification 
of his prescriptions in order to make a particular political 
agenda more popular are political.
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In his latest contribution to the neutrality debate Barry 
adopts the view that foundationalist neutrality is not really 
neutral. As he puts it, "...my object...is to seek an answer 
to. . . [the] charge that justice as impartiality is a fraud 
because it purports to rest on neutral foundations while in 
reality resting upon a distinctively liberal conception of the 
good...[T]he argument from autonomy does rest on a 
distinctively liberal conception of the good."45 This means 
that Barry, once again, treats "neutrality" as a political 
term. Only political neutrality (as defined above) is relevant 
in the neutrality debate. Whether liberals like to think of 
liberalism as a neutral, higher-order conception that is 
compatible with all other conceptions is not relevant in what 
is a distinctively political debate. As in "How Not to Defend 
Liberal Institutions", Barry's concern is how the liberal 
agenda will be made acceptable to non-liberals. Advertising 
neo-Kantian foundationalism as neutral, that is using the 
philosophical argument itself, is a bad liberal strategy. But 
now Barry has come to think that the intuitive appeal of 
"neutrality" can do the trick. Political neutrality should 
not, therefore, be abandoned. Instead, it should be 
differentiated from foundationalist neutrality. The latter may 
be the way in which some liberals perceive of their (higher- 
order) conception of the good but it is useless as a support- 
winning position. It is not, however, considered as dangerous 
or self-defeating as it was argued in "How Not to Defend" and 
this is because it is now not taken to be a promise of 
unilateral disarmament in exchange for votes, but simply a
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philosophical argument which, like its three predecessors, is 
lacking in political conviction. This means that although 
Barry has softened his position towards the presentation of 
neo-Kantian foundationalism as a neutral position, he still 
rejects it for being politically ineffective.
But the connection with his previous statement on 
neutrality is not the core of Barry's recent argument. The 
main point he now makes is that neutral can only be the 
constitutional framework which would be decided upon by 
individuals who are moved by the "agreement motive", that is 
by the desire to "live in a society whose members all freely 
accept its rules of justice and its major institutions...,"46 
and are sceptical in the sense that they deny "the legitimacy 
of certainty".47 Barry argues at length that for individuals 
to decide on a neutral arrangement it is essential that they 
bear both of these characteristics.
Is this a political argument? Is it offered in order to 
induce non-liberals to endorse the liberal agenda? The answer 
is No. Barry's clearly is a full-fledged interpretivist 
position. His point is not that the adoption of the idea of 
neutrality will help popularize the liberal institutional 
arrangement or that the liberal argument (if not the liberal 
institutional arrangement itself) should be modified to 
accommodate the adherents of all conceptions of the good, but 
that the two conditions stated above (i.e. the agreement 
motive and scepticism) are actually present in democratic 
societies. This is not to say that people there are self- 
declared sceptics who want to reach agreement on basic,
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political principles. Rather, the point is that there is 
evidence in support of the view that the desire to justify 
one's actions in terms which are intelligible and acceptable 
to others and the rejection of the legitimacy of certainty are 
implicit in moral and political practice in Western democratic 
societies.v
The crux of Barry's recent argument is that the 
interaction between these two interpretivist findings leads to 
the idea of state neutrality. This means that the argument is 
a constructivist one. In the same way that Rawls puts together 
a number of interpretivist elements (i.e. the findings of 
separate interpretivist projects) in order to determine what 
principles are suitable for Western democratic societies (see
5.2), Barry combines his two interpretivist findings and 
arrives at the principle of neutrality. In his view, given
VI have, admittedly, removed the universalist overtones 
in Barry's argument. Barry seems to be suggesting that the 
desire to justify one's actions to others and the kind of 
scepticism that, as he says, underlies the rejection of the 
legitimacy of certainty, have been present in every historical 
society. For instance, he avers that religious scepticism has 
always been widespread and claims that "...the sheer weight of 
the evidence in favour of [religious] scepticism seems 
overwhelming" (Justice as Impartiality, p. 171). In my view, 
Barry's argument can only stand as an interpretivist one. The 
two elements he identifies are closely related to the ideas of 
public accountability and moral scepticism that are prevalent 
in Western democracies. Given that the examples of religious 
scepticism he offers (p. 170) are basically drawn from Western 
largely secular societies (e.g. the U.S. and 19th century 
Germany and Austria-Hungary), it appears that he would not 
reject the particularist interpretation of his argument.
There is, however, a further indication that Barry's 
argument is interpretivist in character: he accepts
constitutional neutrality alone and maintains that at the 
legislative level the value of certain kinds of conceptions of 
the good should be debated on and put to the vote. This is a 
view that is widely shared in Western democracies and one 
which an interpretivist would hardly ever overlook.
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that the desire to justify one's actions to others and the 
rejection of the legitimacy of certainty are both widely 
shared in Western democracies, one must conclude that no 
particular conception of the good should be built into their 
constitution.
Barry avers that neither one of these two elements can by 
itself lead to the principle of neutrality. This is a valid 
point: one may satisfy one's desire for justifying one's
actions to others by justifying them in terms of one's 
particular conception of the good; justification does not mean 
"neutral justification" unless it is paired with scepticism. 
The latter does not by itself entail neutrality since, in 
Barry's own words, "if there is nothing to choose between 
conceptions of the good, what objection could there be to the 
government's picking one (perhaps at random, even) and 
enforcing it?"48
It is interesting to note that although this argument 
appears be a complete reversal of Barry's earlier position on 
neutrality, his two arguments— the political argument of "How 
Not to Defend Liberal Institutions" and the philosophical 
argument of Justice as Impartiality— are actually compatible 
with each other. In the earlier argument Barry rejects 
foundationalist neutrality both as a philosophical position 
and as an argument designed to popularize the liberal agenda 
whereas in his recent statement he endorses interpretivist 
neutrality by means of a constructivist argument which is both 
simpler and more straightforward than Rawls'.
Now, the neutralists who are most aware of the difference
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between philosophical neutrality and political neutrality are, 
I believe, Bruce Ackerman and Charles Larmore. Ackerman 
understands that in order to make liberal (neutral) 
institutions acceptable, the philosopher (who is either a neo- 
Kantian foundationalist or an interpretivist neutralist) 
should not simply present his philosophical argument. As he 
puts it,
[i]f I simply tried to tell you why I personally am 
a committed liberal, this would predictably divert 
some of you from arguments that you would find more 
compelling. Given this dilemma, it seems best to 
dispense with personal declarations of faith so as 
to better give you a sense of the different paths 
that can lead a thoughtful person to neutrality.49
Ackerman is not really saying that he is a sceptic (although 
he mistakenly suggests that the sceptic is bound to endorse 
neutrality). What he means is that a philosophical neutralist 
argument is unlikely to persuade non-liberals to accept state 
neutrality. His view is not that we cannot really know 
philosophical truth, but that knowledge of the truth does not 
make for persuasive arguments. What the philosopher needs to 
do in order to promote the establishment of his proposed 
institutional arrangement is to make appealing to the members 
of his audience. A single justification is hardly likely to do 
the job (especially if his audience is the kind of multi­
racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious society that Ackerman 
is addressing) . What he should, therefore, do is offer as many
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disparate justifications of his position as he can muster.w
Ackerman purports to do exactly that. He claims that 
neutrality can be reached by many different routes. Neo- 
Kantian foundationalism (which he personally endorses) is just 
one of them. The "dialogic ideal", the values that underlie 
the principles of rational discussion, is another.50 
Scepticism, experimentation (the view that one has to work out 
one's conception of the good by oneself) and mistrust of those 
who hold political power also feature in Ackerman's list.51 At 
times he even appears to be suggesting that an interpretivist 
investigation would also lead us to the principle of state 
neutrality.52
Ackerman's conclusion is that neutrality "...can be 
reached by countless pathways of argument coming from very 
different directions. As time passes, some paths are abandoned 
while others are worn smooth..."53 Nevertheless, the paths to 
neutrality he actually mentions are not diverse enough to 
render his argument persuasive. The dialogic ideal, and the 
notions of scepticism and experimentation are all neo-Kantian 
spin-offs.x Of course, this point has not gone unnoticed by
WI believe that Larmore makes this very point in 
"Political Liberalism", Political Theory. 18 (1990), p. 345, 
when he avers that "...the Kantian and Millian conceptions of 
liberalism are not adequate solutions to the political problem 
of reasonable disagreement about the good life. They have 
themselves become part of the problem."
xThe strong connection between the dialogic ideal and the 
neo-Kantian notion of nationalism is revealed by Ackerman 
himself in "Why Dialogue?", p. 8. As for his argument from 
scepticism, it rests on a strong egalitarian premise (as is 
noted by Barry in Justice as Impartiality, p. 172). Finally, 
the strong connection between autonomy and the notion of 
experimentation is quite clear.
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Ackerman's critics. As Benjamin Barber points out, Ackerman's 
argument lacks the creativity, variety, flexibility and 
inventiveness of a political argument and, therefore, fails to 
persuade.54
The same can probably be said of Larmore's political 
argument. Like Ackerman, Larmore is actually exploring the 
arguments that the liberal (neutralist) philosopher could 
address to the members of his diverse audience in order to 
persuade them to accept state neutrality. He rejects autonomy, 
scepticism and experimentation for being too closely connected 
with the neo-Kantian position and suggests that sympathy, the 
desire for civil peace and the notion of "equal respect for 
everyone" are the only considerations that can appeal to the 
liberal philosopher's audience.55
Whatever its shortcomings, the neutralist's political 
argument is bound to be or to include philosophical positions. 
Although the philosopher wants to exert influence, he cannot 
possibly abandon his philosophy altogether and replace it with 
the empathetic and affective idiom, which Barber finds 
indispensable to political argument, without ceasing to be a 
philosopher.
Having made all the necessary distinctions between the 
different meanings of state neutrality, it is now possible to 
address the critique of state neutrality.
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CHAPTER 7 
The Critique of Neutrality
My main objective in the present chapter is to make a more 
systematic presentation of those arguments which reject the 
idea of state neutrality and argue against the adoption of the 
principle of neutrality (state constraint), and to show that 
not all of them are aimed at the same target or meet with 
success.
Anti-neutralist arguments fall into four different lines 
of criticism. According to the first one, state neutrality is 
impracticable in the sense that it cannot be translated into 
workable principles and guidelines which can govern the 
institutional structure of society or set limits to 
governmental action. According to the second one, state 
neutrality is not actually "neutral" in that it either 
discriminates between different conceptions of the good or is 
derived from non-neutral values. The third general criticism 
holds that although state neutrality may be really neutral and 
even feasible it is bound to be very unpopular. Finally, the 
fourth criticism argues that the philosophical argument(s) 
justifying state neutrality are somehow flawed. Although there 
is considerable overlapping between these criticisms I will 
now approach them separately and examine how each fares 
against the neutralist positions examined above.
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7.1 The Impracticability of Neutrality
The view of neutrality as impossible to implement is quite 
widely held. As we saw in Chapter 3, John Danley claims that 
the main implication of neutrality is the assignment of 
different rights to the adherents of different conceptions of 
the good which amounts to the creation of "a crazy quilt of 
different jurisdictions and...a jumble of different sets of 
rights.1'1 Such an arrangement is not simply difficult to 
supervise and finance; it is also virtually unfeasible. As we 
have seen, Danley equates "conceptions of the good" with
"cultural communities", but as has been mentioned, the proper 
meaning of "a conception of the good" is much wider and
includes preferences, lifestyles and religious beliefs which 
can be seen as independent of any particular ethnic or 
cultural identities. It follows, therefore, that if Danley's 
"neutrality between cultures" is too expensive or too 
complicated to implement, a more complex "neutrality between 
all conceptions of the good" is totally inconceivable.®
It is, I believe, quite obvious that this line of 
criticism assumes that state neutrality is a neutrality of 
outcome whose aim is to make sure that market forces do not 
affect the popularity of the differing conceptions of the
aIt is interesting to note that William Galston takes the
exact opposite view when he states that "[t]he costs of 
cooperation under common rules with individuals who differ 
radically from me may appear prohibitive...It may be rational 
for me to prefer a multiplicity of separate homogeneous 
communities."(Liberal Purposes. pp. 147-148). The point here 
is not that state neutrality is a neutrality of outcome, a 
position which is totally impracticable, but that it is an 
expensive alternative to neutrality of outcome. The 
conclusion, however, is the same in both cases.
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good. The latter are themselves viewed as fixed sets of 
principles and moral or aesthetic priorities which cannot be 
revised without being abandoned. The groups of adherents are 
also assumed to be numerically fixed. Any changes in the 
number of adherents are, therefore, thought to be in breach of 
neutrality. These assumptions lead to an idea of neutrality 
which is very different from the neo-Kantian foundationalist 
and the Rawlsian interpretivist positions examined above.
Ackerman responds to this particular line of anti­
neutralist criticism in a similar manner. As he puts it, if 
neutrality is understood "...as a criterion...which seeks to 
judge political decisions by evaluating the outcomes they 
produce,...[n]eutrality seems a conceptual nonstarter... [M]y 
response is to deny that neutrality is a way of directly 
assessing consequences."2
The conclusion to be drawn from these points is that 
those who think of neutrality as inapplicable have in mind 
some kind of neutrality of outcome and, therefore, their 
criticisms can safely be dismissed as irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, Susan Mendus argues that neutrality of 
intention, too, is inapplicable in the sense that it can never 
be monitored or clearly established. As she puts it, "it is 
notoriously difficult to establish what the motivation is 
behind any particular piece of legislation and, given this 
fact, neutrality in motivation may simply be the fig leaf with 
which to disguise antagonism towards a particular group or 
groups. Ways of life may wither away and die not because they 
are clearly and overtly legislated against, but as a result of
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the unintended, though foreseeable, consequences of some kinds 
of legislation."3 Since both the neo-Kantian, foundationalist 
neutrality and the Rawlsian interpretivist neutrality are 
neutralities of intention, Mendus' view appears to be a 
relevant, powerful criticism.
Rawls and Barry sidestep this criticism by claiming that 
neutrality does not always operate at the legislative level.4 
In their view, there are bound to be certain issues (issues 
where individual rights are not in question) that cannot 
possibly be resolved without giving priority to some 
conception of the good over others. Although the procedure by 
which decisions on these issues are taken should conform with 
the principles of justice, a particular conception will, in 
the end, be promoted. Such issues are "...statutes protecting 
the environment and controlling pollution; establishing 
national parks and preserving wilderness areas and animal and 
plant species; and laying aside funds for museums and the 
arts."5 To say that neo-Kantian foundationalist justice, or 
Rawlsian interpretivist justice, provides an answer to the 
question of whether a specific museum or theatre company 
should be publicly funded or that it determines the 
appropriate level of funding is absurd. A decision can only be 
reached in terms of a particular (lower-order) conception of 
the good (e.g. a conception which values highly Opera or 
Shakespearean theatre) . Of course, any funds that go into such 
projects have to be raised in accordance with the principles
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of justice.b
The upshot of this argument is that neutrality of 
intention is not elusive or impossible to confirm. The 
neutralist cannot suggest that in a just society all kinds of 
policies are adopted with neutral intent. The very nature of 
certain issues makes the promotion of some conceptions 
unavoidable. However, at the constitutional level neutrality 
of intention cannot be doubted. Constitutional principles 
(whether they derive from neo-Kantian foundationalism, or draw 
on principles implicit in a specifically political conception 
that is prevalent in modern democratic societies) are not 
designed to promote particular conceptions of the good.
7.2 Neutrality as a Fraud
Let us now come to the second main line of anti-neutralist 
criticism according to which state neutrality (as defined by 
the neutralists) may indeed be feasible, but is not actually 
"neutral" between the differing conceptions of the good.
This criticism is almost exclusively directed against 
foundationalist neutrality. Consider for example Barry's view 
of neo-Kantian neutrality. As he puts it, for the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist "[o]nly conceptions that have the right 
origins— those that have come about in ways that meet the 
criteria for self-determined belief— can form the basis for
bTo this Barry adds that "the procedure by which the 
decision is taken should be fair" (Justice as Impartiality, p. 
145). The point is not adequately explained and given that he 
states that state neutrality is incomplete as a decision rule 
(Ibid., p. 145) , it feels rather redundant.
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activity that has value. It is therefore unlikely that the 
good as autonomy will be advanced by distributing resources in 
a way that takes no account of the autonomous or non- 
autonomous origins of people's substantive conceptions of the 
good."6 For this reason, Barry concludes, neo-Kantian 
foundationalism is not neutral.
Now, it seems to me that Barry's point does not really 
show that the neo-Kantian higher-order conception is non­
neutral between lower-order conceptions of the good. Although 
the way in which a conception of the good is adopted is of 
great concern to the neo-Kantian foundationalist, its content 
is not. Any conception of the good may be pursued as long as 
it is chosen autonomously by the individual. It is in this 
sense that neo-Kantian foundationalism is neutral.
Of course, Barry is not alone in finding neo-Kantian 
foundationalism non-neutral. Mendus claims that although the 
neo-Kantian foundationalist argument is quite coherent, it is 
non-neutral and this is why it ultimately fails.7 Galston 
makes the same point when he says that the more seriously 
neutralists take their commitment to autonomy/rationality, 
"...the more blurred becomes the line separating...[their 
proposed arrangement] from the tutelary, 'perfectionist' state 
committed to a fuller theory of the good."8 The point that 
these critics are actually making is that the 
foundationalist's meaning of "neutrality" conflicts with the 
correct meaning of the word.
But what is this "correct" meaning? There are three 
possible answers to this question. According to the first
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answer, which was discussed in Chapter 1, neutrality can 
either mean the lack of certain kinds of characteristics which 
would help us place someone or something in one among many 
specified classes or varieties, or it can mean taking neither 
side in a dispute, debate or difference of opinion. As I have 
mentioned (Chapter 1), these two definitions of "neutrality" 
are context-independent, but most theorists find them too 
sketchy to be of any significance. Be that as it may, they set 
standards which are definitely met by the neo-Kantian higher- 
order conception. Since the latter is only concerned with the 
conditions in which conceptions of the good are adopted, it 
lacks those characteristics that would make it one among the 
many, differing conceptions of the good.c Furthermore, it 
takes no sides in the conflict between rival conceptions of 
the good.d It is in this sense that it is a deemed a higher- 
order conception.
I believe that many of those critics who find neo-Kantian 
foundationalism non-neutral reject this definition of 
"neutrality". Instead they imply either that "neutrality" has 
a social meaning which can only be known through social 
interpretation and which sets a standard that neo-Kantian
cTo put it differently it is not the object of one's 
choice. It is not adopted in order to satisfy a first-order or 
second-order desire or preference.
dThis position can be maintained if we accept, as the neo- 
Kantian foundationalist does, that the way in which a 
conception of the good is adopted is not essential to that 
conception. If, in other words, coercive proselytism is not an 
essential feature of any conception of the good— which I 
believe is true— then neo-Kantian foundationalism cannot be 
thought to be taking sides in the conflict between rival 
conceptions.
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foundationalism does not meet, or that neutrality depends 
solely on acceptability (i.e. that in order for an arrangement 
or policy to be neutral, it must be accepted as such by all 
competing groups of partisans) and that neo-Kantian 
foundationalism fails this test.
Surprisingly enough one possible response to such 
criticisms is provided by Barry himself who claims that "it is 
no argument against [neutrality] to say that [it] fail[s] to 
accord with some different conception of neutrality." If this 
statement is paired with the one which precedes it, according 
to which justice is neutral in the sense that "it proposes 
that all conceptions of the good should (in a way defined by 
the theory itself) be treated equally," we are bound to 
conclude that there is no need to compare the 
foundationalist's idea of neutrality with some other notion of 
neutrality which is external to "the (foundationalist) theory 
itself" in order to test its genuiness. The foundationalist 
morality is neutral because it is a higher-order morality 
which is compatible with all the differing conceptions of the 
good. "Compatibility" here is also defined by "the theory 
itself", as is the scope of all the differing conceptions of 
the good (in the sense that they are all regarded as lower- 
order conceptions and objects of individuals' autonomous 
choices). The real reasons why Barry rejects neo-Kantian, 
foundationalist neutrality are, as has been mentioned (see
6.3), that he is disinclined to accept foundationalist meta­
theory and that he is interested in making his idea of 
neutrality politically attractive. To achieve this he has to
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use as support-winning argument for the liberal cause some 
interpretivist position rather than an already widely 
criticised foundationalist view.
A second possible response is that the use of 
"neutrality" can be avoided without changing the actual 
principle itself which can be presented under the heading of 
"principle of state restraint". This was the argument in Part
II. The idea of neutrality may be regarded by some as useful 
in explaining the neo-Kantian foundationalist position or the 
Rawlsian interpretivist position, but there is no reason why 
it should not be abandoned or replaced if the questions it 
raises are more than those it helps to answer.
Before closing this discussion on the second anti­
neutralist criticism, I should briefly touch upon the issue of 
scepticism. In Part II I made clear that state neutrality does 
not derive from scepticism. However, certain critics have 
argued that the neutralist argument is an argument from 
scepticism and that, given that scepticism is not a higher- 
order conception of the good, state neutrality is not really 
neutral .c
eThis is one of the anti-neutralist arguments proffered 
by Susan Mendus (Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, pp. 
75-79). In her view, historical evidence points to a strong 
connection between scepticism and a particular lifestyle, the 
life of ataraxia (imperturbability) . This is a life of 
tranquillity that contrasts with the life of profound 
commitment or intense emotion. English seventeenth-century 
sceptics who embraced this way of life were "neutral" towards 
non-sceptics only insofar as their way of life was not 
threatened by the high emotion and disorder caused by their 
religious disputes. But being "mindful of the fact that 
certain practices were likely to cause civil strife, sceptics 
frequently took the course of intolerance and persecution" (p. 
77) . For Mendus this is enough proof that scepticism does not 
qualify as a neutral, higher-order conception and that the
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It is important to note that this criticism is based on 
a serious misunderstanding. Scepticism not only fails to yield 
state neutrality, but fails to yield any principles that can 
govern the institutional structure of society. The sceptic is 
someone who believes that sure knowledge of philosophical 
truth, of the foundations, cannot be found. Assuming that he 
accepts that the principles that govern public life should be 
derived from the foundations, the sceptic cannot possibly 
prescribe any principles. For all he knows, the principles 
already governing the basic structure may be the ones that 
derive from the truth. Scepticism is, therefore, a reason for 
not prescribing principles and not the foundation of state 
neutrality. To put it in terms of the Platonic fable of the 
cave, the sceptic is one of the chained cave-dwellers who 
although aware that there is life outside the cave, in the 
true world of facts, he knows that no-one can escape from his 
bonds to acquire knowledge of it.
Neutralists often talk of scepticism, but this is not the 
foundationalist scepticism discussed here. Ackerman mentions 
scepticism as a possible route to neutrality, but he can 
hardly disguise the neo-Kantian foundationalism that underlies 
it. (See 6.3). Barry talks about a kind of scepticism which is 
an interpretivist finding and which does not lead to any 
principles unless it is combined with an other interpretivist 
finding, i.e. the desire to justify one's actions to others.
neutrality it endorses is really a fraud.
In fact the kind of scepticism discussed by Mendus is 
what Barry calls "latitudinarianism", a notion of scepticism 
which denies that all knowledge is impossible. (See below).
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(See 6.3). Furthermore, he asserts that the notion of 
scepticism he identifies is a position lying somewhere between 
scepticism and dogmatism; although it rejects zealous 
dogmatism, it does not deny the possibility of any knowledge. 
In fact, he suggests that "latitudinarianism" is a better term 
for it, one that can help to distinguish it from extreme 
scepticism and is historically more accurate.9
Now, I have chosen not to address in this section the 
anti-neutralist argument that stems from the third definition 
of "neutrality" (i.e. from the one according to which neutral 
is what is accepted as such by the actual adherents of the 
differing conceptions of the good), because it falls into the 
third line of anti-neutralist criticism, a criticism that can 
be directed both against foundationalist and against 
interpretivist state neutrality.
7.3 The Unacceptability of Neutrality
One crucial question that seems to be of, at least some, 
concern to the participants in the neutrality debate is 
whether the idea of the neutral state is generally acceptable 
in Western democratic societies. Critics of state neutrality 
suggest that it is not and point to the fact that the 
adherents of many conceptions of the good (most notably, in 
Britain, members of the Muslim communities) reject it out of 
hand as discriminatory and detrimental to their ways of life.f
fWilliam Galston explains the religious fundamentalists' 
position on state neutrality in Liberal Purposes (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1990), pp. 130-131. As he puts 
it, from their perspective, state neutrality "...represents an
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The significance of this point is not really clear.
Some critics seem to be saying that since not all sides 
accept the "neutral state" as actually neutral between the 
differing conceptions of the good, state neutrality is a 
fraud. It seems to me that if this definition of "neutrality" 
is accepted, then the term is clearly not suitable for a 
philosophical argument since the philosopher (whether he is a 
foundationalist or an interpretivist) does not formulate 
principles in order to accommodate the actual adherents of as 
many conceptions of the good as possible. The views that 
particular religious leaders, representatives of ethnic 
communities and spokesmen for cultural minorities hold on the 
genuineness of state neutrality is not taken into account by 
the neutralist philosopher in his formulation of the 
principles that should govern the basic structure of society. 
Therefore, shedding the term "neutrality", as I did throughout 
Part II, makes this criticism appear rather superficial.
However, the critic could suggest that the fact that 
people reject neutrality has serious implications both for 
foundationalist and for interpretivist neutrality. Starting 
with the former, he could argue that the idea of establishing 
(neutral) institutions which are not acceptable to a 
significant number of people seems to contradict the 
foundationalist's claim that the neutral state respects 
individuals' essentially autonomous nature. How can they be 
treated as autonomous if they live within an institutional
injunction to set aside God's word, the only source of 
salvation, in determining the principles of our public order."
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structure which they categorically reject?
One possible response to this argument is to say that 
those individuals who find neutrality unacceptable do so 
because their autonomous nature is somehow impeded. Once the 
neutral institutions are in place, that is, once the proper 
conditions under which they can choose and develop their 
chosen conceptions are present, their attitude towards the 
neutral institutions will change. The fact, for instance, that 
in modern Britain a substantial minority rejects neutrality is 
irrelevant because the institutional structure there is not 
governed by the neo-Kantian, foundationalist morality. In this 
view, it is important to keep in mind that the present 
institutional arrangements in several modern democratic 
societies are not those derived from the neo-Kantian 
foundations and, therefore, their citizens' view of the 
neutral state is likely to be distorted.
Given, however, that actual social arrangements may be 
derivable from these foundations, or that there is a strong 
resemblance between the prescriptions of the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist and certain already established social 
arrangements, and as I do not wish to examine here the 
validity of such an argument, I believe that this response 
should be set aside.
According to an alternative response which, in my view, 
bears more credibility, a great many people oppose neutral 
institutions not because their autonomy is in some sense 
hindered, but because they are actually against the view that 
the adherents of conceptions which differ from their own
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should be treated as autonomous choice-makers. The 
establishment of neutral institutions does not in any way 
compromise the autonomy of the anti-neutralists, since their 
autonomy is not dependent on their ability to coerce others 
into accepting their conception of the good.8
Now, with respect to interpretivist neutrality, the 
critic might argue that the rejection of neutral institutions 
by a substantial minority in Western democratic societies 
discredits the neutralist, interpretivist argument since the 
interpretivist philosopher himself acknowledges the importance 
that people in these societies give to public consensus. This 
means that the interpretivist findings themselves contradict 
the philosopher's distinction between people's opinions on 
matters of public morality, and the (philosophically relevant) 
principles which are implicit in moral and political practice.
As I argued in 5.2, this argument is based on a false 
assumption. The fact that the interpretivist neutralist 
prescribes a principle (i.e. that of state neutrality) which 
many actually reject, does not mean that he underestimates the 
value attributed to public consensus in democratic societies. 
Rather, he specifies the kind of consensus that is valued in 
Western societies and determines its institutional 
implications. In doing so, he pays closer attention to the 
undercurrents, to the principles and ideas implicit in
8The fact that Kantian autonomy implies acceptance of the 
foundationalist institutions is clearly not a problem. As was 
made clear in Chapter 3, the neo-Kantian notion of autonomy is 
narrower in scope.
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practice, rather than to opinion polls or to the protests of 
the variously motivated leaders of religious or cultural 
minorities.
So the conclusion to be drawn from this discussion of the 
third line of anti-neutralist criticism is that the 
desirability or acceptability of state neutrality neither 
determines the content of the neutralist philosopher's 
prescriptions nor confirms the validity of his arguments. Both 
the foundationalist and the interpretivist neutralists have 
their reasons for believing that their prescriptions will be 
accepted by a significant majority of citizens. If some of 
them appear to be trying to accommodate every single 
dissenter, this is because, like Rawls, they are also 
concerned about the reception that their positions will get 
and the level of political support that they will be able to 
muster. To reiterate the point, the political philosopher's 
eagerness to gain popularity and exert influence, can 
sometimes obscure his account of the truth and its 
implications.
7.4 Flaws in the Philosophical Neutralist Arguments
It could be argued, that the three lines of criticisms 
examined so far are political in that they either point to 
difficulties in the achievement of a prescribed neutralist "to 
be", or find the use of the term "neutrality" by the 
neutralist philosopher as an attempt at misleading his 
audience, at making them accept his view as something that it 
is not. By contrast, the fourth line of criticism is purely
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philosophical. It comprises arguments which, being sensitive 
to the meta-theoretical distinction between foundationalist 
and interpretivist neutrality, are concerned with the 
particulars of the philosophical neutralist arguments. Not 
surprisingly this includes arguments which are directed either 
against the foundationalist, neo-Kantian position or against 
Rawlsian interpretivism.
In the former category belong arguments which hold that 
the move from the essentialist account to the prescriptions is 
flawed or, to put it differently, that one cannot possibly get 
from the particular neo-Kantian essences to the principle of 
neutrality. If the foundationalist says that this move is 
possible it is either because somewhere along the line of 
specification he introduced further assumptions which are not 
related to his essentialist account, or because he overlooked 
some gap along the line of specification which is not possible 
to be bridged with the means available to him.
One such argument is proffered by William Galston who 
claims that the path from autonomy "...to negative freedom is 
obstructed, and a substantive doctrine of the good 
is...unsuited to serve as a foundation for negative 
freedom."10 According to Galston the reason for this is 
twofold. First, autonomy (which for Galston is synonymous with 
"positive freedom") and negative freedom have different 
logics. One's autonomy can never conflict with that of another 
whereas negative freedom can. Second, the two of them lie in 
different spheres. Autonomy is metaphysical whereas negative 
freedom is not.11 This means that the move from autonomy
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(which is the basic element of the neo-Kantian's essentialist 
account) to the liberty principle constitutes a serious flaw 
in the foundationalist argument.
In my view, Galston is mistaken in assuming that the neo- 
Kantian starting-point is the Kantian notion of autonomy. As 
I explained in Chapter 3, neo-Kantian autonomy is narrower in 
scope than the Kantian notion of "autonomy in the noumenal 
world" and should, therefore, not be identified with positive 
freedom. Furthermore, the neo-Kantian philosopher's move from 
metaphysics (i.e. the notion of autonomy) to normative 
principles is not unbridgeable precisely because it is not 
identical with Kantian autonomy. As Richards puts it, neo- 
Kantian autonomy can be thought to comprise a number of 
"complex capacities" such as "language and self-consciousness, 
memory, logical relations, empirical reasoning about beliefs 
and their validity (intelligence), and the capacity to use 
normative principles in terms of which plans of action can be 
assessed, including principles of rational choice in terms of 
which ends may be more effectively and coherently realized."12 
Surely, the derivation of a particular social arrangement from 
this list of essential attributes is far more plausible than 
the derivation of normative principles from the Kantian 
noumenal world.
In my view, Galston confuses the neo-Kantian essentialist 
account with the Kantian noumenal world which he seems to 
regard as an explanationist position (i.e. as the 
understanding of a particular, i.e. the Western State, sub 
specie aeternitatis). As a result, he concludes, like
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Oakeshott does, that such a position cannot yield normative 
principles.h
Now, even if the transition from neo-Kantian autonomy to 
negative freedom is valid, it seems to me that there is still 
a flaw in the neo-Kantian neutralist argument further down the 
ladder of specification: although the market economy is
convenient for the neo-Kantian as it helps him to model the 
notion of responsibility implicit in autonomy and to reach 
conclusions which are not radically different from the already 
established institutional structure of Western democratic 
societies, it does not derive from the neo-Kantian 
essentialist account. Instead, it is injected into the 
argument in the late stages of specification. Perhaps the 
anti-neutralist claim that the market economy is really non­
neutral (see 6.1) can be taken to mean exactly this; that it 
cannot be derived from the essences on which the higher-order, 
neutral morality is founded without the belated introduction 
of external elements.1
The role of the market in neo-Kantian foundationalism is 
critically examined by Raz who asserts that
[t]he individualistic bias that Rawls is accused
hNot surprisingly, Oakeshott himself regards the Kantian 
noumenal world as the product of explanationist understanding 
and Kant himself as an explanationist philosopher.
•It is interesting to note that the market economy can 
more plausibly be derived from the welfarist's essentialist 
account and perhaps this is why it has never been regarded as 
non-neutral when examined within the context of the welfarist 
position.
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of...is not that he rules out [non-individualistic] 
conceptions but that he is not neutral regarding 
them because he makes their successful pursuit more 
difficult than that of individualistic conceptions 
of the good...The point is valid...If some market 
mechanism...is assumed, the value of primary goods 
is the function of supply and demand where the 
demand is partly determined by the usefulness of the 
goods in the implementation of conceptions of the 
good which are actually pursued in that society and 
by the number of those pursuing different 
conceptions. Relative to any such evaluation of 
primary goods some conceptions of the good will be 
harder to implement, i.e., will require primary 
goods of greater value to realize, than others.13
Raz's main point is that although the market discriminates 
against non-individualist conceptions by treating them as 
"expensive preferences", it is indeed neutral. This
neutrality, however, is less than the neo-Kantian
foundationalist position itself requires. It is a "narrow 
neutrality" in a "comprehensive conflict...which is about the 
ability of people to choose and successfully pursue 
conceptions of the good (and these include ideals of the good 
society or world)".14 How can the foundationalist philosopher 
allow that market forces should interfere with the process of 
autonomous choice-making?
The crux of Raz's argument is that a more comprehensive 
neutrality is required, a neutrality which "...consists in 
helping or hindering the parties [i.e. the adherents of
different conceptions of the good] in equal degree in all
matters relevant to the conflict between them...and not just 
in those activities and regarding those resources that they 
would wish neither to engage in nor to acquire but for the 
conflict."15 This is a neutrality of outcome which as we have
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seen, and as Raz himself acknowledges, is impossible to 
implements
Clearly Raz's argument goes too far. He is not only 
suggesting that the market economy cannot be derived from the 
neo-Kantian essentialist account, but that what does derive 
from it is a neutrality of outcome. As I explained in 6.1, 
where I first examined this argument, this view is mistaken. 
According to the neo-Kantian position, the objects of 
autonomous choices do not have the same status as 
philosophical truth (knowledge of the essences). The idea of 
bringing about a situation in which the outcome of the 
conflict between the differing conceptions of the good is in 
no way determined by the operation of the basic, social 
institutions or by governmental policy stems from an 
essentialist account which is different from the one proffered 
by the neo-Kantian foundationalist. According to the latter, 
the just distribution of primary goods is compatible with all 
conflicting conceptions. Furthermore, a conception of the good 
is not thought to entail a particular list of inflexible rules 
and regulations or to be inextricably linked with a particular 
group or organization. Instead, it is revised and modified 
through individuals' choices. It follows that neither the 
resolution of the conflict between differing conceptions of 
the good nor their preservation in the form of isolated, 
closed communities is required by the foundationalist higher- 
order morality. What is, instead, required is the distribution
jThis is why Raz's argument may also be seen as part of 
the first line of anti-neutralist criticism. (See 7.1).
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of liberty rights and resources which are necessary for 
choosing autonomously between differing conceptions of the 
good. The partisans' activities aimed at attracting 
individuals to their particular conceptions must not violate 
these rights or interfere with the just distribution of 
resources intended to secure the (near) equal worth of 
liberty.k
The second type of criticism levelled against 
foundationalist neutrality is that its essentialist account is 
inaccurate. Arguments of this type do not question the meta- 
theoretical assumptions of foundationalism. They take for 
granted that there is a universal, immutable notion of human 
nature and challenge the neo-Kantian account of it. For 
instance, Raz suggests the neo-Kantian overlooks the fact that 
individuals have the essential second-order desire not to have 
their false desires satisfied.1 Given that individuals choose 
their conceptions of the good on the basis of their desires, 
it follows that they do not themselves expect the state to be 
neutral towards their chosen conceptions. Starting from this 
essentialist assumption, Raz is bound to reach non-neutral 
conclusions.
Any essentialist account that differs from the one 
offered by the neo-Kantian foundationalist is bound to lead to 
a different set of prescriptions. For instance, Robert George
kSee Chapter 3 on the distinction between "equal liberty" 
and the "equal worth of liberty".
JThis point is similar to the one made by Robert George 
(see Chapter 4), according to which "desires are not reasons 
for acting".
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claims that "by grounding civil liberties in true human values 
whose realization those liberties help to protect, promote and 
even make possible," we arrive at a "pluralistic 
perfectionism", a position which helps us distinguish sharply 
between morally good and morally bad conceptions.16
A similar view is put forward by John Finnis, who, like 
George, is an ardent critic of state neutrality. (See 4.2). 
According to Finnis, the "true human values" are knowledge, 
friendship, practical reasonableness, aesthetic experience and 
religion. It is from these essentially human values that he 
derives his index of civil rights and on the basis of which he 
finds the choice of certain conceptions immoral.17 Such an 
elaborate essentialist account is bound to warrant a 
discriminatory conception of justice, one that favours 
particular conceptions of the good at the expense of others.
Let us now turn to the criticisms directed against 
interpretivist state neutrality. First, there are those that 
are levelled against direct interpretivist arguments (or 
against the particular interpretivist findings that are to be 
combined into a constructivist argument) and, second, those 
which question the coherence of constructivist interpretivist 
arguments (suggesting that the interaction between particular 
interpretivist findings does not really yield the principle of 
state neutrality).
An example of the former type of criticism is put forward 
by Galston who claims that Rawls' direct argument 
"...misrepresents what is in fact our shared cultural
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understanding of personality..."18 and argues that members of 
Western democratic societies share the view that the public 
understanding of moral personality must be reconciled with the 
non-public personality of private aims and attachments.19 This 
amounts to saying that when Rawls talks about the distinction 
between the political conception of justice and the non­
political conceptions of the good as being commonly 
acknowledged among the members of Western democracies, he 
mistakes what is commonly understood as an aberration for a 
widely shared normative principle.
A criticism of interpretivist neutrality of the second 
type, i.e. an argument that questions the way in which the 
interpretivist findings are put together into a constructivist 
position could be directed against the Rawlsian constructivist 
position. (See 5.2). But having been criticized from every 
other possible angle Rawls has been spared from this kind of 
criticism.”1
The conclusion that should be drawn from this discussion 
is that anti-neutralism, like state neutrality itself, is not 
a single, coherent position. Directing against neutrality as 
many disparate arguments as possible does not make for a 
coherent philosophical position. And yet anti-neutralists have
“In fact the only such argument that can be found in the 
literature is Barry's recent criticism of Larmore's neutralist 
position. Barry asserts that the desire for civil peace, and 
the feelings of sympathy and mutual respect held together do 
not lead to the adoption of the principle of neutrality 
(Justice as Impartiality, pp. 173-177). However, as I argued 
in 6.3, whether Larmore's argument is interpretivist, whether, 
that is, he believes these three elements to be prevalent in 
democratic societies, is debatable.
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been doing exactly that. Galston, who focuses his attack on 
Rawls as the main exponent of state neutrality, criticizes him 
for being a sceptic,20 for being a foundationalist ,21 for 
being an interpretivist and, therefore, a relativist,22 for 
putting forward the wrong essentialist account,23 for giving 
a wrong interpretation of American public culture,24 for 
putting forward an unacceptable position (a position that is 
certain to be rejected by large minorities),25 and for seeking 
to achieve agreement rather than explore the implications of 
philosophical truth.26 Galston cannot possibly be thinking 
that his is a critique of a single, coherent philosophical 
position. For him state neutrality is no longer a 
philosophical position; it is an enemy side that is prepared 
to use all kinds of arguments to promote the idea of a neutral 
state. This proves that the neutrality debate has to a great 
extent ceased to be a philosophical discourse and has been 
thoroughly politicized. And, needless to say, putting meta- 
theoretical constraints on political arguments is a rather 
foolish idea.
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Part IV: The Non-Normative Position
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CHAPTER 8
Neutrality and the Oakeshottian Civitas
The kind of state constraint position whose authorship, as I 
will now argue, belongs to Michael Oakeshott is remote from 
the battleground of the on-going Neutrality Debate. The reason 
for the "remoteness" of this position is its meta-theoretical 
background and, more specifically, the fact that it is non- 
normative, i.e. that it does not set moral/political 
principles or prescribe the establishment of a particular 
institutional arrangement. My starting-point will, therefore, 
be a brief review of the Oakeshottian view of political 
philosophizing, a view which I have already referred to as 
explanationism.
8.1 Philosophizing About Philosophy and Philosophizing
About Politics
In Oakeshott's view philosophy starts with the exploration of 
the conditionality of those abstractions, or "ideal 
characters", which have been invented to provide fixed points 
of reference, unquestionable criteria— the "embraces of 
abstraction"— facilitating our everyday lives. To question the 
conditionality of an ideal character is to elucidate and 
examine its postulates, or essences, and in their light 
explain why it has a certain character. A further
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investigation into the postulates of the original postulates 
leads to an unconditional and definitive understanding, to the 
creation of a self-sufficient world of ideas, an absolute 
coherence, a concrete whole that is implied in all 
experiences. In Experience and Its Modes "philosophy" (along 
with "history", "science" and "poetry") is itself an ideal 
character to be understood "philosophically" whereas in On 
Human Conduct the ideal character is "the Western state".
My main assumption here is that for Oakeshott political 
philosophy is the understanding of "the Western state" as a 
complete and self-sufficient world of ideas. This involves 
identifying and examining its postulates. His view of 
political philosophy is, therefore, essentialist, in the sense 
that it seeks to identify the essences, i.e. the 
distinguishing characteristics of a given ideal character. It 
is also particularist, in the sense that it seeks to 
understand philosophically a particular political tradition, 
and non-normative since, for Oakeshott, philosophical 
understanding is thought to start where practical, or 
conventional, understanding ends. This kind of investigation 
is bound to lead "so far aside from the ways of ordinary 
thought"1 that its findings will have no bearing on the lives 
and ways of the members of Western societies. They will be 
irreducible to moral or political prescriptions.
To use the Platonic Story of the Cave, after he makes his 
escape the philosopher contemplates the realities of the cave 
away from it and never returns. Oakeshott himself uses the 
allegory of the cave in order to illustrate his position but
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claims that his philosopher does return to the cave to give an 
interesting account of what he has found without setting 
principles or advising that changes should be made in the 
understanding of the goings-on in the cave or in its 
institutional arrangements. In Oakeshott's own words, the 
philosopher "...who now reluctantly returns to the cave from 
this greatest of all intellectual adventures carries with him 
an unconditional understanding of the world in terms of its 
ultimate postulates.. . Thus [he] returns not with something 
useful in his pocket,...but with a gift of inestimable value 
to mankind."2 Oakeshott goes on to say that if the returning 
philosopher were to tell the denizens of the cave that "in 
virtue of his more profound understanding of the nature of 
horses, he is a more expert horseman, horse-chandler, or 
stable boy than they (in their ignorance) can ever hope to be, 
and when it becomes clear that his new learning has lost him 
the ability to tell one end of a horse from the other..." he 
would appear rather foolish. "And if, in taking part in legal 
proceedings...he were to brush on one side the cave-understood 
conditionality of 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth' and were to insist that matters should be delayed 
while the question What is truth? was explored, or if he were 
to lecture judge and jury about the postulates of justice, 
those concerned might be expected to become a trifle 
restless."3 Oakeshott does not mention the fact that there are 
always those who mistake the philosopher's words for 
prescriptive statements (after all Oakeshott himself is no 
exception), and who take interest in his position only insofar
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as it can be shown to have normative implications. For this 
reason I believe it is more suitable to liken the 
explanationist philosopher's engagement to a permanent escape. 
After all, his performance before an audience of inmates, i.e. 
the relation of his intellectual adventures, however 
interesting or original or entertaining it may be, has no 
bearing on his engagement as a philosopher. All his 
philosophical work, the unconditional understanding of the 
goings-on of the cave, is necessarily done in the barren, 
empty world (devoid of any identifiable goings-on) that 
surrounds the cave.
The fact that Oakeshott talks of the return of the 
philosopher does not, of course, mean that he is not conscious 
of the non-normative character of his philosophy, that he, 
somehow, leaves it open to the chained inmates to interpret 
the philosopher's exposition as a normative statement. He is 
concerned about presenting his work as a non-normative 
position and for this reason he avoids using as postulates 
terms which signify desirable states of affairs or 
intrinsically valuable objectives. Instead, he replaces them 
with the Latin equivalents which are meant to be purely 
explanatory. "State", therefore, becomes "civitas", "citizen" 
is replaced with "cive", "public concern" is turned into 
"respublica" and "law" is substituted for "lex".
Given Oakeshott's rather specific, explanationist 
conception of political philosophizing (as the questioning of 
the conditionality of "the Western European state") one could 
say that he engages in political philosophizing only in the
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second essay of On Human Conduct. titled "On the Civil 
Condition". It is there that Oakeshott identifies and 
investigates the postulates of the European state understood 
as a complete, self-sufficient world of interrelated ideas. In 
the present chapter I will mainly focus on this particular 
exposition and argue that "neutrality" or "state constraint" 
is actually a postulate of the Oakeshottian Civitas.
The idea of state neutrality was known to Oakeshott at 
the time of the writing of On Human Conduct and he evidently 
thought it deserved a mention in his discussion of the 
postulates of civitas. As he puts it in "On the Civil 
Condition", "...the so-called neutrality of civil
prescriptions is a half-truth..."4 A "half-truth" is, 
presumably, not good enough to be a postulate of civitas. but 
what exactly is it? Before I give my interpretation of this 
rather odd statement on state neutrality, I will argue against 
the view that Oakeshott's is a foundationalist philosophy and, 
at the same time, reconstruct the context within which his 
statement on neutrality is made.
8.2 Oakeshott as Foundationalist
The starting-point of "On the Civil Condition" is the view 
that the idea of civitas postulates a certain mode of 
association between personae, namely "the Civil Association" 
which is a "moral association", i.e. an association in terms 
of a practice governed by non-instrumental rules. This is 
distinguished from two other modes of association, "enterprise 
association" and "prudential association". The former is a
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relation in terms of the common pursuit of a substantive 
satisfaction or the achievement of a common purpose. Oakeshott 
mentions three main characteristics of this mode of 
association: First, it is voluntary. The associates have the 
option of quitting once they no longer share the same purpose 
or doubt the usefulness of the practice for the achievement of 
the common purpose.
Second, it is not an association of equals.5 To 
understand this point one has only to consider the case of any 
one enterprise association: the members of the staff of a
public hospital share the same purpose, namely the restoration 
of all patients to their health. For that purpose, a certain 
hierarchy based on expertise and experience is considered a 
necessary arrangement. The hospital cannot be run without the 
assignment of specific roles, some of which are more important 
than others. The contribution of physicians, paramedics and 
attendants to the pursuit of the common purpose is not the 
same and it is for this reason that they cannot be considered 
as equals. This sense of inequity is clearly related with 
"responsibility" which in enterprise association measures 
one's contribution to the common purpose, or the others' 
expectations of one's contribution.
Third, enterprise association is association in terms of 
the management of its pursuit. Its codes and regulations are 
instrumental to its purpose and can, therefore, be questioned 
on grounds of efficacy.6
The second mode of association to be contrasted with 
civil association, what Oakeshott calls "prudential
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association", corresponds to the Hegelian Burgerliche 
Gesellschaft and is postulated of the economy: Personae
"...related to one another in continuous transaction of... 
their multifarious, different, ever-changing individual wants 
and associated in terms of a manifold of practices each 
composed of rules and rule-like prescriptions purporting to 
comprise convenient procedures for conducting the transaction 
entailed."7 Association in terms of practices aiming at the 
achievement or protection of social peace is also prudential. 
The main point Oakeshott makes in connection with this mode of 
association is that, unlike the other two, it cannot be 
understood as a self-sufficient, complete world of ideas, or 
to put it differently, it cannot be understood 
philosophically. The reason for this is that it is composed of 
"...considerations to be subscribed to in choosing wants to 
satisfy and in performing actions to satisfy them."8 Such 
considerations belong only to the practical mode of 
experience.
So "prudential association" cannot be a postulate of 
civitas because it contravenes the autonomous, self-sufficient 
character which civitas has sub specie aeternitatis. To put it 
differently, philosophical understanding of civitas cannot be 
understanding of it as a prudential association because that 
would not be an understanding independent of the 
conditionality of practice. But why does Oakeshott also reject 
"enterprise association" as a suitable postulate for civitas? 
Why does he claim that philosophical understanding of the 
state is understanding of it as a "moral association"?
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According to the foundationalist reading of Oakeshott's 
position, the answer to the question lies in the first essay 
of On Human Conduct, titled "On the Theoretical Understanding 
of Human Conduct". The ideal character under investigation in 
that essay is not "the Western state" but "human conduct". 
Strictly speaking Oakeshott is not engaged in political 
philosophizing (as he himself defines it) but has climbed 
further up the ladder of condition-less understanding. The 
postulates here are "capacity for free agency", "reflective 
consciousness", "deliberation", "practice" and "morality". 
Starting with the first one of these, Oakeshott claims that 
human conduct is free in the sense that it is an expression or 
exhibition of intelligence.9 This means not that human conduct 
is reflective, self-conscious or rational, but that it 
involves understanding and that it must, ultimately, be 
learned. No aspect of human conduct, that is, no understood 
situation, response to a situation or satisfaction obtained 
from others' responses, escapes this minimal condition of 
understanding or intelligibility. An agent's understanding of 
a situation is not a mere "feeling" or "organic tension" but 
an objective conclusion, arrived at through deliberation, open 
to examination both to the agent himself and to others. The 
agent's response is neither caused by nor deducible from the 
understood (un)acceptability of a situation. It is a "genuine 
answer" which has to be chosen by the agent himself. The 
latter is free precisely because his response, like the 
situation itself, is the outcome of an intelligent engagement. 
Not surprisingly, according to Oakeshott, satisfaction is also
285
an understood condition and not merely a "natural" enjoyment 
or what is commonly meant by "happiness".
Now, of all the transactional relationships between 
individuals there are some which are "practices", i.e. durable 
relationships specifying "procedural" or "adverbial"
conditions to be subscribed to in acting. For Oakeshott, a 
practice
. . . does not impose upon an agent demands that he 
shall think certain thoughts, entertain certain 
sentiments, or make certain substantive utterances. 
It comes to him as various invitations to 
understand, to choose and to respond. It is composed 
of conventions and rules of speech, a vocabulary and 
a syntax, and it is continuously invented by those 
who speak it and using it is adding to its 
resources. It is an instrument to be played upon, 
not a tune to be played. Learning to speak it is 
learning to enjoy and to explore a certain 
relationship with other agents. The requirements of 
justice are not obeyed or disobeyed; they are 
subscribed to or not subscribed to. What Bagehot 
called 'coarse, causal, comprehensive usage' is a 
condition unknown to reflective consciousness;... 
Further a practice cannot itself be 'performed'. 
Purely regularian conduct (that is, conduct whose 
imagined and wished for outcome is solely that a 
procedure shall have been observed) is impossible: 
to make a grammatically faultless utterance is to 
say something...10
According to Oakeshott, there are two kinds of practices: 
"prudential practices" and "moral practices". The former are 
devices "for promoting the satisfaction of the wants of 
individual agents", whereas the latter are only instruments of 
understanding and media of intercourse. Quite obviously these 
two kinds of practices correspond to two (Of the three modes of 
association discussed in "On the Civil Corndition": "prudential 
association" and "civil association". Muich of what Oakeshott
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says in connection with moral practices (or "moralities") in 
the first essay of On Human Conduct is restated in connection 
with one such practice, namely civitas. in the second essay of 
the book. The connection, therefore, between his political 
philosophy and his philosophical understanding of "human 
conduct" is the concept of "the moral practice" and of
"association in terms of a moral practice". Of course, the two
projects are not quite distinct from one another but the way
they are related is not quite clear. My view is that if the
philosophical understanding of "human conduct" is used in 
order to provide an answer to the question about whether the 
Western state is a moral or an enterprise association, then it 
is used as a foundation and is, therefore, at odds with 
Oakeshott's meta-theory.
As has been mentioned, Oakeshott holds that philosophy 
questions the conditionality of the various abstractions 
invented to facilitate the lives of those who understand the 
world in the practical mode. Questioning the conditionality of 
these abstractions means identifying and exploring their 
postulates or essences. The postulates can of course be 
understood in terms of their own postulates and the ascent of 
the ladder of philosophical investigation leads the 
philosopher to the highest metaphysical stage where, as Bikhu 
Parekh puts it, "[he] is only concerned with the general and 
permanent features of the totality of experience, and specific 
goings-on are no longer visible to him."11 This means that 
political philosophy (the understanding of the Western state 
in terms of its postulates) is one particular stage of
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philosophical understanding. It is "an inherently precarious 
and fragile form of inquiry. The more philosophical it becomes 
the further it moves away from politics.1,12 If, in other 
words, the philosopher keeps questioning the postulates of 
civitas, he ceases to be engaged in political philosophizing 
and is carried "far out of sight" of civil society. Oakeshott 
himself is fully conscious of this point and in the first 
essay of On Human Conduct issues a warning to the political 
philosopher that he must forswear metaphysics and accept the 
"intermediate" nature of his enterprise.13 This enterprise is 
the discovery and exploration of particularist, as opposed to 
universal, essences which explain the Western state as a 
homogeneous, self-contained world of ideas. Any conclusions 
that may be drawn from this enterprise cannot, of course, be 
prescriptive because none of the actual Western states is or 
can ever be autonomous and self-contained (i.e. independent of 
the economy or the pursuit of common purposes).
Now one could argue that the fact that in the first essay 
of On Human Conduct Oakeshott moves away from political 
philosophy in pursuit of universal essences causes him to lose 
sight of civitas. But this is not the accusation levelled at 
Oakeshott. The problem is not that he overshoots civitas, but 
that his philosophical findings are used to provide the answer 
to the question of whether "enterprise association" is a 
postulate of civitas. The point, therefore, is not that 
Oakeshott's "more philosophical" enterprise obscures his 
philosophical understanding of the Western state, but that he 
uses his higher philosophy as the foundation for arbitrating
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between two rival philosophical understandings of civitas. And 
once this descent from philosophy to political philosophy is 
allowed, there is no reason why a further descent to the 
practical mode and to the formulation of moral/political 
prescriptions is not permissible. The implication is that 
Oakeshott fails to deliver a truly explanationist political 
philosophy.
The foundationalist reading and the ensuing critique of 
Oakeshott's position should not be taken lightly. The use of 
foundationalist language, both by Oakeshott himself and by his 
exponents, gives them some credibility. Oakeshott states that 
"civil association" is the proper postulate of civitas because 
"there is nothing in [it] to threaten the link between belief 
and conduct which constitutes 'free' agency."14 In the same 
vein, Paul Franco, a self-proclaimed Oakeshottian, avers that 
civitas can only be understood as civil association because 
"to make enterprise association compulsory would be to deprive 
an agent of 'that freedom' or 'autonomy' which is inherent in 
agency... A state is a compulsory association. As such it 
cannot be an enterprise association without compromising the 
moral autonomy of its members."15 Thus stated, Oakeshott's 
argument is a quintessential foundationalist argument, 
identical in its structure with the arguments of Chapter 3. It 
is Oakeshott's foundations, his essentialist account, that 
tell us which conception of the state (and ultimately which 
institutional arrangement) is "threatening" or "compromising" 
and which is not.
In the light of these points the very structure of On
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Human Conduct, with the philosophical understanding of "human 
conduct" and "human agency" preceding, rather than following, 
the decidedly less philosophical enterprise of understanding 
"the Western state" in terms of its postulates, seems to 
strengthen the case for a foundationalist interpretation of On 
Human Conduct. After all, this interpretation of the book 
seems to be the only one that can bind all three essays 
together and explain the rather idiosyncratic attack on 
universitas (i.e. the recorded understandings of the Western 
state as an "enterprise association") carried out in the last 
essay.
In my view, the foundationalist reading may be an 
interesting reflection on Oakeshott's (non-philosophical) 
intentions in writing On Human Conduct (I believe that he 
tacitly encourages the foundationalist reading of his work 
leading to the prescription of his preferred institutional 
arrangement while, at the same time, maintaining the aloofness 
and respectability of the explanationist philosopher), but it 
is a misinterpretation of the philosophical argument as that 
appears in the book. The isolated foundationalist phrases, 
the order in which the essays appear and the rather 
Nietzschean attack on universitas in the last essay, are 
strong indications that Oakeshott is partial to a particular 
political agenda (and perhaps to a particular institutional 
arrangement) and that he wants his audience to know. 
Nevertheless, this does not interfere with or undermine his 
philosophical argument which remains strictly explanationist. 
More specifically, Oakeshott's claim that "enterprise
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association" is not a postulate of civitas does not rest on 
the findings of "On the Theoretical Understanding of Human 
Conduct". Rather, the argument is that since enterprise 
association is voluntary in character, in the sense that 
people choose to be associated in this way and given that they 
do not choose to be cives. i.e. that civitas is necessarily a 
compulsory association, the idea of a "compulsory enterprise 
association is a self-contradiction.1,16
Although this is the main official argument offered by 
Oakeshott there are two secondary ones which are also non- 
foundationalist in character. The first one holds that if 
civitas postulated enterprise association, it would not be an 
association of equals for its citizens would have different 
degrees of responsibility and, therefore, different degrees of 
importance and different rights and responsibilities. 
According to the second, if civitas had a common purpose, it 
would be intolerant towards individuals adhering to purposes 
other than its own. In Oakeshott's words, "it is not easy to 
rebut the view that the logic of the state thus constituted 
assigns to the office of its government the authority to 
exterminate associates whose continued existence is judged to 
be irredeemably prejudicial to the pursuit of its purpose."17 
In both of these arguments the point is not that the state qua 
enterprise association would compromise what is essentially 
human (e.g. equality or diversity), but that it is not in any 
way connected with the lower-order (or less philosophical) 
postulates of civitas, namely cives, lex. respublica etc.. It 
is these postulates that the explanationist sets out first.
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Then comes "civil association" and then its postulate idea of 
"moral association" which is contrasted with "enterprise 
association" (according to the explanationist "technique" of 
contrasting philosophical conceptions in order to explain 
their homogeneous, self-contained nature). So the question of 
whether civitas postulates enterprise association or moral 
association is a pseudo-dilemma. The answer is already known 
since "civil association" is an already identified postulate: 
it is a compulsory association of equals.
Once the conceptions of "moral" and "enterprise 
association" have been set out, any further, more complete, 
philosophical understanding involves moving to higher 
metaphysical planes in pursuit of the series of postulates 
which Oakeshott introduces at the outset of On Human Conduct. 
Thus, we come to the ideas of practice, morality, "reflective 
consciousness" and "free agency" which appear to be 
foundations, but are actually implications of our 
understanding of the Western state as an autonomous, self- 
sufficient world of ideas (namely the lower-order, latinized 
postulates). Such a world, needless to say, differs from the 
one the citizens of Western European countries live in or can 
ever hope to bring about.
It is, therefore, to the cluster of lower-order 
postulates that I will now turn to in order to examine 
Oakeshott's position on state neutrality and argue that it can 
be seen as the missing postulate.
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8.3 State Neutrality: The Missing Postulate?
Citizens of Western states, the Oakeshottian cives. are not 
enterprisers or joint enterprisers, but are related solely in 
terms of their common recognition of particular rules, rules 
which prescribe common responsibilities (and corresponding 
rights) and in terms of which they set aside all that 
differentiates them and recognize themselves as formal 
equals.18 Setting aside those things and roles which make them 
different or unequal (i.e. the pursuit of particular 
objectives and their part in joint enterprises) does not mean 
renouncing or forswearing them for ever. It means that it is 
only as cives that they are equals and related solely in terms 
of rules.
These rules, the Oakeshottian lex, comprise a "system", 
rather than "a mere collection of rules", and relate to "the 
miscellaneous, unforeseeable choices and transactions" of 
individuals who are not joined in a common purpose, who may be 
complete strangers to one another, whose preferences may be as 
various as themselves and who may lack any moral allegiance to 
one another except from the one they feel qua cives.19 Lex is 
a system of rules in the sense that it is self-contained 
(since it "relates those who are not, as such, otherwise 
related") and that there is a relationship between its 
prescriptions.
Of course, lex prescribes a set of abstract 
considerations whose relation to contingent situations must be 
known to and understood by cives if they are to be related as 
such. What must, therefore, be known and understood is
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"...what will count as an adequate or acceptable subscription 
[to lex! in a contingent situation11.20 What is required in 
cases of uncertainty about the relation between general 
considerations and contingent situations is a process of 
adjudication, of determination of the meaning of lex, 
authorized in the system of lex itself.
Oakeshott makes clear that adjudication is not a 
bargaining process between litigants, a process whose outcome 
reflects the relative advantage of either one of them. More 
importantly, he avers that the resolution of any uncertainty, 
which is really an interpretation of lex, cannot be
in terms of a so-called 'social policy' or the 
common purpose of interest of an association: here, 
there is no such common purpose. The meaning of lex 
lies in the considerations it prescribes and in 
prescribing conditions lex cannot prescribe an 
imagined and wished-for outcome in human conduct.
And if the procedure invokes a general moral 
consideration it must be in respect of its 
antecedent recognition in lex and in terms of that 
recognition.21
What is emphasized here is the non-instrumental character of 
lex which is fully congruent with the claim that individuals 
qua cives are equals and that they are, therefore, regarded as 
independent of any individual or joint purposes have set out 
to achieve. The terms in which cives are related (i.e. lex) 
cannot be determined or illuminated by the imagined or wished- 
for states of affairs inherent in their chosen purposes since 
these purposes are not set by them qua cives.
This point is reiterated throughout "On the Civil 
Condition". Oakeshott extends the meaning of the postulate of
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lex, by adding to it the twin concepts of "civil obligation" 
and "civil authority", and calls it respublica, "the public 
concern or consideration of cives".22 He identifies this more 
complete postulate of civitas in order to emphasize that 
cives are related "in terms of the recognition of rules as 
rules" (rather than as means to the achievement of a 
particular purpose or as prescriptions of rationality or 
wisdom).
For Oakeshott authority is attributed to respublica "not 
in virtue of what can exist or be achieved only in the 
recognition of its authority" (e.g. formality, security or 
social stability), nor because it is recognized to have some 
valuable quality or attribute (e.g. being identified with a 
majority of cives or with a so-called "general will") ,23 Nor 
does this authority stem from the "identification of 
rrespublica'si prescriptions with a current 'social purpose', 
with approved moral ideas, with a common good or general 
interest, or a 'justice' other than that which is inherent in 
respublica" or from its prescriptions' purported access to 
'scientific' information about the tendencies of human action 
or about 'laws of historical development'.24 In other words, 
the authority of respublica is not justified in terms of some 
conception of the good, be that a moral principle, a 
scientific theory, a foundationalist position, an independent 
notion of justice, a social cause or a widely acceptable 
social arrangement, but in its own terms. In Oakeshott's own 
words,
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...the attribution of authority to respublica and 
the postulate of the evidential procedure in which 
the validity of its items may be determined, are 
nothing other than the acknowledgement of respublica 
as a system of moral (not instrumental) rules.25
To put it in the language of Chapter 6, Oakeshott talks of a 
neutrality of justification which, however, is non-normative 
in character. It is often the case that in Western societies 
the authority of the legal system is often justified in terms 
of a conception of the good (for instance, judges often claim 
that their ruling intends to set the right example for
youngsters or to enhance family values). Oakeshott does not
imply that this violates a principle implicit in social 
practices or that it compromises our essentially human
character. Instead, he means to say that if the phenomenon 
that is the Western state is to be understood philosophically, 
i.e. in terms of its essential characteristics, the authority 
of its laws should not be thought to emanate from any 
conception of the good.
It is, of course, the case that the neutrality of civitas 
is also a "neutrality of aim", in the sense that, when 
understood philosophically the Western state does not exist in 
order to achieve some conception of the good or, in
Oakeshott's parlance, a "substantive purpose". To understand 
this point it is important to examine yet another of the 
postulates of civitas, namely "legislation", or "the enactment 
of lex", and the related concept of "politics".8
aIt should be emphasized that Oakeshott's definition of 
"politics" (On Human Conduct, pp. 161-163) is different from 
the one I offered in Chapter 2 and which I take to be
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For Oakeshott "the enactment of lex" is a distinct 
postulate of civitas because it relates to the desirability of 
lex rather than to its authority. A new law is enacted and 
appended to respublica and an already existing one is altered 
or replaced, because this is regarded as desirable in a very 
specific sense.
First of all, the enactment of law involves an engagement 
which is deliberative and persuasive in character rather than 
demonstrative.26 This means that proposed laws cannot be 
proven to be desirable to cives; their desirability is always 
questionable and has to be argued about. Arguments and actions 
intended to persuade that proposed laws are desirable 
constitute what Oakeshott calls "politics". In Oakeshott's own 
words, politics "...is holding up to inspection in terms of 
approval or disapproval some item, large or small, of 
respublica. considering more desirable alternatives to it, and 
recommending and promoting the change from what is, to the 
alleged more desirable condition."27 Civil rulers and more 
specifically legislators who enact new laws do not protect or 
promote powerful or preferred interests but take part in 
politics in order to persuade others about the desirability of 
their proposals. And in order to be "...recognizably 
'political', a proposal together with the reasons for it must 
relate to a possible condition of respublica and to nothing 
else."28 This necessarily means that certain kinds of 
arguments are excluded from political discourse. No 
substantive purposes, prudential considerations, personal or
independent of all three views of political philosophizing.
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group interest are offered as the reasons for enacting new 
laws or changing those already in place since all of these 
things are external to respublica. And to reiterate 
Oakeshott's main point, only respublica provides the terms in 
which individuals qua cives are related to each other. Reasons 
external to respublica are often offered for the enactment of 
new legislation in Western societies and in Oakeshott's view 
such reasons are simply non-political.
Oakeshott offers a detailed list of the reasons and 
proposals that are external to, or rather, incompatible with 
respublica. The list includes "benevolent plans for the 
general betterment of mankind, for diminishing the discrepancy 
between wants and satisfactions or for moral 
improvement,...proposals for awards of benefit or advantage to 
ascertainable individual or corporate interests claimed on 
account of the merit, the bargaining power or any other 
alleged property of such interests,...proposals to prescribe 
as a rule that a certain opinion, theorem, purported statement 
of fact, doctrine, creed, dogma, or the like to be believed to 
be morally right or wrong or be believed to be organically 
beneficial or harmful to human beings...."29 It is quite clear 
that in this list Oakeshott includes not only what the 
foundationalist neutralist regards as "conceptions of the 
good" (including all the different foundationalisms) or 
contingent, institutionally irrelevant considerations, but 
neo-Kantian foundationalism itself which is given no special 
status among other foundationalist positions.
What Oakeshott also includes in the list of inadmissible
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reasons for proposing new laws is what the neo-Kantian 
foundationalist regards as the bases for the "acceptability" 
or "desirability" of the neo-Kantian prescriptions (i.e. the 
personal or group interests within a particular society). It 
would be recalled that the foundationalist (like the 
interpretivist) thinks of the desirability of his view as 
irrelevant to his argument. He thinks of it as a political 
rather than as a philosophical consideration. In other words, 
it is for the politicians to popularise the neo-Kantian 
position, to persuade others to accept it and to establish the 
prescribed institutional structure. In Oakeshott's view, the 
kind of desirability deemed irrelevant by the foundationalist 
is indeed unconnected with the philosophical understanding of 
civitas. Nevertheless, a particular sense of "desirability" is 
very relevant to the explanationist view. This Oakeshott calls 
"civil desirability". It is desirability in terms of
a common concern that the pursuit of all purposes 
and the promotion of all interests, the satisfaction 
of all wants and the propagation of all beliefs 
shall be in subscription to conditions formulated in 
rules indifferent to the merits of any interest or 
to the truth or error of any belief and consequently 
not itself a substantive interest or doctrine.30
Oakeshott is keen to emphasize that the civil desirability of 
a proposed piece of legislation cannot be demonstrated or 
proven, as most interpretivists seem to suggest (see Section 
IV) , but has to be argued about. And, to reiterate the crux of 
the explanationist view of the Western state, all arguments 
offered must be uttered in the language of respublica. The
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latter could be called "neutral" precisely because it relates 
to a concern which "is not itself a substantive interest or 
doctrine", or, to use the terminology of the previous 
chapters, to a concern which is not a conception of the good.
For Oakeshott the Western state, so understood, could be 
characterised as a "mode of association" between individuals, 
a mode which he calls "the civil association". This is a 
higher-order (more philosophical) postulate leading, as has 
been explained, to a chain of even more philosophical concepts 
like "moral association", "enterprise association", 
"prudential association", "moral agency", "freedom", 
"reflective consciousness" etc.. But why does not Oakeshott 
ever use "neutrality" as a postulate, a concept which seems to 
be a suitable characterization for a mode of association which 
has no set purpose or direction and whose authority is not 
justified in terms of any conception of the good? As we have 
seen, this is because he thinks of state neutrality as a half- 
truth. It is now time to examine what he means by that.
Oakeshott's complete statement on neutrality reads as 
follows:
Civility...denotes an order of moral (not 
instrumental) considerations, and the so-called 
moral neutrality of civil prescriptions is a half- 
truth which needs to be supplemented by the 
recognition of civil association as itself a moral 
and not a prudential condition. Civil relationship 
is certainly a fiduciary relationship in which 
faithfulness is not a device for promoting the 
satisfaction of substantive wants; but it is not the 
faithfulness of friends. This does not mean that 
civil desirabilities are unconnected with more 
intimate moral relationships; it means only that 
what is civilly desirable cannot be inferred or 
otherwise derived from general moral desirabilities,
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that it is not necessarily the sign of something 
amiss if they are not found to be pulling in the 
same direction or even to conflict with such 
desirabilities, and that political deliberation and 
utterance (concerned with civil desirabilities) is 
concerned with moral desirabilities of its own.31
Oakeshott clearly thinks that "neutrality" seems to imply that 
the Western state is a prudential association, that is, 
association satisfies the associates' multifarious wants or 
at the achievement of social peace. And, as was mentioned in 
the previous section, understanding the state as a prudential 
condition is understanding it in non-philosophical (i.e. in 
non-explanationist) terms. Unless neutrality is "supplemented 
by the recognition of civil association as moral and not 
prudential condition" it will remain a "half-truth" in the 
sense that it will only belong to the practical mode of 
understanding which can never grasp its subject (in this case 
the state) sub specie aeternitatis.
By saying that when state neutrality is identified with 
the pursuit of social peace or with the satisfaction of all 
individuals' wants is a-moral, Oakeshott does not mean to 
refute those philosophers (like Rawls) who, as we saw in the 
last chapter, claim that there can be no neutral (a-moral) 
values. What he means to say is that prudential considerations 
do not fit into the philosophical (explanationist) 
understanding of the moral, since they compromise the 
autonomous, self-sufficient character of the philosopher's 
subject.
Now, one could argue that Oakeshott's point is redundant 
since, as we saw in the previous chapters, state neutrality is
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not connected with prudential considerations, but with a 
foundationalist morality, a set of interrelated moral 
principles stemming from what is essentially human. After all, 
the satisfaction of all individuals' wants (what in the 
previous chapter was presented under the heading of 
"welfarism") can itself be seen as a foundationalist position 
(based on the assumption that having one's wants satisfied is 
an essentially human experience). Oakeshott's answer to this 
is quite straightforward: a foundationalist position is not a 
"morality" because the latter, unlike the former, cannot (in 
the explanationist view) be deduced from universal essences15 
or from first principles, but is a live tradition, a language 
which can be learned and subscribed to by the individual in 
his pursuit of whatever ends. The difference, therefore, is 
meta-theoretical. What is initially known to the 
explanationist is not the essential human character perceived 
as a whole from which particulars can be deduced, but a 
tangent reality, a tradition which is to be understood as a 
world of interrelated ideas forming a homogeneous, self- 
sufficient whole.
It seems, therefore, that Oakeshott has not one but two 
reasons for avoiding using "neutrality": The term is used both 
by those who think of the state as a prudential arrangement 
(and this, as we saw in Chapter 6 and as Oakeshott himself 
makes clear, involves having a non-philosophical outlook), and
bOne must always keep in mind that the explanationist too 
is an essentialist. His essences, however, are not universals 
but refer to the particulars which he investigates (e.g. the 
Western state).
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by those who have a view of political philosophizing which is 
different from his own. And he wants to be identified with 
neither of these groups.c As with the substitution of the 
first-order postulates of civitas with their latin 
equivalents, he wants to make clear that the explanationist 
notion of state neutrality is non-normative; that it is 
neither political nor foundationalist.
Oakeshott's point, therefore, is that "neutrality” can 
indeed be regarded as a postulate of civitas. provided that 
the necessary clarifications are made. In this sense, state 
neutrality really is the missing postulate of Oakeshottian 
political philosophy.
Before I close this section I should make a brief comment 
on the suitability of "state constraint" as an Oakeshottian 
postulate. As I explained in Chapter 1, one of the many 
connotations of "neutrality" is constraint. The neutral party 
is constrained from acting in certain ways or pursuing 
particular courses of action in order to maintain its neutral 
status. In Part II, I used "state constraint" as an 
alternative to "state neutrality", an alternative which I 
believe creates fewer of the complications which have fuelled 
the neutrality debate. The question here is whether 
Oakeshottian neutrality as explained above connotes state 
constraint. It could, perhaps, be said that rulers
cIt is of course the case that, in some sense, Oakeshott 
does wish to be "misread" as a foundationalist (see section 
8.2) . He is, however, aware that he should not achieve this by 
tampering with the internal coherence of his philosophy, by 
littering his book with terms which are used by
foundationalist philosophers.
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(e.g.legislators or the judiciary), when acting as such, are 
constrained from favouring preferred or powerful interests or 
from pursuing their own purposes. This, however, does not mean 
that the Western state can be understood as being constrained 
from treating its citizens in a particular way. And this is 
because the explanationist's state is itself the relationship 
between citizens and not an institutional structure whose 
operation affects citizens' lives. In this respect, a citizen 
is not someone who is treated as an essential character, but 
an equal member of the civil association. Drawing the line 
between the state and the citizen cannot but have normative 
implications (like the state constraint principle) and this is 
something that is incompatible with the explanationist task of 
understanding the Western state sub specie aeternitatis. that 
is as an autonomous, self-sufficient whole.
So far my intention has been to explain why Oakeshottian 
neutrality is different from the normative neutralities of the 
previous chapters and why it can be thought to be remote from 
the melee that is the neutrality debate. As I have maintained 
throughout this discussion, dragging Oakeshott into this 
debate is misunderstanding him, failing to grasp the 
difference between the two normative views of political 
philosophizing on the one end (i.e. foundationalism and 
interpretivism) and explanationism on the other. The final 
point of my argumentation will be that, in order to secure 
Oakeshott in his position as a truly non-normativist political 
philosopher, we have to make one very important distinction.
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8.4 The "Pursuit of Intimations", Politics 
and Interpretivism
As we have seen, civitas postulates the idea of "politics" 
understood as a persuasive or argumentative engagement in 
which what is argued is the desirability of proposed laws. 
This desirability is specifically "civil" in that it is not 
derived from or connected with foundationalist positions, 
widely held views and moral principles, joint purposes or 
vested interests. Instead, it relates to the rules of 
respublica. to the public morality which provides the only 
terms of the association of individuals qua cives. In On Human 
Conduct, Oakeshott makes a negative specification of politics 
thus emphasizing its neutral character. According to many 
commentators, a positive, explanationist account of what 
politics is, of what it really involves, is offered in 
Rationalism in Politics.32 It is there that Oakeshott calls 
politics "the pursuit of intimations" or "the pursuit of 
intimated sympathies". In a much cited passage he avers that 
"...the arrangements which constitute a society, whether they 
are customs or institutions or laws or diplomatic decisions, 
are at once coherent and incoherent, they compose a pattern 
and at the same time they intimate a sympathy for what does 
not fully appear. Political activity is the exploration of 
this sympathy; and consequently, relevant political reasoning 
will be the convincing exposure of a sympathy, present but not 
yet followed up, and the convincing demonstration that now is 
the appropriate moment for recognizing it."33
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This view of politics sounds very familiar. It is the 
interpretivist view of political philosophizing, the crux of 
interpretivist meta-theory presented in Chapter 2. Oakeshott 
clearly believes that what the interpretivist understands as 
moral/political philosophizing is not a philosophical 
engagement at all. Rather, it is an altogether different 
concern. This can be easily explained in terms of the Platonic 
Allegory of the Cave. Those who engage in the pursuit of 
intimations are those who remain in the cave, those who are 
left to ponder over and argue about the meanings of the 
particulars of the cave while the (explanationist) philosopher 
is away contemplating the realities of the cave as if the cave 
were an autonomous, self-sufficient world on its own. In 
Chapter 2, I rejected this view, arguing instead, that 
interpretivism and explanationism are two distinct meta- 
theoretical views. The argument there was that the 
interpretivist thinks of the withdrawal from the cave as 
impossible, claiming that we can know of no essences, either 
universalist or particularist. I will now argue that although 
what Oakeshott calls "the pursuit of intimations" and what he 
does in parts of Rationalism in Politics, "Contemporary 
British Politics" and "On the Character of A Western State" is 
interpretivism, what is postulated of civitas is something 
that is significantly different.
My main point is that a distinction must be made between 
three things: First, interpretivism as a distinct meta-theory, 
second, "politics" as we know it and practice it in Western 
societies (i.e. as a language of persuasion which does not
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exclude foundationalist, interpretivist or mixed arguments) 
and, third, "politics" as the postulate of the concept of 
civitas. If these three are understood as one, and I believe 
Oakeshott does exactly that, then explanationism loses its 
non-normative character. This distinction, which I suggest is 
essential for our understanding of Oakeshottian philosophy, is 
closely connected with the issue of state neutrality.
As we saw in Chapter 5, the interpretivist can engage in 
a large-scale investigation, in a hermeneutic project which 
starts with very few, if any, presuppositions. Rawls' later 
philosophy, exemplifies this strand of the interpretivist 
position. In his argument state neutrality is one of those 
implicit meanings, these "intimated sympathies" that he 
discovers and puts forward in a systematic fashion. In fact, 
his task is exactly this: to find those basic principles which 
are implicit in practice or in the existing institutions 
themselves. In order to make morality more coherent he looks 
for fundamental principles and what he finds is a distinctly 
political (public) morality which is not only independent of 
general moral outlooks concerned with the question of the good 
life and of personal excellence, but is thought to occupy a 
particular position in relation to them. Other interpretivists 
reject his position and find that public morality is 
inextricably linked with particular conceptions of the good. 
For Oakeshott it is not only the latter positions that are 
flawed, but the former ones as well. In his view, civitas 
postulates a sort of constrained interpretivism, an 
interpretivism which is necessarily limited in scope. The
307
Walzerian argument in favour of universal suffrage (an 
argument which, according to Walzer, is the epitome of 
interpretivism) is perfectly compatible with Oakeshott's view, 
but the larger scale interpretivist project undertaken by 
Walzer is not.d Furthermore, in Oakeshott's view, the 
interpretivist (or what for him is a "politician") cannot find 
the state non-neutral. In "Contemporary British Politics", as 
in "On the Character of A European State", he criticizes those 
interpretivists who claim that the state is an enterprise 
association. Although he acknowledges that it was the 
experience of World War II that slowly transformed the state 
into a centre of social planning, he refuses to accept that 
this realization is a valid interpretivist argument.34 
Clearly, this is because such arguments conflict with the 
explanationist understanding of the state. But this 
understanding is not normative in character and the imposition 
on "politicians" of philosophical constraints is unacceptable 
in Oakeshottian terms.
In "On the Character of A European State" Oakeshott comes 
close to realizing this. He acknowledges the validity of the
dTo understand this point one needs only to notice the 
kind of "evidence" interpretivists submit with their 
prescriptions. Unlike the suffragettes, who only suggested 
that their proposed principles were implicit in existing 
legislation (since it treated both sexes equally), 
interpretivists look also for principles implicit in society's 
history, language and culture. More importantly, the 
Oakeshottian notion of "contingency" does not coincide with 
that of the interpretivist since it does not allow for sudden, 
drastic changes in the shared understandings and self­
perceptions in the particular society. For the interpretivist, 
it is possible for the members of a democratic society to come 
to understand the state as an enterprise association (as in 
fact they did during and immediately after World War II) .
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interpretivist understanding of the Western state as an
universitas and avers that evidence in support of the view
that the Western state is a non-neutral mode of association is
all around us. He even discovers a type of agent (as Rawls
does in his interpretivist/constructivist argument), the
/
"individual manque" whom he describes as "...intolerant not 
only of superiority but of difference, disposed to allow in 
all others only a replica of himself, and united with his 
fellows in a revulsion of distinctness".35 His dislike for 
this individual is, however, hardly suppressed. With strong, 
almost Nietzschean language he seeks to discredit him and 
distance himself from him. But he cannot do so as a 
philosopher. As an explanationist he cannot prescribe against 
universitas and as an interpretivist he accepts it as a sound 
argument. And yet he strives to find ways to oppose it. As was 
mentioned in section 8.3, encouraging a foundationalist 
reading of On Human Conduct is a way of achieving his desired 
effect. (According to a foundationalist argument the 
"individual manque” does not have the essentially human 
characteristics— as the word "manque" seems to suggest— and 
therefore no prescriptions can be derived from his particular 
characteristics).
The truth of the matter is that the interpretivist has 
much more freedom to investigate a particular society, a 
tradition, than Oakeshott suggests. And this is because 
interpretivism is not a postulate of civitas, but a meta­
theory based on different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. Unlike the Oakeshottian postulate of "politics",
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it is not argumentative in character. It does not seek to 
persuade but to prove. Furthermore, a tradition is not 
presupposed since it is the core of this tradition that is to 
be questioned. It cannot, therefore, impose constraints on the 
kinds of things the interpretivist is to unearth.
Oakeshott's argument could have been coherent if he had 
not been tempted, like so many others, to combine his 
philosophy with a strong political message. Being himself so 
severe on those who mix politics with pleasure (that of 
engaging in explanationist philosophy), makes it hard to 
forgive him. Benjamin Barber's claim that he elevates his 
political agenda "...from an ideological (or psychological) 
preference into theoretical necessity" seems to be quite 
fair.36
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Conclusion
As I first mentioned in Chapter 2, the main categorical 
difference between politics and philosophy is that the former 
seeks to persuade, whereas the latter to prove or 
demonstrate.® All three views of political philosophizing set 
out in this thesis hold that political philosophy is about 
revealing or discovering the philosophical truth. The 
foundationalist derives his normative principles from what he 
knows to be the truth about human nature, the interpretivist 
reveals principles which, he is convinced, are implicit in 
contemporary social practices, and the explanationist offers 
a superior understanding of Western political tradition viewed 
sub specie aeternitatis.
Each one of these views begins with different 
ontological/epistemological assumptions. The foundationalist
“It is important to reiterate the different senses of 
"political" that have been employed in this thesis. First, 
"political" is the argument that seeks to persuade and achieve 
the acceptability of a particular institutional arrangement. 
The combination of foundationalist and interpretivist elements 
into one position is one such argument. Second, "political" 
refers to principles or set of principles which refer to the 
operation of the institutional structure of society. Thus, 
Rawls talks of a specifically "political" conception of 
justice which, as he claims, is distinguishable from the non­
political ones (those that refer to individuals' private 
lives) and which is prevalent in Western democratic societies. 
(See Chapter 5) . Third, "political" refers to a particular 
tradition (i.e. Western democratic tradition), seen as an 
immutable, autonomous whole. (See Chapter 8). A "politician" 
is someone who puts forward "political arguments" and not 
someone who regards "political principles" as dictates of the 
foundations or as elements of endoxa.
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believes that it is possible to get access to knowledge about 
what is essentially human, whereas the explanationist believes 
that what can be known is only what is essential to a 
particular tradition, when that is understood as an immutable, 
self-sufficient world, a world that does not depend on 
anything that is external to it. The interpretivist rejects 
both of these views and claims that since a moral/political 
tradition undergoes continuous changes, and given that these 
changes are contingent, any talk of essences (either universal 
or particular to the tradition) is fatuous. The truth can only 
be known at a certain point in (or, rather, in an undetermined 
period of) time and, therefore, the interpretivist 
philosopher's work never ends. Of course, this does not mean 
that his conclusions are tentative, but only that the truth is 
located in time.
Furthermore, the adherents of the three different meta­
theories are also in disagreement on the question of whether 
philosophical truth has normative implications. The 
foundationalist, like the interpretivist, holds that knowledge 
of the truth necessarily leads to the prescription of 
principles regulating our lives. The interpretivist believes 
this to be so, because the truth for him comes in the form of 
normative principles (or elements of principles which beg to 
be put together— as in Rawlsian constructivism).
The foundationalist, on the other hand, claims that human 
nature can be compromised or frustrated, if certain conditions 
are not present. It is these conditions that he, therefore, 
has to set out in the form of prescriptive principles, whose
314
continuous specification must always be proved to be connected 
with the essentially human attributes.
The explanationist is the only one among the three who 
rejects the view that philosophical knowledge is normative in 
character. His claim is that since the philosopher understands
the world (and more specifically politics) as something that
neither is nor will ever be in an unadulterated form, it 
cannot be prescriptive.
A crucial point which is made explicitly in Chapter 2 is 
that the juggling of all three views of political 
philosophizing is flawed from a meta-theoretical point of 
view, but is common practice among politicians and 
philosophers with political aspirations. Even Oakeshott, whose 
official explanationism makes him impervious to criticism by 
normativists, does, at times, speak the normative idiom only 
to retreat to his explanationist fortress, when in fear of 
being involved into the inconclusive normative arguments.
What is more commonplace is the mixing of interpretivism 
with foundationalism with the purpose of offsetting what in 
politics is construed as an epistemological one-sidedness. The 
idea that all main principles can be derived from a minimalist 
account of what is essentially human, like the idea that no 
essences can ever be known, is hardly persuasive as a
political argument, as an argument which seeks to persuade
non-philosophers that one prescribed institutional arrangement 
(or means of bringing about such an arrangement) is better 
than another. The combination of foundationalism with 
interpretivism gives the former the ability to reach advanced
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levels of specification (which would otherwise fail to reach) 
and the latter to avoid being identified with relativism. But 
to reiterate the main point, this is unacceptable from a meta- 
theoretical point of view.
Now, connecting this tripartite meta-theoretical 
distinction with the issue of state neutrality, helps to trace 
the philosophical arguments that are incorporated into the 
mixed, political arguments offered by neutralists and anti­
neutralists. The foundationalist neutralist finds state 
neutrality to be the only arrangement that respects what is 
essentially human. The interpretivist, on the other hand, 
demonstrates that state neutrality is implicit in Western 
democratic societies and claims that although this may change 
in the future, it can be prescribed as the proper 
institutional arrangement. The explanationist, who like the 
interpretivist focuses on the Western state, avers that 
neutrality is an essential characteristic of the idea of the 
state as an autonomous, immutable world.
All three notions of state neutrality mentioned above 
must, of course, be distinguished from what I have called 
"political neutrality", that is neutrality as an argument or 
a policy whose ultimate goal is to make a particular proposed 
arrangement (foundationalist or interpretivist) acceptable to 
the adherents of differing conceptions of the good. Such an 
argument usually combines both foundationalist and 
interpretivist elements in order to be more persuasive. 
Imposing meta-theoretical constraints on such mixed arguments, 
by stressing that the three meta-theories cannot be combined
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into one coherent position, is exhibiting political naivety. 
On the other hand, it emphasizes the difference between 
philosophy and political discourse by leading to some 
interesting conclusions which, however, the politician will 
find hard to appreciate.
The first conclusion is that state neutrality is not an 
amoral position, or an implication of scepticism or. Instead, 
it is a higher-order conception of the good, a conception that 
is supposed to govern the basic institutional structure of 
society.
Second, the endorsement of interpretivist meta-theory 
does not necessarily lead to the rejection of state 
neutrality. As we saw in 5.1, 5,2 and 6.3, the interpretivist 
can very well prescribe neutrality, if he finds it is 
predominant in the endoxa of the society he investigates. 
Rawls and, to some extent, Barry, Larmore and Ackerman are 
interpretivist neutralists. Rawls' case is, perhaps, the most 
significant from a meta-theoretical point of view, as he seeks 
to construct principles from more elementary interpretivist 
findings. The reasons behind this move are, I believe, 
political. Rawls strives to be more persuasive than the 
average interpretivist by proving the connection between less 
controversial interpretivist, finds and his principle of 
neutrality. But although his motives are political, Rawls' 
constructivist argument is really interpretivist.
Third, the neutralist philosopher need not concern 
himself with criticisms which find his position impracticable, 
unpopular or not genuinely neutral between conceptions of the
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good, since these considerations are not related with the 
philosophical arguments themselves, but with the chances of 
implementing its prescriptions. The foundationalist neutralist 
can be criticized for having the "wrong" essentialist account 
as his point of departure, or for prescribing principles which 
cannot be traced back to his foundations (i.e. for introducing 
external elements during the process of specification). The 
foundationalist arguments discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
5 prescribe the market economy (a prescription which is 
presented as a corollary of state neutrality) without linking 
it sufficiently with their essentialist assumptions.15
The interpretivist neutralist, on the other hand, can be 
criticized for having mistaken the significant elements of 
endoxa and, thus, for having prescribed the "wrong" 
principles. The constructivist interpretivist, in particular, 
can be criticized for drawing the wrong conclusions from his 
construction of interpretivist findings. Furthermore, the 
interpretivist can be criticised for treating the self- 
interested opinions of actual members of the society he 
investigates as interpretivist findings from which he can 
derive principles to govern public life.
In Chapter 1, I argued that "neutrality" is a 
semantically overloaded term, and one which not better suited 
to the politician's purposes rather than to the philosopher's. 
Throughout Part II of this thesis, I replaced it with
bAn exception to this is the welfarist position as this 
is presented by Barry and Raz. There, the essence of being 
human is the experience of having one's wants satisfied and 
the market economy is thought of as a way of spreading this 
satisfaction around in the best possible way.
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"constraint" (an idea which is implicit in a certain sense of 
"neutrality"), in order to show that "neutrality" is a mere 
stage prop which the philosopher does not need to employ. 
There are reasons to believe that most neutralists are of the 
same opinion. Besides Rawls, who says so quite explicitly, 
most neutralists treat "state neutrality" as a technical term, 
whose meaning they feel compelled to clarify. We, thus, have 
terms like "neutrality of justification", "neutrality of 
outcome", "neutrality of opportunity", "neutrality of aim" 
etc.. (See 6.1). In my view, if the philosopher fails to make 
such clarifications, or to discard "neutrality" altogether, he 
runs the risk of being drawn into a political debate. However, 
in view of the fact that the Neutrality Debate is indeed 
highly politicized and that many a political philosopher have 
willingly joined in, this point betrays a certain political 
naivete.
My last point will be on explanationist neutrality which, 
being non-normative, cannot be substituted with "state 
constraint". Oakeshott is not impervious to criticism just 
because he does not prescribe moral/political principles. To 
the extent that he contradicts his own meta-theory (by using 
foundationalist language or by trying to impose constraints on 
interpretivist philosophy) his argument is flawed. His 
conception of state neutrality is, however, presented with 
great care in On Human Conduct so as not to be mistaken for a 
normative principle. For this reason it can be regarded as a 
truly explanationist conception. Of course this does not mean 
that it cannot be drawn into a political discourse by those
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who speak only the language of persuasion. As for those who, 
like myself, find the notion of state neutrality intuitively 
appealing or interesting, but decide that for some reason (any 
of the reasons mentioned above) it cannot take the form of a 
normative principle, they may find it easier to accept it as 
the main feature of civitas, of the state understood as a 
world that has never and will never exist in an unadulterated 
form.
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